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Abstract
An Empirical Investigation into Alternative Theories Explaining Taxpayer Behavior
Kevin Eugene Flynn
Janet Trewin, Ph.D. and Anthony P. Curatola, Ph.D.
This study furthers our understanding of taxpayer behavior by introducing two
alternative theories that might provide better explanations of taxpayer behavior than
prospect theory: the house money effect and the breakeven effect.  Prospect theory
posits that taxpayers in a refund situation act conservatively, while those in a tax due
situation act aggressively.  It is theorized in the house money effect that taxpayers in a
refund situation act aggressively up to the point where the potential exists to eliminate
the refund, at which point taxpayers become conservative.  Conversely, it is theorized
in the breakeven effect that taxpayers in a tax due situation act conservatively up to the
point where the potential exists to eliminate the tax due amount, at which point
taxpayers become aggressive.  A secondary purpose of this study is to determine how
a preliminarily determined current year tax position, also prior years’ taxpaying
experience, influence taxpayer behavior.
A total of 415 graduate students from four regional universities in the Middle-
Atlantic states completed a case study where they were asked whether they would
take an ambiguous deduction given a 40 percent IRS disallowance rate and a risk of
incurring IRS penalties and interest of $600.  The subjects responded conservatively
when provided with either a refund position or a tax due position.  Therefore, these
initial results do not support the house money effect, the breakeven effect, or prospect
theory, but do support the idea that taxpayers are inherently conservative.  However,
when one of the assumptions, either the disallowance rate or the penalty and interest
amount, was relaxed, subjects responded more aggressively.  Subjects provided with a
xii
refund position responded in a manner consistent with the house money effect, while
subjects provided with a tax due position responded in a manner consistent with the
idea that a larger tax due position promoted more aggressive behavior.  Further, when
testing the refund position, current year versus prior year, an initial current year refund
position more significantly promotes conservative behavior than an initial prior year
refund position.  When testing the tax due position, current year versus prior year,
neither position has more influence over compliance behavior.

1CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
This research study seeks to further our understanding of taxpayer compliance
behavior when a taxpayer is faced with the decision whether or not to take an
ambiguous deduction.  Behavior is one of the factors identified by the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) that determine taxpayer compliance in the United States.   Since the
introduction of prospect theory in 1979, studies, either using it to explain taxpayer
behavior or testing it in a tax context, have shown mixed results [Jackson and Spicer,
1986; Schadewald, 1989; Schepanski and Kelsey, 1990; White, Harrison and Harrel,
1993; Schepanski and Shearer, 1995; Schisler, 1996; Copeland and Cuccia, 2002].
The primary purpose of this study is to introduce and test two alternative theories that
might provide better explanations: the house money effect and the breakeven effect.
In the seminal article that introduces prospect theory, Kahneman and Tversky
(1979) posit that individuals use a neutral point as a basis of comparison when
evaluating potential outcomes, or prospects.  Kahneman and Tversky suggest that the
neutral point should be assigned an arbitrary value of zero.  Potential outcomes that
are greater than the neutral point, called a reference point, are positive and are viewed
as gains, while outcomes less than the reference point are negative and are viewed as
losses.  According to prospect theory, gains cause individuals to act conservatively,
while losses cause individuals to act aggressively.
In the seminal article that introduces two alternative theories, the house money
effect and the breakeven effect, Thaler (1990) suggests that prior gains and losses can
influence decision-makers in ways that violate the tenets of prospect theory.  In a tax
context, the house money effect contradicts prospect theory by suggesting that
2taxpayers in a refund (gain) situation are risk-seeking up to the point where the
potential exists to eliminate the refund.  At that point, the house money effect becomes
congruent with prospect theory, that is taxpayers become risk averse.  Also
contradicting prospect theory, the breakeven effect theorizes that taxpayers in a tax
due (loss) situation are risk-averse up to the point where the potential exists to
eliminate the tax due.  At that point, the breakeven effect becomes congruent with
prospect theory, that is taxpayers become risk seeking.
A secondary objective of this study is to test two different tax positions, prior years’
experience and a preliminarily determined current year tax position, to determine how
they are viewed by taxpayers, and how they influence decisions.  Integral to the house
money effect and the breakeven effect is the presence of a prior gain or prior loss,
respectively.  Prior years’ experience may create expectations that represent the prior
gain upon which the house money effect is based, or the prior loss upon which the
breakeven effect is based.  For example, if a taxpayer has received refunds in the past,
all things being equal, the taxpayer could be expecting to receive a refund this year of
about the same amount.  The house money effect suggests that this expected refund is
“found” money, and, thus, represents a gain.  On the other hand, prospect theory
suggests this expected refund may be viewed as a reference point, a neutral point
assigned the arbitrary value of zero, as opposed to a gain.  According to prospect
theory, the taxpayer would have to receive a current year refund greater than the
expected amount in order to feel as though he/she has experienced a gain.
The second tax position tested in this study is a preliminarily determined current
year tax position.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that taxpayers often compute their
preliminary current year tax position (refund or tax due) before deciding whether or not
to act aggressively by either taking an additional deduction, or underreporting income.
3In addition to prior years’ experience, the current year tax position may also represent
the prior gain or the prior loss upon which the house money effect and the breakeven
effect are based, respectively.  But, the current year tax position may represent a
reference point instead.  However, Schadewald (1989) and Schepanski and Shearer
(1995) determined that a preliminarily determined current year tax position is not a
taxpayer reference point, adding credibility to the argument that an initially computed
current year tax position may be viewed as a gain or loss.
The house money effect and the breakeven effect have been shown to apply in
non-tax contexts (Thaler and Johnson, 1990; Battalio, Kagel, and Jiranyakul, 1990;
Sullivan, and Kida, 1995).  However, neither theory has yet been tested in a tax
context.  By testing for the applicability of these two theories, this study will seek to
provide a richer understanding of taxpayer compliance behavior.
1.2 Taxpayer Compliance
1.2.1  Background
The United States (U.S.) tax system differs from the systems of most (if not all)
other countries in that it is a voluntary system, which means that U.S. taxpayers
determine the amount of income reported and deductions taken on their own tax
returns.  As a result, the success of the federal individual income tax system is
dependent on voluntary taxpayer compliance.  However, the IRS has estimated that 54
percent of individual taxpayers have engaged in some form of noncompliance [White,
et al., 1993].  Using the most recent data available from the IRS, the revenue losses
from noncompliance by individual taxpayers were estimated to range from $93.2 to
$95.3 billion for tax year 1992 [IRS, 1996].  Table 1.1 (located in Appendix C) shows
that, although the actual dollar amount of revenue losses has grown in recent years,
4the revenue losses as a percentage of the IRS’s estimated true tax liability, that is, the
liability that would exist if all income were properly reported, has actually decreased
slightly in recent years.  These revenue losses are based on income taxpayers legally
received.  Other forms of noncompliance -- for example, by those who fail to pay the
income tax that they report, and/or by those who receive illegal income -- push the
“noncompliance tax gap” considerably higher [Roth, Scholz and Witte, 1989].
Because the last major study [taxpayer compliance measurement program
(TCMP) audit] was done 12 years ago, the IRS no longer has up-to-date statistics
about taxpayer compliance.  Therefore, in a renewed interest in measuring the
noncompliance gap, in 2000, IRS Commissioner Rossotti announced that “officials are
moving closer to developing new and better methods to gauge compliance” [Herman,
2000, page 1].
Song and Yarbrough’s (1978) survey supports the idea that taxpayer
noncompliance is a significant issue in this country, as can be seen from the following
findings:1
• Respondents viewed tax evasion as only a slightly more serious crime than 
stealing a bicycle and substantially less serious than bribery or stealing from 
an employer.
• Seventy-four percent of people felt that some or most taxpayers intentionally 
pad business expenses and other deductions.
• Sixty-four percent thought that some or most people do not report all of their 
taxable income.
                                                          
1 Although Song and Yarbrough’s survey is dated, it remains an often-cited study, as there are no more
recent surveys as comprehensive.
5• For overall tax ethics, taxpayers barely gave themselves a passing score (60 
on a scale of 100).2
In a survey conducted by Grasmick and Scott (1982), respondents felt less guilty, on
average, about tax evasion than about petty or grand theft.  In another survey, “upward
of a quarter of adults indicate that they either failed to report all their income or have
overstated their deductions” [Long and Swingen, 1991, page 644].  However, it is not
clear how much of this statement is the result of the intent of taxpayers, and how much
is the result of the taxpayers’ perceived complexity of the income tax laws.  Finally, it
seems that some people feel that defrauding Uncle Sam is a birth right [Long and
Swingen, 1991].
The concept of compliance cannot always be clearly applied because
circumstances for many individuals are inherently ambiguous [Schepanski and
Shearer, 1995].  Reasons for noncompliance may extend beyond a deliberate attempt
to understate tax liability.  Deliberately understating tax liability constitutes tax evasion,
which is illegal.  Interpreting an ambiguous Code section, U.S. Treasury Regulation, or
court opinion in a manner that reduces tax liability constitutes tax avoidance, which is
legal.  Although both tax evasion and tax avoidance are aggressive behaviors, this
study will focus on tax avoidance behavior.
For the purposes of this study, compliance is defined using the definition resulting
from a multidisciplinary study on tax compliance commissioned by the IRS.
Compliance with reporting requirements means that the taxpayer files all required 
tax returns at the proper time and that the returns accurately report tax liability in 
accordance with the Internal Revenue Code, regulations, and court decisions 
applicable at the time the return is filed [Roth, Scholz and Witte, 1989, page 2].
                                                          
2 As Jackson and Milliron (1986) point out, this conclusion of a barely passing score is dependent upon
Song and Yarbrough’s definition of ethical behavior, implying that the conclusion can be interpreted in
different ways.
6Based on the definition, “noncompliance can occur through failure to file a return,
misreporting income, or misreporting allowable subtractions from taxable income or
taxes due (i.e., exemptions, deductions, adjustments, and tax credits)” [ibid. page 2].
1.2.2  Early Research
Taxpayer noncompliance has existed in some form since 1913 when the current
federal income tax first became law in this country.  Until 1913, solely voluntary
contributions and custom duties (tariffs) funded the federal government.  An exception
was during the Civil War years when an involuntary income tax was imposed and then
repealed upon the war’s conclusion.  However, knowledge about taxpayer
noncompliance remained relatively limited until the 1970s when articles in the financial
and popular press publicized an “underground economy” which accounted for
hundreds of billions of dollars per year in untaxed economic activity [Roth, Scholz and
Witte, 1989].  Policy-makers, administrators, and scholars quickly showed an interest in
this area as they tried to estimate the size of the “tax gap” due to noncompliance.  The
IRS and scholars took the next step by trying to determine reasons for noncompliance
and the most effective ways to prevent noncompliance.
Early research suggested that tax noncompliance was simply a special form of
gambling.  Specifically, playing the tax audit lottery involved reporting a lower tax
liability given the risk of detection and penalties imposed on detected tax evaders.
Taxpayers who were not audited by the IRS within its 3-year statute of limitations
window won, while taxpayers who were audited and penalized by the IRS, lost
7[Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Srinivasan, 1973; Spicer and Lundstedt, 1976]3.
However, research has evolved to the point where we now know that noncompliance
involves more than just gambling.  In fact, the Internal Revenue Service Research
Division prepared a comprehensive list of compliance factors [IRS, 1978].4  This list
spawned many research studies in the area of tax compliance.  The complete list of the
compliance factors can be found in Appendix A.  Jackson and Milliron’s (1986)
compendium of research studies shows that early tax compliance researchers focused
on environmental factors such as age, gender, education, income level, income
source, occupation, IRS contact, legal sanctions, probability of detection, and tax rates.
Environmental factors are those that are objective, observable, and/or clearly
identifiable, and not subject to taxpayer cognition.  To date, research results
addressing these factors have been mixed.  Some research studies support the IRS’s
indices of noncompliance, while others do not.  The next section introduces
psychological factors as a potential complement to environmental factors determining
taxpayer compliance.
1.2.3  Psychological Tax Compliance Factors
Today, tax researchers and tax administrators continue to focus on environmental
factors.  Perhaps this is because environmental factors are often readily available and
can be relatively easy to quantify.  Indeed, some environmental factors (e.g., age,
                                                          
3 The statute of limitations is a provision in the law that limits the amount of time in which the IRS may
assess an additional tax liability against a taxpayer.  The IRS may make this assessment within three
years of the later of the filing of the income tax return or the due date of the tax return.  However, if a
taxpayer omits an amount of gross income exceeding 25 percent of the reported gross income, then the
statute of limitations is increased to six years.  Further, there is no statute of limitations on additional
assessments if no tax return is filed or if a fraudulent tax return is filed.
4 This IRS list of compliance factors has never been updated.  It remains the only comprehensive list of
compliance factors and is often cited in tax compliance studies.
8gender, income level, income source, and occupation) appear on income tax returns.
However, the IRS Research Division’s list of compliance factors also included a few
psychological factors, defined by the IRS as those variables that are “cognitive,
psychiatric, behavioral, etc.” [IRS, 1978, Section F42.1-1].  Psychological factors are
considered by the IRS to be a potential complement to environmental factors for
determining reasons for taxpayer noncompliance.  Nonetheless, the author of the list of
compliance factors opined “while possibly very useful in predicting compliance, these
[psychological] variables are unlikely to be observable and are therefore of little interest
for tax administration purposes” [IRS, 1978, Section F42.1-1].
Although this statement may be correct from an enforcement perspective, from a
researcher’s or policy maker’s perspective, psychological factors are important and
merit consideration.  In the United States, less than 1 percent of income tax returns
that are filed are audited [Alm, 1991], and the IRS only recovers an estimated 10 to 15
percent of the noncompliance tax gap through its enforcement activities [Roth, Scholz
and Witte, 1989].  Further, as shown in table 1.1, the dollar amount of the gross tax
gap continues to grow.  Potential explanations for this are that the environmental
factors investigated so far cannot independently explain all noncompliance behavior
and that other factors account for a potentially significant portion of tax noncompliance
decisions [Alm, 1991].  This study will attempt to further our understanding of
psychological factors by investigating a set of theories to determine which of these best
explain taxpayer behavior.
91.3 Research Questions
Integral to identifying psychological compliance factors is being able to explain
taxpayer behavior.  Historically, expected utility theory was thought to describe
decision-making behavior under risk, including a taxpayer’s behavior.  The theory
suggests that given a decision involving risk, if the expected values of the payoffs are
equal, a risk-taking person would take the risk, while a risk-averse person would not.
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) introduced prospect theory as an extension of expected
utility theory.  They suggested that an individual’s risk propensity does not determine
risk-taking behavior, rather the expectations of the decision-maker determine this
behavior.  Specifically, individuals use a psychological variable known as a reference
point as a basis of comparison in order to determine whether a decision involves either
a gain or a loss.   Those conditioned to expect a gain act conservatively and do not
take a risk, while those conditioned to expect a loss act aggressively and take a risk.
Although prospect theory suggests that prior gains and prior losses could be an
individual’s reference point, that is, the basis upon which current outcomes are
evaluated, the theory does not address how prior gains and prior losses influence risk-
taking decisions when those gains and losses are not reference points.  It has been
demonstrated in non-tax studies that prospect theory is not always descriptive when
prior gains and prior losses are experienced (Thaler and Johnson, 1990, Battalio,
Kagel, and Jiranyakul, 1990 and Sullivan and Kida, 1995).  These studies demonstrate
that the house money effect and/or the breakeven effect can be the descriptive theory
that explains behavior in certain contexts.  This study will seek to determine if either the
house money effect and/or the breakeven effect better explain taxpayer behavior in a
tax context.  Therefore, this study addresses the following research questions:
10
In a refund situation, does the house money effect provide a better explanation of
taxpayer compliance behavior than prospect theory?
In a tax due situation, does the breakeven effect provide a better explanation of
taxpayer compliance behavior than prospect theory?
1.4 Organization of the Dissertation
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows.  Chapter 2 includes the
theory development, literature review, and hypotheses development.  Chapter 3
discusses the methodology used to obtain the data.  Chapter 4 analyzes the results.
Lastly, chapter 5 discusses the implications and contributions of the study.
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CHAPTER 2: THEORY DEVELOPMENT, LITERATURE REVIEW, AND
HYPOTHESES
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, theories that attempt to explain taxpayer behavior when faced with
a tax compliance decision will be discussed.  For each theory, relevant literature is
reviewed, leading to the development of hypotheses.
Expected utility theory is discussed only briefly as this body of research is well
established.  Prospect theory is discussed as an extension of expected utility theory.
Then, the house money effect and the breakeven effect, theories that sometimes
contradict prospect theory, are introduced.  Neither of these theories has yet been
tested in a tax context.  Further, hypotheses are developed to empirically test the
strength of each alternative theory’s ability to explain taxpayer behavior.  Finally,
hypotheses are developed to determine whether tax position, prior years’ experience
and/or current year preliminarily determined tax position, influence a taxpayer’s
compliance decision.
2.2 Expected Utility Theory
Historically, expected utility theory [“orthodox utility analysis” (Friedman and
Savage 1948, page 279 and Mosteller and Nogee 1951, page 372), “theory of rational
choice” (Tversky and Kahneman 1981, page 453)] was generally accepted as the
normative model used to predict and explain an individual’s behavior when making a
decision involving risk.  Expected utility theory has its roots in the 18th century when
researchers of the day began to use the concept of rationality to explain perceived
phenomena.  Daniel Bernoulli (1738) introduced the concept of utility to decision-
making theory by theorizing that people maximize expected utility rather than expected
12
monetary value.  He suggested that when an individual considers the purchase of an
item, the individual’s utility for the item drives the decision, not the item’s price or
monetary value.  Utility represents the power to satisfy the needs or wants of an
individual.  The item’s price or monetary value is the same for everyone.  However,
utility is peculiar to an individual and is based on the individual’s particular
circumstances.  For example, the concept of diminishing marginal utility suggests that
an additional dollar means less to a rich man than to a poor man [Friedman and
Savage, 1948].
Although other researchers wrote about a rational theory of decision making, von
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) are generally credited with authoring the seminal
article introducing expected utility theory as it exists today.  Expected utility models are
concerned with choices among risky prospects.  Expected utility theory states that a
decision maker calculates the overall expected utility value of each prospect and
chooses the alternative that maximizes the mathematical expectation of the individual’s
gain or utility [von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944 and Friedman and Savage, 1948].
Overall expected utility of a prospect is the sum of the utilities associated with all
possible outcomes, weighted by the probability that each outcome will occur.  The
model, originally stated by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) and restated by
Schoemaker (1982), is:
E(u)  =  p1u(x1)  +  p2u(x2)  +  ...  +  pnu(xn)
where:
E(u) = Overall expected utility of the prospect
p = Probability of occurrence (where Σni=1 pi = 1)
u = Utility
x = The outcome
13
n = The number of outcomes or prospects
Thaler (1980) adds to the model by positing that the utility function is defined over
an individual’s final wealth state (final asset position).  That is, Thaler adds the
individual’s initial wealth to the model as follows:
E(u)  =  p1u(w + x1)  +  p2u(w + x2)  +  ...  +  pnu(w + xn)
where:
w = The individual’s initial wealth state before making the risky 
decision.
An individual’s utility function is peculiar for each commodity and is illustrated
graphically in figure 1.  Utility is shown on the vertical (y) axis and monetary amounts of
a commodity are shown on the horizontal (x) axis.  The shape of the curve depends on
the individual’s risk preference.  If an individual is “conservative” (i.e., risk averse), the
curve will have a concave shape, (i.e., the slope of the line is decreasing).  If an
individual is “extravagant” (i.e., risk seeking), the curve will have a convex shape, (i.e.,
the slope of the line is increasing).  If an individual is “fair” (i.e., risk neutral), the curve
will be a straight line emanating from the origin, increasing at a 45 degree angle
[Mosteller and Nogee, 1951].
In order to explain the three utility curves shown in figure 1, assume that the
commodity in question is income.  Annual income is represented on the horizontal (x)
axis and utility is represented on the vertical (y) axis using an arbitrarily assigned scale
with an arbitrarily assigned origin.  Increased levels of income result in increased levels
of utility to an individual.  The three curves are divergent by the amounts of the
increases in utility.  For example, assume that an individual is considering taking a new
job.  His/her current position is a salaried position that involves no risk, while the new
job is a sales position paying only commissions.  Further, assume that the individual
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can determine that there is a 50 percent chance that he/she will make $20,000 more
than in the current position, and a 50 percent chance that he/she will make $20,000
less than in the current position.  Remaining in the current position is a riskless option
while taking the new job involves risk.  The expected value of taking the new job is
exactly the same as the expected value for staying in the old job.  As a result, whether
the individual takes the new job depends on the individual's risk propensity, all other
things being equal.  The risk averse individual has a diminishing marginal utility for
income, and the risk of taking the new job does not increase his/her utility enough to
make it worth the risk.  Therefore, based on income alone, the risk averse individual
would choose the riskless option and keep the current job because it has a higher
expected utility.  Conversely, the risk seeking individual has an increasing marginal
utility for income, and the risk of taking the new job increases the utility enough to
make it worth the risk.  Therefore, based on income alone, the individual would take
the risk and take the new job because it has a higher expected utility.  Finally, the risk
neutral individual has a constant marginal utility for income, and the risk of taking the
new job results in an increased utility that is just enough to make the individual
indifferent about taking the risk.  Therefore, based on income alone, the individual
would be indifferent about taking the new job because it has the same expected utility
value as the current job.
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2.3 Prospect Theory
2.3.1  Introduction
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) published the seminal article introducing prospect
theory as an extension of expected utility theory.  Since then, many articles have been
published either evaluating prospect theory, or using it in a study [Elliott and Archibald,
1989, Frisch, 1993 and Gregory, Lichtenstein and MacGregor, 1993].
Prospect theory involves three significant philosophical departures from expected
utility theory.  The first deals with how individuals process or code information.  The
second and third deal with the two functions that prospect theory uses to characterize
choices: the value function and the decision weight function [Thaler and Johnson,
1990].
2.3.2  Coding Information
Expected utility theory suggests that making a decision is a two step process:
evaluating alternatives (evaluation phase) and selecting the option with the highest
expected utility (decision phase).  Prospect theory modifies the process by adding a
step (or phase) before the evaluation phase.  Specifically, prospect theory suggests an
editing phase that frames the acts, outcomes, and contingencies [Tversky and
Kahneman, 1981].  In general, framing describes the manner in which information is
communicated.  This phase is needed because research has demonstrated that
individuals respond differently to alternative descriptions of the same problem [Frisch,
1993].  Hence, an imperfection among decision-makers exists when information is
processed.
In the editing phase, the decision-maker organizes and reformulates the options
so as to simplify the subsequent evaluation phase.  As part of this process, Kahneman
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and Tversky (1979) suggest that decision-makers frame outcomes as gains and losses
relative to some neutral reference point, rather than as final states of wealth.  A
reference point is the mental anchor or zero point around which decision alternatives
are presented [Gregory, Lichtenstein, and MacGregor, 1993].  That is, the reference
point is used by a decision-maker as a basis of comparison when evaluating decision
alternatives.  However, the location of the reference point, and therefore, the perceived
gain or loss, can be affected by both the way the decision is framed and the
expectations of the decision-maker [Kahneman and Tversky, 1979].
2.3.3  Value Function
Prospect theory’s value function replaces the utility function of expected utility
theory, shown graphically in figure 2.  In the figure, the y-axis represents the value
function whereas in figure 1 it represents the utility function.  Prospect theory suggests
that value is assigned to changes in wealth or welfare, that is, gains and losses, rather
than to final wealth states (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
The x-axis in figure 2 represents a monetary amount as it does in figure 1.
However, the x-axis in figure 2 has a neutral reference point that is not present in figure
1.  The location of the reference point is at the intersection of the x- and y-axes.  This
point is given the value of zero.  Points on the x-axis to the right of the reference point
are viewed as gains, while points on the x-axis to the left of the reference point are
viewed as losses.
The shape of the prospect theory value function, illustrated in figure 2, is based on
the theory of diminishing marginal utility.  This theory suggests, for example, that the
difference in value between a gain of 100 and a gain of 200 is greater than the
difference between a gain of 1,100 and a gain of 1,200.  Similarly, the difference in
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value between a loss of 100 and a loss of 200 is greater than the difference between a
loss of 1,100 and a loss of 1,200 (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).  This is the basis for
the concave shape (decreasing slope) in the gain domain portion of the graph and the
convex shape (increasing slope) in the loss domain portion of the graph.
Like the expected utility theory utility function, the shape of the prospect theory
value function suggests an individual’s propensity to take a risk.  Through a series of
surveys given to university students and faculty, Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
determined that people tend to be risk averse in a gain situation, shown on the graph
by the concave (decreasing slope) shape.  Therefore, those in a gain situation would
rather take a certain gain to minimize their downside risk and avoid the risk of reducing
their current asset position.  Conversely, in the loss domain, the shape of the value
function is convex (increasing slope).  People in a loss situation would rather risk taking
a larger loss in return for the prospect of eliminating or reducing a loss.  Kahneman and
Tversky (1979) label the concavity of the value function in the domain of gains and its
convexity in the domain of losses the “reflection effect” [page 268].  That is, the shape
of the utility curve is a reflection of itself around the reference point.
Further, the slope of the value function in the loss domain is steeper than in the
gain domain.  This is explained by prospect theory’s loss aversion principle and
suggests that losses loom larger than gains [Kahneman and Tversky, 1979].  That is,
the decrease in value of experiencing a loss is greater than the increase in value of
experiencing a corresponding gain of the same amount [Tversky and Kahneman,
1986].  This is illustrated by the dotted lines in figure 2.  Notice the loss results in a
larger decrease in value than the corresponding increase in value from a gain of the
same amount.
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Thaler (1980) calls this loss aversion principle the “endowment effect” [page 44].
Thaler posits that goods already included in an individual’s possession (endowment)
are more highly valued than goods not yet held.  Therefore, removing a good from the
endowment results in a loss larger than the gain that initially resulted when the good
was added to the endowment.  Thaler’s endowment effect is the theory behind many
companies’ return policy.  Typically, companies offer customers a certain amount of
time during which they can return a purchased product for a full refund, i.e., a money
back guarantee.  For example, a typical company marketing pitch is “try our product for
30 days.  If you are not completely satisfied, simply return it for a full refund.”  The
company selling the product hopes that once the consumer has the product in his/her
endowment, giving the product back would cause a feeling of greater loss than the
feeling of gain received from the return of the money used to purchase the product.
2.3.4  Decision Weight Function
The third significant departure from expected utility theory involves the treatment of
probabilities.  In expected utility theory, utility is determined by multiplying an uncertain
outcome by its probability of occurrence.  However, determining the probability of
occurrence is not an exact science.  Kahneman and Tversky (1979) suggest that the
value of an outcome is not only multiplied by its probability of occurrence, but also by a
decision weight that is unique to each decision maker and subjectively inferred from
choices between prospects.
The decision weight, Π, is attached to the probability, p, to give an overall
probability, Π(p).  As illustrated in figure 3, the hypothesized properties of Π(p) are
such that large and intermediate probabilities are underweighted (Π(p) < p), while small
probabilities are overweighted (Π(p) > p).  For example, Tversky and Kahneman (1986)
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suggest the purchase of a lottery ticket illustrates a situation where the weighting
function overweights the probability of occurrence.  The probability of winning the
lottery is extremely low, yet many people buy lottery tickets.  Why?  Because the
decision weight, Π, is high enough to offset the very low probability, p, making the
purchase of a lottery ticket desirable.  Further, as illustrated in figure 3, the decision
weighting function is not well behaved at extremely high or extremely low probabilities
and, therefore, is discontinuous at its endpoints.  As a result, according to prospect
theory, decision alternatives involving very low probabilities may be disregarded and
decision alternatives involving very high probabilities may be treated as certain
[Tversky and Kahneman, 1981].
2.3.5  Prospect Theory Model
The prospect theory model extends the expected utility theory model primarily by
adding the decision weight.  To illustrate the model, consider a prospect that yields
outcome x with probability p, and outcome y with probability 1 – p.  There are values, v,
associated with the outcomes, and decision weights, Π, associated with the
probabilities, such that the overall value of the prospect, V, is defined as [Tversky and
Kahneman, 1981]:
V = Π(p) v(x)  +  Π(1 - p) v(y) (1)
According to prospect theory, this model applies when x and y are of opposite signs
(either x ≥ 0 ≥ y or y ≥ 0 ≥ x) [Thaler and Johnson, 1990].  For example, assume that a
person is faced with the following decision:
a) keep the status quo and wager nothing, or
b) take a gamble where there is a 50% chance of winning $40 and a 50% chance of
losing $40.
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Using the model, the overall value, V, of choosing the gamble is:
Π(.5)v(40)  +  Π(.5)v(-40)
The decision-maker could put this in words as: I have a 50% chance to gain $40 and a
50% chance to lose $40.
However, when outcome x and outcome y are of the same sign, the model
changes.  In this case, “prospects are segregated into two components: (1) the riskless
component, i.e., the minimum gain or loss that is certain to be obtained or paid; and (2)
the risky component, i.e., the additional gain or loss that is actually at stake”
[Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, page 276].  So, if either x > y > 0 or x < y < 0, then:
  V = v(y)  +  Π(p) [v(x)  –  v(y)]  (2)
For example, assume that a person is faced with the following decision:
a) wager nothing and receive a certain $100, or
b) take a gamble where there is a 50% chance of winning an additional $40, i.e.,
receiving $140, and a 50% chance of losing $40, i.e., receiving $60.
Using the model, the overall value, V, of choosing the gamble is:
v(60)  +  Π(.5) [v(140) - v(60)]
The decision-maker could put this in words as: If I accept this gamble, I win $60 for
sure, plus I have a 50% chance to increase my gain from $60 to $140 [Thaler and
Johnson, 1990].
To summarize, whether equation (1) or equation (2) above applies to a decision is
determined by the signs of outcome x and outcome y, which are determined by the
location of the decision-maker’s reference point.  Using this example, is the decision-
maker’s reference point the status quo (current cash position), or has it shifted to
incorporate the $100 gain?  If the reference point is the status quo, then outcome x and
outcome y are of the same sign and model (2) applies.  However, if the reference point
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has shifted to incorporate the $100 gain, then outcome x and outcome y are of different
signs and model (1) applies.  Model (2) is the basis for alternative theories to be
discussed later in this chapter.
2.3.6  Empirical Testing of Prospect Theory
Overall, taxpayer compliance studies have demonstrated inconsistent support for
prospect theory.  Most of the initial studies provide little or weak support for the
predictions of prospect theory as it applies to tax evasion [Robben, et al., 1990], while
newer studies provide some support for prospect theory [White, Harrison and Harrel,
1993; Schepanski and Shearer, 1995].  This section critiques prior research studies
that are relevant to this research. Jackson and Spicer (1986) is one of the first papers
to report a study determining the effect of under- or over-withholding of taxes on
taxpayer compliance.  Two things differentiate this study from other studies: the
researchers used jurors as subjects and barter income was considered in addition to
cash income.  A strength of this study is the good cross-sectional sample of subjects.
The results did not support the propositions derived from prospect theory.  That is, tax
evasion behavior was not significantly greater for subjects who were under-withheld
than for those who were over-withheld.  One possible explanation for these results
could be the location of the subjects.  Jurors may have exhibited higher moral
standards than they otherwise would because they were in the county courthouse.
Schadewald (1989) used prospect theory in a tax context in an attempt to
determine an individual taxpayer’s reference point.  Specifically, Schadewald tried to
determine if a taxpayer’s reference point is the amount withheld during the year and/or
the preliminarily computed current year tax position.  Prospect theory predicts that
subjects in a refund (gain) situation will act conservatively.  However, in these two
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situations, only slightly more than half of the subjects in the two refund situations (two
reference points tested) acted conservatively which is not statistically significant.
Conversely, prospect theory predicts that subjects in a tax due (loss) situation will act
aggressively.  As in the refund situation, only a slight majority of subjects in the two tax
due situations acted conservatively, and, again, this number was not significant.
Schadewald concluded that prospect theory might not apply in a tax context.  However,
Schadewald used 70 percent as the disallowance rate (the probability of disallowance
by the IRS).  According to White, Harrison and Harrell (1993), in tax research studies
up to that time, prospect theory principles were demonstrated when the disallowance
rates were in the range from 20 percent to 55 percent.  Schadewald’s high
disallowance rate may have dominated any noncompliance behavior that would have
been exhibited, obscuring the results.  Further, Schadewald failed to determine that a
preliminarily determined tax position influenced taxpayer behavior.
Some studies have supported the prospect theory principle of reflection, but not
prospect theory itself.  Kahneman and Tversky labeled the opposite pattern of behavior
around the reference point the “reflection effect” [Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, page
268].  In other words, above the reference point, prospect theory posits conservative
behavior, but below the reference point, prospect theory posits aggressive behavior.
The reference point is said to be an inflection point because it is the point at which
behavior changes.  Some studies have found the reference point to be an inflection
point, not because the behavior changed from conservative to aggressive, but from
conservative to less conservative.  For example, Dusenbury (1994) found that 85
percent of subjects in the refund condition acted conservatively while 80 percent of
subjects in the tax due condition acted conservatively.  In a different twist, instead of
performing an experiment, Chang and Schultz (1990) used actual archival data
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provided by the IRS from the Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP)
and determined that taxpayers in a refund condition have a higher voluntary
compliance rate than taxpayers in a tax due condition.  But, the Chang and Schultz
results must be interpreted with caution because the sample included 46,471
observations.  With such a large sample, statistical significance is virtually assured.
The importance of the Dusenbury and the Chang and Schultz studies is that the
researchers were able to demonstrate a withholding effect, suggesting that withholding
position is a taxpayer’s reference point, without demonstrating the applicability of
prospect theory.
In order to support prospect theory completely, individuals in a refund condition
should be risk averse and act conservatively, while individuals in a tax due condition
should be risk seeking and act aggressively.  For example, Schepanski and Kelsey
(1990) tested the application of prospect theory in a tax context using five IRS
disallowance rates ranging from 20 percent to 45 percent (.20, .25, .30, .35 and .45).
Results supported prospect theory at the 20 percent disallowance rate because a
majority of subjects acted conservatively in the refund condition and aggressively in the
tax due condition.  However, at the 25 percent and 30 percent disallowance rates, only
the reflection effect was supported because subjects were less likely to claim a
nonallowable deduction in the tax refund condition than in the tax due condition.  At the
35 percent and 45 percent disallowance rates, the reflection effect was not supported.
Therefore, it can be concluded that the Schepanski and Kelsey study supported
prospect theory at the 20 percent disallowance rate and supported the reflection effect
at the 25 percent and 30 percent disallowance rates.
Schepanski and Shearer (1995) extended both the Schadewald and the
Schepanski and Kelsey studies by using prospect theory to determine a taxpayer’s
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reference point.  Schepanski and Shearer tested the application of prospect theory
using five IRS disallowance rates ranging from 20 percent to 70 percent (.20, .35, .50,
.60 and .70).  Results showed stronger support for prospect theory than the
Schepanski and Kelsey study by supporting the reflection effect for all five
disallowance rates.  Further, the study supported prospect theory at the 35 percent
disallowance rate with 62 percent of subjects in the tax due condition acting
aggressively.  Results enabled Schepanski and Shearer to conclude that a withholding
phenomenon exists where taxpayers who are underwithheld at filing and have an
additional payment due exhibit significantly lower rates of compliance than taxpayers
who are overwithheld at filing and are due a refund of taxes previously withheld.
One result of the Schepanski and Kelsey (1990) and Schepanski and Shearer
(1995) studies is that a majority of subjects did not act aggressively in the tax due
condition at the higher IRS disallowance rates.  This could have occurred for several
reasons.  First, both studies used a case involving tax evasion instead of tax
avoidance.  According to Robben, et al, (1990), subjects like to project an image of
honesty.  Therefore, asking subjects to take a nonallowable deduction rather than an
ambiguous deduction may have made subjects more conservative.  Second, some of
the case scenarios did not involve realistic IRS penalty and interest rate amounts.  The
penalty and interest rates for the scenarios in the two studies ranged from 43 percent
to 400 percent.  As will be explained in section 3.5, realistic IRS penalty and interest
rate amounts range from 59 percent to 71 percent.  Finally, both studies used
undergraduate students as subjects.  White, Harrison, and Harrell (1993) determined
that professional MBA students act more aggressively than undergraduate students.  In
their study, White et al. compared the responses of professional MBA students to
undergraduate students.  Results showed that in the tax due condition, 63 percent of
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professional MBA students acted aggressively while 44 percent of undergraduate
students acted aggressively.  Further, in the refund condition, 50 percent of
professional MBA students acted aggressively while 28 percent of undergraduate
students acted aggressively.
In summary, a reason for inconsistent results when either testing or using prospect
theory in a tax context may be for methodological reasons, as discussed, or it may be
that prospect theory does not fully describe taxpayer behavior.  Refunds and/or
additional taxes due from prior years may influence current year compliance decisions.
When the current year’s withholding position is determined to be the taxpayer’s
reference point, as demonstrated in some studies [Chang and Schultz, 1990; White,
Harrison, and Harrell, 1993; Dusenbury, 1994; Schepanski and Shearer, 1995], prior
years’ experience is not considered by prospect theory because the theory does not
explicitly deal with multiple reference points.  However, Copeland and Cuccia (2002),
discussed further in section 2.5, showed prior years’ experience to be a reference
point.  The next section introduces two theories, one in the refund condition and one in
the tax due condition, that challenge prospect theory as an explanation of taxpayer
behavior.
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2.4 Alternative Descriptive Theories
2.4.1  Background
What happens to prospect theory framework when prior gains or losses are
involved?  Using the second example from section 2.3.5, but stating the facts in a
different way, assume that an individual has just won $100.  Now, that person is faced
with the following decision:
a) keeping the status quo and wagering nothing, or
b) taking a gamble where there is a 50% chance of winning $40 and a 50% chance
of losing $40.
Given the two models introduced in section 2.3.5, the model that applies is determined
by how the decision is viewed.  This decision can be viewed in one of two ways:
1) Model (1) -- as a gamble where there is a 50% chance of winning $40 and a 50%
chance of losing $40, or
2) Model (2) -- as a gamble where there is a 50% chance of winning $140 and a 50%
chance of winning $60.
The question is whether or not the individual incorporates the prior $100 gain into the
current decision.  In scenario 1), the gain is not considered when making the decision.
In scenario 2), the prior gain is incorporated into the decision-maker’s mental account
and therefore is considered when making the decision.
Kahneman and Tversky recognized this issue both when originally formulating
prospect theory and in their subsequent research.  Interestingly, they did not come to a
conclusion.  They proposed “that people generally evaluate acts in terms of a minimal
account, which includes only the direct consequences of the act” [Tversky and
Kahneman 1981, page 456].  This statement suggests that prior outcomes do not
affect subsequent decisions, and the decision above would be encoded into an
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individual’s mental account as in 1).  However, Tversky and Kahneman recognize the
other possibility by stating “there are situations in which the outcomes of an act affect
the balance in an account that was previously set up by a related act.  In these cases,
the decision at hand may be evaluated in terms of a more inclusive account, as in the
case of the bettor who views the last race in the context of earlier losses.  More
generally, a sunk-cost effect arises when a decision is referred to an existing account
…” [Tversky and Kahneman 1981, page 457].  This second quote from Tversky and
Kahneman suggests that prior outcomes do affect subsequent decisions in certain
circumstances, and the decision above would be encoded into an individual’s mental
account as in 2).  Therefore, in general, how prior outcomes influence a decision
remains an open issue.  It should be noted that in a tax context, Copeland and Cuccia
(2002), discussed later, have demonstrated that prior years’ experience acts as a
referent for taxpayers when making a compliance decision.
2.4.2  Refund Domain: The House Money Effect
Thaler and Johnson (1990) found that in certain decision contexts, a prior gain is
considered when making a current decision as explained by model (2) in section 2.4.1.
Thaler and Johnson performed an experiment and found that a prior gain actually
increased the majority of subjects’ willingness to take a risk, rather than make them risk
averse as predicted by prospect theory.  Thaler and Johnson labeled this phenomenon
the house money effect.  Specifically, they theorize that after a gain, “subsequent
losses that are smaller than the original gain can be integrated with the prior gain, thus
mitigating the influence of loss aversion and facilitating risk-seeking” (page 657).  For
example, a gambler at a casino who bets no more than the amount previously won that
evening feels like he or she is not gambling his or her own money, but instead is
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gambling using the house’s money.  Gamblers use the phrase “gambling while ahead”
[Thaler and Johnson 1990, page 657] to describe this situation.  The individual in this
situation tends to be risk-seeking.  The idea is that until the winnings are depleted,
loses are mentally coded as reductions in gains, not as losses.
Sullivan and Kida (1995) tested for the presence of both prospect theory and the
house money effect in a corporate investment decision-making context when they
determined the risk-taking propensity of corporate investment managers.  Two groups
of subjects were each given four scenarios, two scenarios involving prior gains and two
scenarios involving prior losses.  One group of subjects was given a decision set that
did not use the words “prior gain” or “prior loss”, while the other group of subjects was
given a decision set that did use the words “prior gain” or “prior loss”.  Results from the
group without the prior gain/loss terminology supported prospect theory because
managers with prior gains acted conservatively while managers with prior losses acted
aggressively.  However, when the words “prior gain” were added to the scenario,
significantly more subjects chose to be risk seeking, supporting house money effect
principles.  Further, more subjects were risk seeking when the decision did not involve
the risk of eliminating the gain than when the decision did involve the risk of eliminating
the gain.  However, results from the group with the gain/loss terminology did not
completely support the house money effect because the majority of subjects were still
risk averse.
A finding by Battalio, Kagel, and Jiranyakul (1990) enhances understanding of the
house money effect.  The researchers gave subjects $30 at the beginning of the
experiment.  When faced with the gamble that involved winning an additional $10, or
losing $10 from the original $30 endowment, sixty percent of the subjects were risk
seeking.  However, when faced with the gamble that involved winning an additional
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$20, or losing $20 from the original $30 endowment, only forty-three percent of the
subjects were risk seeking.  These results suggest that the house money effect may
diminish as the amount of the potential loss approaches the initial endowment.
The house money effect has not yet been tested in a tax context.  Schadewald
(1989) and Schepanski and Kelsey (1990) both tested how aggressively an individual
taxpayer would behave in a refund (gain) condition, but only with the potential of
eliminating the entire refund.  On the other hand, Schepanski and Shearer (1995)
tested the level of aggressiveness when there is a chance of only reducing the refund.
In order to test for the presence of the house money effect, at least two scenarios must
be involved: one with the chance to eliminate the refund, the other with the chance of
only reducing the refund.
Even though Schisler (1996) did not test for the presence of the house money
effect, the study supported house money effect principles in a tax context.  Schisler
performed a study to determine if taxpayers follow the advice of an experienced tax
practitioner.  Not surprisingly, results showed that taxpayers do follow the advice of an
experienced tax practitioner.  Further, in Schisler’s control group where no advice was
given to subjects, the majority of subjects in the refund condition acted aggressively,
supporting the house money effect principle that taxpayers in a refund condition act
aggressively up to a point.  The Schisler results should be interpreted with caution
because the expected value of the aggressive choice in Schisler’s case could not be
determined since subjects were not given a probability of IRS disallowance.  Instead,
subjects were only told that there was either a high or low probability of IRS
disallowance.  Contrary to expectations, subjects in the high probability scenario acted
more aggressively than subjects in the low probability scenario.
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2.4.3  Refund Domain Hypothesis
Expected utility theory states that, assuming the expected values of the payoffs
are equal, an individual who is risk seeking will take a risk, while an individual who is
risk averse will avoid taking a risk.  In a tax context, risk-seeking behavior is
demonstrated by being aggressive, either by taking an additional deduction or by
underreporting income.  According to prospect theory, an individual who has
experienced a refund will be risk averse, and act conservatively either by not taking the
additional deduction or by not underreporting income.  The house money effect
contradicts prospect theory by theorizing that an individual who has experienced a prior
refund will act aggressively up to the point the risk involves the potential to eliminate
the refund.  At that point, the house money effect becomes congruent with prospect
theory and suggests that an individual will become conservative and not take a risk.
The house money effect suggests that prior refunds viewed as prior gains create
expectations that influence current behavior, but is silent as to when those refunds
need to be recognized.  Those expectations could be based on a preliminarily
computed refund position in the current year, or on refunds received in prior years.  For
example, a taxpayer who expects to receive a refund in the current year based on prior
years’ experience might act aggressively even before determining the current year tax
position.  Another possibility is that taxpayers view prior years’ experience as a
reference point (Copeland and Cuccia, 2002).
Studies have demonstrated that prospect theory is not always descriptive when
prior refunds are involved.  Suggesting that the house money effect might better
explain taxpayer behavior when prior refunds are present, the first hypothesis, stated in
alternative form, is:
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H1: When taking a deduction does not involve the risk of eliminating a refund (either
prior years’ refunds or a preliminarily determined current year refund), subjects will
be aggressive, and when the deduction does involve the risk of eliminating a
refund, subjects will be conservative.
2.4.4  Tax Due Domain: The Breakeven Effect
Thaler and Johnson (1990) performed a series of experiments and determined that
a prior loss does not always induce risk-seeking behavior as predicted by prospect
theory.  In a tax context, a tax due amount may represent a prior loss.  Further, Thaler
and Johnson noted that “the empirical demonstrations of risk seeking in the presence
of losses provided by Kahneman and Tversky were always accompanied by an
opportunity to get back to the original reference or ‘break-even’ point (page 658).”
Thaler and Johnson suggest that determining an inflection point in the loss domain
where an individual’s risk propensity might shift from risk aversion to risk seeking is a
critical factor not addressed by prospect theory.  Through their experiments, Thaler and
Johnson found that individuals faced with a prior loss were risk seeking as predicted by
prospect theory, but only if the gamble gave them an opportunity to break-even.
Otherwise, individuals faced with a prior loss were risk averse.  Thaler and Johnson
called this phenomenon a breakeven effect.
There are no research studies that test Thaler and Johnson’s break-even effect in
a tax context.  In order to test for the presence of the breakeven effect, at least two
scenarios must be involved: one with the chance to eliminate the tax due, the other
with the chance of only reducing the tax due.  Schadewald (1989), Schepanski and
Kelsey (1990), and Schepanski and Shearer (1995) used scenarios in the tax due
domain that involved only the chance to completely eliminate the loss (break-even).
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White, Harrison and Harrell (1993) used scenarios in the tax due domain that involved
only the chance to reduce the loss.
Chang, Nichols, and Schultz (1987) gave subjects six scenarios, all in the tax due
domain.  Subjects were asked whether or not they would report additional income, but
were not given an initial tax position.  Because the scenarios do not involve an initial
tax position, the breakeven effect was not tested.  However, the majority of subjects in
five of the six scenarios acted conservatively, failing to support prospect theory, but
supporting, up to the point that the loss can be eliminated, the breakeven effect’s idea
that subjects are conservative in the tax due domain.  Similarly, Martinez-Vazquez,
Harwood, and Larkins (1992) only tested subjects in the tax due domain and also
found that the subjects were risk averse.  It should be noted that the scenarios used in
Chang et al. and Martinez-Vazquez et al. involved tax evasion.
In a non-tax context, Sullivan and Kida (1995) tested for the presence of the
breakeven effect by determining the risk-taking propensity of corporate investment
managers.  Two groups of subjects were each given four scenarios, two scenarios
involving prior gains and two scenarios involving prior losses.  One group of subjects
was given a decision set that did not use the words “prior gain” or “prior loss”, while the
other group of subjects was given a decision set that did use the words “prior gain” or
“prior loss”.  Results from the no prior gain/loss verbiage group supported prospect
theory because managers with prior gains acted conservatively while managers with
prior losses acted aggressively.  However, when the words “prior loss” were added to
the scenarios, subjects were significantly risk averse, supporting breakeven effect
principles and Thaler and Johnson’s idea that prospect theory does not fully explain an
individual’s risk taking behavior when a prior loss is involved.  Further, the opportunity
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for subjects to “break-even” in the prior gain/loss group increased a subject’s risk
seeking propensity, although only slightly.
2.4.5  Tax Due Domain Hypothesis
Studies have demonstrated that prospect theory is not always descriptive when
prior losses are involved.  The breakeven effect suggests that prior losses influence
current behavior, but is silent as to when those losses need to occur in order to be
incorporated into the decision-maker’s mental account.  Prior losses could be taxes
due in prior years, or a preliminarily computed tax due position in the current year.
Applying prospect theory, an individual who has experienced a tax due amount
should be risk seeking, and act aggressively.  It is theorized by the breakeven effect
that when the deduction is not large enough to eliminate the prior loss, a taxpayer who
has experienced a tax due position will be risk averse and act conservatively.
However, at the point the risk involves the potential to eliminate the loss (tax due
amount), the breakeven effect becomes congruent with prospect theory and it is
theorized that an individual will become aggressive and take a risk.  Therefore, the
second hypothesis, stated in alternative form, is:
H2: When taking a deduction does not provide the opportunity to eliminate a tax due
amount (either prior years’ tax due amounts or a preliminarily determined current
year tax due amount), subjects will be conservative, and when the deduction does
provide the opportunity to eliminate a tax due amount, subjects will be aggressive.
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2.5 Tax Position Hypothesis Development
A secondary objective of this study is to determine whether the existence of prior
refunds and prior taxes due can influence an individual taxpayer’s tendency to be
aggressive when making a compliance decision.  Prior refund and tax due positions
can be incorporated into a decision-maker’s cognitive process.  The issue is how the
prior tax positions are incorporated into a decision-maker’s cognitive process.  The
house money effect and the breakeven effect suggest that taxpayers recognize prior
refund and tax due positions as prior gains and losses respectively.  Prospect theory
suggests that in a tax context, either prior refund and/or prior tax due positions could
be reference points.
Until recently, extant literature had not determined that either an initially computed
current year tax position or prior years’ experience influenced a taxpayer’s compliance
decision.  Copeland and Cuccia (2002) recently demonstrated that taxpayers use at
least two reference points when making a compliance decision: prior years’ experience
and current withholding position.  Prospect theory does not address the existence of
multiple reference points.  Therefore, the shape of the prospect theory curve when
multiple reference points exist remains an open issue.
When examining the Copeland and Cuccia study, two issues should be noted.
First, the researchers gave their subjects a case that was biased towards the subjects
responding aggressively.  That is, the expected value of the aggressive option was
greater than the conservative option, creating an incentive for subjects to respond
aggressively.  Although this bias might not limit the ability to draw conclusions from the
results in the refund domain since prospect theory posits that individuals act
conservatively when faced with a refund, it does limit the ability to deduce the
existence of strong support in the tax due domain because prospect theory posits that
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individuals act aggressively when faced with tax due.  Subjects could have chosen the
aggressive option because it had the higher expected value.  Therefore, Copeland and
Cuccia cannot conclusively conclude that taxpayers act aggressively in a tax due
domain, which means they cannot conclude that prospect theory is supported by their
study.  However, Copeland and Cuccia did identify the presence of the reflection effect,
which enables them to conclude that they recognized a reference point not previously
identified.            
Second, only subjects who had included Schedule A, C, or E on their three
previous tax returns, and were willing to provide the researchers with copies of Form
1040 from the subjects’ three previous tax returns, were allowed to participate.  Tax
returns contain sensitive information for many taxpayers.  Given the sensitive nature of
the information, many individuals are not willing to divulge the information on their prior
year tax returns, let alone their actual returns, limiting generalizability of the results to
those taxpayers that are willing to divulge their tax return information.
How the initially computed current year tax position influences current year
decisions is still an open issue.  Both Schadewald (1989) and Schepanski and Shearer
(1995) found that this position does not act as a taxpayer reference point. Kirchler and
Maciejovsky (2001) found that accrual basis taxpayers use an initially computed
current year tax position as a reference point, but that cash basis taxpayers do not.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the vast majority of individual taxpayers in the United
States are cash basis taxpayers.  Therefore, these results suggest that an initially
computed current year tax position is not a reference point for most individual
taxpayers.  It should be noted that the Kirchler and Maciejovsky study has limited
generalizability in the United States because the study was performed in Austria using
the rules and regulations of the Austrian tax code.  However, the results from these
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three studies add credibility to the argument that cash basis taxpayers view an initially
computed current year tax position as something other than a reference point, possibly
as a prior gain or loss.
Neither the house money effect nor the breakeven effect put a time limit on when
the prior gain or loss must occur in order to influence a current decision.  Although the
period over which either theory has influence has not yet been tested, it could be
argued that the closer the prior event is to the current decision, the more significant the
theory’s influence.  That is, the house money and breakeven effects could diminish
with the passage of time.  This idea is supported by Copeland and Cuccia (2002).  That
study found that the influence of the current year reference point is greater than the
influence of the prior years’ experience because taxpayers adapt to their current filing
scenario.  Therefore, it is expected that the initially computed current year tax position
has greater influence over a compliance decision than prior years’ experience,
assuming that prior years’ experience is viewed as a prior gain or loss.  Positing that
one or both of these two tax positions influences a compliance decision, and that the
influence of the initially computed current year tax position is greater, the third
hypothesis, stated in alternative form, is:
H3A: In the refund domain, the preliminarily computed current year tax position, in the
absence of prior years’ experience, influences a taxpayer to be more aggressive
than prior years’ experience, in the absence of a preliminarily computed current
year tax position.
H3B: In the tax due domain, the preliminarily computed current year tax position, in the
absence of prior years’ experience, influences a taxpayer to be less aggressive
than prior years’ experience, in the absence of a preliminarily computed current
year tax position.
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2.6 Chapter Recap
This chapter introduces and develops the theoretical principles of prospect theory,
house money effect, and breakeven effect, summarizes relevant literature, and
develops the three hypotheses tested.  The next chapter discusses the research
design and methodology that are used.
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the selection of subjects, the research design, the research
instrument, and the experimental analysis are discussed.  The discussion about the
research instrument includes the development of the scenarios used to test the
hypotheses, the follow-up demographic and risk perception questionnaire, and the
pretest and pilot study.  The experimental analysis discusses the determination of the
sample size, the statistical tests used to analyze the data, the variables used to test the
data, and finally the model used when analyzing the data.
3.2 Background
When an individual prepares his/her federal income tax return or has it prepared
by a third party, the tax liability owed is compared to taxes prepaid to the United States
Treasury Department during the year to determine if a refund of tax payments will be
received or additional taxes will be owed by the taxpayer.  There are three ways to
prepay taxes: by having taxes withheld from salary, by making estimated quarterly
payments, or by a combination of these methods.  In 1999, the most recent year for
which statistics are available, eleven percent of individual income tax returns had
estimated quarterly payments, and ninety-five percent had income tax withheld
(Internal Revenue Service, 2001).  These statistics suggest that some tax returns
contained both estimated quarterly payments and income tax withholdings, while other
tax returns contained neither quarterly payments nor withholdings.  In the present
study, the amount of taxes prepaid during the year is called the taxpayer’s withholding
position.
39
Each taxpayer has some control over the amount withheld.  However, end of year
distributions, such as from mutual funds and year-end bonuses, can impact the refund
or additional taxes owed by each taxpayer.  The two questions are how a person will
react to this situation and which theory best explains this behavior.  The theories as
explained in chapter 2 are prospect theory, house money effect, and breakeven effect.
To provide evidence about which theory best explains behavior, the selection of
subjects and the research design are discussed in the following sections.
3.3 Selection of Subjects
Different theories could apply when describing the behavior of different groups of
taxpayers.  Results in White, Harrison and Harrell (1993) showed that experienced
taxpayers, represented as Professional MBA students, engaged in more aggressive
behavior than novice taxpayers, represented as undergraduate business students.
The majority of taxpayers in the United States have at least a few years of taxpaying
experience.  As a result, the target population of interest in this study is experienced
taxpayers.  However, defining “experienced” taxpayer can be arbitrary.  Therefore,
similar to the White et al. study, a convenience sample of students taking a variety of
graduate-level courses will be selected.
Subjects will be told that their responses will be confidential and that ten
respondents will be chosen to receive a $50 cash prize.  To be eligible for the final
drawing, a subject must provide a complete set of responses, including his/her e-mail
address.  An e-mail message will be sent to all participants giving them both an
executive summary of the findings of the study and a list of the prize winners.  Each
winner will be requested to personally pick up the award so that he/she can be thanked
for participating in the study and to ensure that the correct person receives the cash
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award.  If a winner cannot pick up the award, other arrangements will be made for its
delivery.
3.4 Research Design
In most prior empirical studies involving taxpayer behavior, subjects have
completed a case study in an experimental setting.  In order to achieve a high degree
of internal validity, this study also involves an experiment where subjects complete a
case study.  Each case requires the subject to make a tax compliance decision for two
independent hypothetical scenarios.  Specifically, the subject will be asked whether or
not he/she would take an ambiguous deduction, and to identify the strength of his/her
conviction about this decision.  Because the deduction is ambiguous, taking it is seen
as an aggressive position.  Likewise, not taking the deduction results in a certain
outcome and is considered to be the conservative position.
Although each subject is given a case involving only two hypothetical scenarios,
four scenarios in total are developed containing a taxpayer’s situation in one of two
levels (or domains): two scenarios in either the tax refund domain, or two scenarios in
the additional tax owed domain.  In order to determine which theory explains behavior,
it is necessary that each subject be given two scenarios within the same domain, one
scenario involving the chance to eliminate a tax refund or an additional tax owed
amount, and the other scenario involving only the chance to reduce the tax refund or
additional tax owed amount.  In the refund domain, prospect theory posits that a
taxpayer would act conservatively for both scenarios, while the house money effect
posits that a taxpayer would act aggressively up to the point where the refund can be
eliminated.  Beyond that point, the house money effect becomes congruent with
prospect theory by positing conservative behavior.  In the tax due domain, prospect
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theory predicts that a taxpayer would act aggressively for both scenarios, while the
breakeven effect predicts that a taxpayer would act conservatively up to the point
where the additional tax owed amount can be eliminated.  Beyond that point, the
breakeven effect becomes congruent with prospect theory by predicting aggressive
behavior.  Table 3.1 compares and contrasts these three theories for each of the four
scenarios.
In addition to being assigned to one of the two domains, subjects will be assigned
to one of two tax positions: current year tax position or prior years’ tax position.
Subjects will be given either a case where they are to assume that they have made a
preliminary determination of their current year tax position (either tax refund or
additional tax owed), or a case where they are to assume a tax position from prior
years (either tax refund or additional tax owed).  Subjects will be randomly assigned to
one of the following four treatment groups:
• Current year tax position:
– Refund (scenarios 1 and 2 in table 3.1)
– Additional tax owed (scenarios 3 and 4 in table 3.1)
• Prior years’ tax position:
– Refunds (scenarios 1 and 2 in table 3.1)
– Additional taxes owed (scenarios 3 and 4 in table 3.1)
In addition, each case will include two scenarios, one with the chance to eliminate the
refund or tax due amount, and the other with no chance to eliminate the refund or tax
due amount.  Therefore, this experiment involves eight scenarios in total, two scenarios
for each of the four treatment groups.  To avoid ordering effects, the order of the
scenarios was reversed for half the subjects in each treatment group.  Subjects in the
two current year tax position groups will receive either a tax refund or an additional tax
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owed amount that is tentatively calculated for the current year.  From this tentative
calculation, the subject will be asked to make a compliance decision.  Conversely,
subjects in the two prior years’ tax position groups will receive information concerning
prior years’ tax refunds or additional tax payments, but will be told that an initial current
year tax position has not yet been determined.  Therefore, the subjects have no
information about the current year (i.e., refund or additional tax owed amounts) and are
expected to make a compliance decision that is based on prior years’ taxpaying
experience.
The information shown in tables 3.2 and 3.3 is excerpted from two cases (see
Appendix E) and illustrates both the experimental manipulation performed in the study
and the compliance decision each subject will be asked to make.  Tables 3.2 and 3.3
are identical with two exceptions.  First, table 3.2 shows that an initial current year tax
position (refund of $1,000) has been determined before considering the current year
compliance decision.  Second, table 3.3 contains prior years’ experience in the form of
the taxpayer’s typical tax filing position (refund of $1,000) for prior years.  Tables 3.2
and 3.3 do not contain tax liability information because research has shown that
individuals focus on refunds and additional taxes owed, not on total liability amounts
[Copeland and Cuccia, 2002].
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 show that the aggressive option (option B) contains a 60
percent chance that the ambiguous deduction will not be disallowed and a 40 percent
chance that the deduction will be disallowed.  The refund increase of $400 and the
refund decrease or additional tax owed of $600 appearing in tables 3.2 and 3.3 can be
illustrated as follows.  Assume that a taxpayer in the 30 percent marginal tax bracket
takes a deduction of $1,333.  If the IRS does not disallow the deduction, the additional
deduction would increase the taxpayer’s refund by $400 ($1,333 x 30%).  However, if
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the IRS disallows the deduction, the taxpayer would incur penalties and interest
totaling $600.
Table 3.4 shows the dollar amounts and the probabilities for each of the two
scenarios within each of the four experimental treatment groups.  Specifically, as is
illustrated in table 3.4, given a refund amount, the aggressive option either includes a
chance of eliminating the entire refund, or a chance of only reducing the refund
(respectively, decision scenarios 2 and 1, or 2a and 1a, from the refund domain).
Conversely, given a tax due amount, the aggressive option either includes a chance of
eliminating the entire tax due, or a chance of only reducing the tax due (respectively,
decision scenarios 4 and 3, or 4a and 3a, from the tax due domain).
It should be noted that subjects in the current year tax position group are given a
preliminarily determined tax position for the current year while subjects in the prior
years’ tax position group are not.  Therefore, the amounts in table 3.4 in the column
titled “current year result” represent current year resulting tax positions.  The amounts
in the column titled “prior years’ average” represent the average tax positions from prior
years.  However, the amounts in the column titled “current year impact” represent only
the impact of a decision to choose either the conservative option (A) or the aggressive
option (B), not the resulting tax position.
In order to effectively make comparisons between groups, the potential gain and
loss amounts for each decision scenario are equal, as illustrated in table 3.4.  For
each scenario, the potential gain is $400 while the potential loss is $600.  Therefore,
the confounding of different gain and loss amounts is removed from consideration.
Further, the expected values of option A and option B within each of the eight
scenarios are equal.  Therefore, there is no monetary advantage to selecting one
option over the other.  Rather, the subject is responding to his/her preference.  Further,
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keeping the expected values of the two options equal for each scenario facilitates
comparisons when analyzing results.
It is important that the dollar amounts in the case cross a subject’s salience
threshold, i.e., the amounts are significant enough to be taken seriously by the subjects
participating in the study.  At the other end of the spectrum, it is important that amounts
are not so large that they seem unrealistic to the subjects.  Table 3.5 shows amounts
that have been used in comparable studies.  White et al. (1993) did a
pretest to determine if there was a significant difference between using a tax savings of
$700 and a tax savings of $1,400.  They found no significant difference and chose to
use $700 in their study.  Christiansen and Hite (1997) took a slightly different approach:
they simply asked the subject if he/she would be willing to take an additional $5,000
deduction or omit $5,000 from income instead of telling the subject to assume a
particular refund or additional tax owed position.  Therefore, the tax savings depended
on the subject’s marginal tax bracket and could range from $750 ($5,000 x 15%) to
$1,980 ($5,000 x 39.6%).  The current study uses a refund amount of $1,000 or $600,
and an additional tax owed amount of $1,000 or $400.  In each scenario, the potential
additional refund amount or reduced additional tax owed amount is $400.
3.5 Research Instrument
3.5.1  Scenario Development
Each case requires the subject to make the decision of whether or not he/she
would take an ambiguous deduction, and to identify the strength of his/her conviction
about this decision.  The ambiguous deduction is purposely not defined in order to
ensure that a subject’s personal biases do not enter into the compliance decision.  For
example, certain individuals could be biased against making charitable contributions
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and, therefore, should not be asked whether or not to take a charitable deduction.  A
second reason is that a subject’s knowledge may influence his/her responses.  For
example, Schisler (1996) asked a group of MBA students whether they would take two
different deductions: a casualty loss deduction and an education expense deduction.
Schisler found that the subjects were more aggressive taking the casualty
loss deduction, possibly because their knowledge about education expense rules
precluded them from taking the education expense deduction in the case.  Further,
knowledge about a particular area may not be consistent for all subjects.  Some
subjects might not understand a certain deduction if they have no experience taking it
on their personal tax returns, while other subjects might understand the deduction.
However, virtually all taxpayers understand that a deduction reduces their tax liability.
Therefore, in order to avoid potential misunderstandings and biases, each participant
will be asked to choose whether or not to include an undefined ambiguous deduction
on his/her current year income tax return.
Each case states that the ambiguous deduction, if taken, would have a 40 percent
probability of disallowance by the IRS, which would result in an imposed penalty plus
interest.  At first glance, this percentage may seem high considering that “the IRS has
audited less than 1 percent of all individual returns in recent years” (Herman, 2/28/01,
page 1).  However, the IRS does not perform a one percent random sample selection
to determine which returns are audited.  Instead, the IRS computer performs a
“discriminant analysis function” (White, Harrison and Harrell, 1993) that is designed to
pick up items on a tax return that have high audit exposure by using mathematical
formulas to determine potentially erroneous items.  For example, “if an individual’s
itemized deductions are in excess of norms established for various income levels, the
probability of an audit increases” (Willis et al., 2002, p. 25-7).  Therefore, even though
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the overall chance of audit is low, the chance of audit can increase substantially when
an item on a tax return is determined by the IRS computer to have a high audit
exposure.  As a result, a 40 percent disallowance probability is reasonable for an
ambiguous, high exposure deduction.  However, to ensure that a taxpayer would
consider this probability to be reasonable, subjects will be asked in the follow-up
questionnaire to state their perception of what is the probability (%) that the IRS will
disallow an ambiguous deduction.
Another reason for choosing 40 percent as the IRS disallowance rate concerns
prior research findings.  White, Harrison and Harrell (1993) concluded that prospect
theory is not effective in a tax context when the risky decision involves a probability of
IRS disallowance so high that the taxpayer subjects in an experiment simply choose
the certain option.  White, et al. used a disallowance rate of 55 percent in their study
and demonstrated the presence of the reflection effect, which is a prospect theory
principle.  Further, Schepanski and Shearer (1995) demonstrated the reflection effect
at both the 60 percent and 70 percent disallowance rates.  Specifically, results from
both studies demonstrated that subjects in the tax due condition were more aggressive
than subjects in the refund condition, hence the reflection effect.  Even though subjects
in the tax due condition were more aggressive than subjects in the refund condition,
the majority of subjects in the tax due condition were conservative, thus suggesting
that prospect theory might not completely explain behavior.  Schadewald (1989) used a
disallowance rate of 70 percent and failed to demonstrate that any prospect theory
principle applied in his study.  In addition to not having the disallowance rate too high,
the disallowance rate should not be so low that subjects decide that the potential
reward is not stimulating enough to take the risk.  For example, Chang, Nichols and
Schultz (1987) tested subjects in the tax due condition using three disallowance rates:
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10 percent, 50 percent and 90 percent.  Subjects acted most aggressively at the 50
percent level.  However, prospect theory was not supported because only about one-
half of the subjects acted aggressively at the 50 percent disallowance rate.
Initially, 60 percent was chosen as the disallowance rate to be used in this study.
The reason for initially choosing 60 percent pertains to the relationship between the
disallowance rate and the amount of the IRS penalty plus interest.   According to
Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 6662, the penalty for accuracy-related errors is
20 percent.  Further, according to IRC §6622, interest is compounded daily and the
rate is based on current market conditions.  The interest rate is revised quarterly.
Table 3.6 shows the interest rate for the five-year period from 1997 to 2001.  The
average rate for that period is 8.3 percent.  Further, the statute of limitations (IRC
§6501) provides the IRS with a three-year window of opportunity to disallow a
taxpayer’s deduction.  Often, it takes the IRS another one to two years after identifying
which tax returns to audit to actually conduct the audit.  Therefore, interest typically
runs four to five years before the matter is resolved.  The average interest rate of 8.3
percent compounded daily for four years grows to a total interest rate of 39 percent,
and compounded daily for five years grows to a total interest rate of 51 percent.  The
39 percent interest rate added to the 20 percent penalty rate results in a penalty and
interest rate of 59 percent.  While the 51 percent interest rate added to the 20 percent
penalty rate results in a penalty and interest rate of 71 percent.  Initially, each of the
four decision scenarios used a total IRS penalty and interest rate that fell within this
range (67 percent).
Keeping the expected values of the two options equal within each scenario
facilitates comparisons when analyzing results.  When keeping the expected values of
both options equal, choosing a probability of IRS disallowance and an IRS penalty plus
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interest amount becomes a tradeoff.  That is, there is an inverse relationship between
the two items because the higher the IRS disallowance rate, the lower the IRS penalty
and interest rate, and vice-versa.  For example, a 50 percent IRS disallowance
probability would result in a 100 percent IRS penalty and interest rate.  A 100 percent
rate is unrealistically high.  Further, a 70 percent IRS disallowance probability would
result in a 43 percent IRS penalty and interest rate.  Although perhaps not apparent to
the average taxpayer, a 43 percent rate is also not realistic, and as seen in
Schadewald (1989), a 70 percent disallowance rate may be too high.  A 60 percent IRS
disallowance rate yields a 67 percent IRS penalty and interest rate, which is slightly
less than the 71 percent rate calculated above.  The computation of these percentages
is illustrated in table 3.7 using the certain option (option A) amount of $1,000, which is
the amount chosen in scenario #1 in table 3.4.  Four different alternatives are chosen
for the risky option (option B).
After performing the pretest, it became apparent that the IRS disallowance rate of
60 percent was too high.  It appeared to be masking aggressive behavior that would
otherwise manifest if a lower disallowance rate were used.  Therefore, the requirement
of a realistic IRS penalty and interest rate was relaxed and the disallowance rate of 40
percent was chosen for this study, even though choosing that disallowance rate
resulted in a penalty and interest rate of 150 percent, as is illustrated in table 3.7.
The participants will be told to consider each decision scenario independently and
sequentially, and that there are no correct or incorrect responses.  Since two decision
scenarios are involved, the scenarios will be reordered to counteract any potential
order effects.
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3.5.2  Social Desirability Response Bias
A social desirability response bias is the tendency for the subject to respond in a
manner that he/she feels is socially acceptable, but is not necessarily congruent with
how he/she would respond in an actual situation.  Robben, Webley, Elffers and
Hessing (1990) suggest that this can be an important consideration in a tax study.
They theorize that it can be hard to get subjects to respond aggressively in a case
study because subjects may want to present an image of themselves as being honest.
Further, they state that “in everyday tax evasion, people are able to regard their
behavior not as dishonest, but as clever, justified, or reasonable” (page 360).
Participants who consistently choose the case study’s certain option (A), but who state
that the majority of taxpayers would select the risky option (B), could be demonstrating
a social desirability response bias.  To determine the possibility of a social desirability
response bias, subjects will also be asked to determine which option they think most
taxpayers would choose.  This question is placed at the end of the questionnaire to
prevent or minimize any tainting of a person’s response.
3.5.3  Demographic and Risk Perception
The research instrument will also include a questionnaire that will ask each subject
for demographic and risk perception information (see appendix F).  This information is
gathered to enable further testing of the responses and to determine the affect these
factors had on subjects’ responses to the case study.  Further, the questionnaire will
attempt to elicit the subject’s risk propensity, which also could be a factor in his/her
willingness to act aggressively in a tax situation.  Finally, the questionnaire tries to
determine the subject’s level of honesty in general by asking subjects to give their
opinion about how honest they are compared to other taxpayers.
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Periodically, the President signs major tax legislation into law.  In such cases, the
tax refund or payment that a taxpayer incurs as a result of the law may alter a person’s
responses.  Such a situation recently occurred on June 7, 2001 when President Bush
signed into law the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (Public
Law 107-16, 107th Congress, 1st Session), which provides taxpayers with a large tax
cut effective in 2001 and for the next 10 years.  For the first time in this country’s
history, the IRS mailed refund checks to taxpayers for the current year, during the
current year (2001).  Thus, taxpayers did not have to wait until they filed their tax
returns at the end of the year in order to get their refunds.  It is not clear whether
taxpayers will expect to continue to receive refunds when filing future tax returns.
Therefore, questions relevant to this legislation will be asked in the follow-up
questionnaire to determine how the new tax law influences a taxpayer’s expectations.
3.5.4  Intertemporal Issue
Psychological accounting literature has demonstrated that people tend to discount
future losses.  They like to experience rewards sooner and incur costs later
[O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999].  Therefore, it is possible that subjects in this study
could be more prone to choose the aggressive option because they are savvy enough
to realize that IRS penalties and interest might not be incurred until three or four years
into the future.  They could be willing to take on costs if those costs are not realized
until some point in the future.  The propensity to do this will be determined by asking a
question in the follow-up questionnaire.  Subjects’ responses will be analyzed to
determine if this intertemporal issue influenced results.
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3.5.5  Pretest and Pilot Study
3.5.5.1  Pretest to a Pilot Study
The research instrument was pretested with a convenience sample of three
working adults, including two tax attorneys who have experience working with a wide
variety of clients.  The goal was to develop an instrument that is readable,
understandable, realistic, and crosses a subject’s salience threshold, i.e., the dollar
amounts are significant enough to be taken seriously by the subjects completing the
case study.  The pretest subjects completed the case study (appendix E) and the
demographic and risk perception questionnaire (appendix F).  In addition, they
completed a follow-up pretest questionnaire (appendix G), which requested additional
comments that they deemed to be helpful to the experiment.  The comments of the
pretest subjects have been incorporated into the cases.
3.5.5.2  Pilot Study
The research instrument will be pilot-tested by asking subjects to complete the
case study (appendix E), and the follow-up demographic and risk perception
questionnaire (appendix F). In order to determine that all eight scenarios are
operational, all scenarios will be pilot-tested.
3.6 Experimental Analysis
3.6.1  Sample Size
Whenever a statistical analysis involves testing a sample from a population, there
is a chance that a statistical conclusion will be incorrect.  For example, there is a
chance that the null hypothesis will be rejected when it is true.  This kind of error is
called a Type I error and its probability of occurrence is designated as alpha (α).
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Conversely, there is also a chance that the null hypothesis will fail to be rejected when
it is false.  This kind of error is called a Type II error and its probability of occurrence is
designated as beta (β).  Given these concepts, choosing the levels of acceptable alpha
and beta risk for a study involves a tradeoff: the lower the alpha risk, the greater the
beta risk, and vice-versa.  The term power is defined as the probability of correctly
rejecting a false null hypothesis, and is represented in formula notation as one minus
the beta risk (1 - β).  Stated differently, power represents the ability to find a difference
(i.e., a difference in population means) that actually exists.  For a given level of alpha
risk, increasing the sample size will increase the power of the study, thus lowering the
beta risk.
3.6.1.1  Analysis of Variance Test
In order to determine the sample size necessary to perform an analysis of variance
(ANOVA), the standard deviation (σ) for the population must be estimated.  The
standard deviation is a measure of the average of the deviations of each individual
score from the mean.  The standard deviation used to compute the sample size will be
estimated from the pilot test.  However, until the pilot test is performed, the standard
deviation used will follow from this quote: “the standard deviation for many distributions
is usually about one-fifth or one-sixth of the range” (Howell, 1992, page 41).  In this
study, subjects will indicate the strength of their preferences using a ten-point scale
(see section 3.5.2).  In order to be conservative, it is assumed that the standard
deviation approximates one-fifth of the range of ten, which equals two points on the
ten-point scale.
There will be two ANOVA models used to analyze the data in this study, with two
independent variables (at two levels) in each model.  Thus, both models will have four
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cells.  In order to compute the required sample size when using ANOVA, two additional
items must be determined: the effect size and the desired power level (Cohen, 1988).
The effect size is defined as the amount of variation from the null hypothesis that is
determined to be significant (Cohen, 1988).  It is an arbitrary measure determined by
the researcher.  The selected effect size in this study is one point on the ten-point
scale.  In order to be able to use the effect size in Cohen’s sample size formula, the
effect size must be converted to a distance measure and standardized by dividing by
the standard deviation.  Therefore, the distance measure, d, in formula notation is:
d  =  (µ1 - µ0)  /  σ
where:
µ1 is the mean under the alternative hypothesis,
µ0 is the mean under the null hypothesis, and
σ is the standard deviation of the population.
Therefore, the absolute value of d is calculated as:
(6.50 – 5.50) / 2 = .50  or (4.50 – 5.50) / 2 = .50
Cohen uses d to compute f, which is defined as “the standard deviation of standardized
means” [Cohen, 1988, page 276].  The formula for f is:
 f  =  (1 / k) d
where:
d  =  the distance measure, and
k  =  the number of treatment groups for a variable.
As previously stated, there are three independent variables being tested in this
experiment.  Each variable contains two factors (treatment groups).  Therefore, k
equals 2 for each variable.  Because k equals 2, f is calculated as:
f  =  (1 / 2) (.5)  =  .25
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Finally, in order to calculate sample size, the required power level must be
determined.  According to Cohen, “when the investigator has no other basis for setting
the desired power value, the value .80 should be used” [Cohen, 1988, page 56].
Therefore, assuming a power level of 80 percent, and using an f value of .25, an alpha
level of .05, and “Sample Size Table 8.4.4” developed by Cohen, the required sample
size per cell is 16 [Cohen, 1988, page 384].  Given that there are 8 cells in this
experiment, that translates into a total sample size of 128 to perform the experiment.  If
the power level is increased to 90 percent, then the required sample size per cell
increases to 22, resulting in a total sample size of 176 [Cohen, 1988, page 384].  This
research study has set the minimum number of observations per cell at 25, which
increases the power to over 90 percent and results in a minimum total sample size of
200 (25/cell  x  4 cells/ANOVA  x  2 ANOVA models/study).
3.6.1.2  Chi-Square Test
The two ANOVA models will be used to analyze the subjects’ responses on the
ten-point scale.  However, the responses will also be dichotomized: responses on the
left-hand side of the scale (scored 1 through 5) will represent choosing the
conservative option (A), and responses on the right-hand side of the scale (scored 6
through 10) will represent choosing the aggressive option (B).  The dichotomous
responses will be analyzed using a chi-square test.  In order to compute the required
sample size, the effect size must be determined (Cohen, 1988).  As for the ANOVA
test, the effect size is defined as the amount of variation from the null hypothesis that is
determined to be significant (Cohen, 1988).  It is an arbitrary measure determined by
the researcher.  The selected effect size for the chi-square test is .30 (30 percent),
which is a “medium effect size” according to Cohen (1988, page 225).  For example, if
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the null hypothesis is that a proportion will have a value of .50, then an observed
proportion that is at least .15 (15 percent) different in either direction (i.e., less than or
equal to .35, or greater than or equal to .65) will be considered to be statistically
significant.
In addition to the effect size, degrees of freedom must also be calculated.  The chi-
square test will be performed using a 2 x 2 contingency matrix.  By definition, there is
one degree of freedom when using a 2 x 2 matrix (Cohen, 1988).  There are four chi-
square tests to be performed, one for each of the four treatment groups.  Given an
effect size of .30, one degree of freedom, an alpha level of .05, a sample size of 100,
and using “Power Table 7.3.15” developed by Cohen, the resulting power for each of
the four chi-square tests is 85 percent [Cohen, 1988, page 235].  However, increasing
the sample size by 17 subjects per chi-square test would increase the power to 90
percent according to “Sample Size Table 7.4.6” [Cohen, 1988, page 258].  Therefore, a
minimum of 120 subjects will be chosen for each of the four chi-square tests.
3.6.2  Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in this study will be the choice made by each subject.  As
previously noted in the Research Design section and illustrated in the Research
Instrument section, subjects will make a dichotomous choice about whether to choose
the conservative (certain) option (A), or the aggressive (risky) option (B).  Subjects will
be asked to choose either option A or option B, and then to identify the strength of their
convictions by circling a number on a five-point scale.  The end points of the scale are
labeled “weakly” and “strongly”.  (See the research instrument located in appendix E.)
An illustration of the scale is as follows:
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1                           2                           3                           4                           5
weakly moderately strongly
The five-point strength of conviction measure will be combined with the dichotomous
selection to create a transformed ten-point scale.  The transformation will be
accomplished by reverse scoring the conservative (option A) choices.  Therefore, the
endpoints on this ten-point scale will be “1” for those subjects who choose the
conservative option (A) and indicate that they strongly choose this option by circling “5”
on the strength of conviction scale, and “10” for those subjects who choose the
aggressive option (B) and indicate that they strongly choose this option by circling “5”
on the strength of conviction scale.5  An illustration of the scale is as follows:
Strongly Strongly
Conservative Aggressive
|              |              |              |              |              |              |              |              |              |
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
A5 A4 A3 A2 A1 B1 B2 B3 B4 B5
Note that letter A represents option A, while letter B represents option B.  For example,
“A2” represents a subject choosing option A with a strength of conviction reading of 2.
That response would be scored number 4 on the ten-point scale.  The scores on the
ten-point scale will be collected and analyzed using an analysis of variance test, while
the dichotomous decisions will be analyzed using a chi-square test.
A ten-point scale is chosen for this study.  Other studies have used seven-point
scales (Chang, 1995 and Copeland and Cuccia, 2002), an eight-point scale
(Schadewald, 1989), nine-point scales (Schepanski & Kelsey, 1990, Schepanski &
Shearer, 1995, and Christensen & Hite, 1997), ten-point scales (Sullivan, 1993 and
White, Harrison & Harrell, 1993), and a one hundred-point scale (Schisler, 1996) to
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measure subjects’ strength of preference.  However, all odd-point scales have a
neutral midpoint that, if chosen, effectively allows the subject to be indifferent.  This is
not realistic because taxpayers make decisions when preparing their tax returns.
Therefore, the strength of preference stated on an even-numbered scale (i.e., an eight-
point scale or a ten-point scale) is a better option.
The choice of a particular scale is somewhat arbitrary and does not affect this
study.  For example, when using a scale with fewer points, the dispersion of data is
narrower than when using a scale with more points.  The effect size would be smaller
and the standard deviation would also be smaller.  Simply put, because the smaller
effect size is standardized (divided by the standard deviation), choosing a particular
scale becomes an arbitrary decision, resulting in the same required sample size for any
sized scale.
3.6.3  Independent Variables
3.6.3.1  Between-Subjects Variables
There are two independent between-subjects variables: the assigned tax position
and the domain of the case scenario.  Each subject will be given either a current year
tax position or prior years’ tax position.  The given tax position represents the first
variable.  The results for this variable will be analyzed to determine whether tax
position influences the subjects’ decisions about whether or not to act aggressively.
The second between-subjects variable will be the domain assigned to the subject.
As previously noted, subjects will be given a case with two scenarios; both scenarios
involving either a refund or a tax due.  Given that the refund and additional tax owed
amounts for scenario #2 are not equal, a comparison between the refund domain and
                                                                                                                                                                         
5 The transformed ten-point preference rating scale is the same measure used by Sullivan (1993).
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the additional tax owed domain is not appropriate.  As a result, separate ANOVAs will
be performed for responses obtained in the refund and tax owed domains.
3.6.3.2  Within-Subjects Variable
As previously noted, each subject will be asked to respond to two scenarios, both
involving either refunds or additional tax payments.  As illustrated in table 3.4, one
scenario provides an opportunity to only reduce the gain or loss (scenario #1), while
the other scenario provides an opportunity to completely eliminate the gain or loss
(scenario #2).  How the subjects respond to each of the two scenarios represents a
within-subjects variable.
3.6.4  Analysis of the Within-Subjects Variable – Chi-Square Test
To determine which theory applies under what set of conditions, i.e., testing
hypotheses one and two, individual comparisons between the scenarios will be made
for each of the four experimental groups.  Table 3.8 lists the possible results from
testing the within-subjects variable in the refund domain, and how to interpret the
results.  The house money effect suggests that subjects in a refund domain would act
aggressively unless the risk involved the possibility of completely eliminating the gain
created by the refund, in which case the subject would act conservatively.  Therefore,
the house money effect would explain a subject choosing aggressively for scenario #1
and conservatively for scenario #2.  Prospect theory suggests that subjects in a refund
domain would act conservatively, assuming that withholding position is the subject's
reference point.  Therefore, prospect theory would explain a subject choosing
conservatively for both scenarios #1 and #2.  Expected utility theory suggests that an
individual who is normally a risk-taker would choose aggressively for both scenarios #1
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and #2, regardless of any other factors such as the presence of a prior refund or the
taxpayer’s withholding position.  No known theory explains the choice selection of
choosing conservatively for scenario #1 and aggressively for scenario #2.
Table 3.9 lists various possible results from testing the within-subjects variable in
the tax due domain, and how to interpret the results.  The breakeven effect suggests
that subjects in a tax due domain would act conservatively, unless the risk involved the
potential to completely eliminate the tax due (loss), in which case the subject would act
aggressively.  Therefore, the breakeven effect would explain a subject choosing
conservatively for scenario #1 and aggressively for scenario #2.  Prospect theory
suggests that subjects in a tax due domain would act aggressively, assuming that
withholding position is the subject's reference point.  Therefore, prospect theory would
explain a subject choosing aggressively for both scenarios #1 and #2.  Expected utility
theory suggests that an individual who is normally risk-averse would choose
conservatively for both scenarios #1 and #2, regardless of any other factors such as
the presence of a prior additional tax owed amount or the taxpayer’s withholding
position.  No known theory explains the choice selection of choosing aggressively for
scenario #1 and conservatively for scenario #2.
It should be noted that analyzing either the refund domain or the tax due domain
individually will not determine the presence of prospect theory.  Instead, the two
domains will be considered in conjunction using a chi-square test to determine the
presence of the reflection effect theorized by prospect theory.  The reflection effect is
the term used to describe the difference in behavior between the refund domain and
the tax due domain.  Prospect theory posits that people are conservative in the refund
domain and aggressive in the tax due domain.  In other words, there is a “reflection”
around the reference point.
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The dichotomous decisions that subjects make in each case scenario will result in
a binomial sampling distribution of responses.  The binomial distribution deals with
situations in which each of a number of independent trials results in one of two
mutually exclusive outcomes.  In this case, subjects make a dichotomous decision to
choose either option A or option B.  The chi-square statistic will be computed to
determine if there are significant differences in the proportion of subjects choosing
various combinations of responses.
The outcomes will be analyzed using a 2 x 2 contingency matrix for each of the
four treatment groups.  For the two refund domain treatment groups illustrated in table
3.10, a significant number of subjects choosing option A for both scenario #1 and
scenario #2 would suggest that prospect theory (PT) is more applicable to these
subjects than other theories.  A significant number of subjects choosing option B for
scenario #1 and option A for scenario #2 would suggest that the house money effect
(HME) is more applicable to these subjects than other theories.  A significant number
of subjects choosing option B for both scenario #1 and scenario #2 would suggest that
expected utility theory (EUT) is more applicable depending on the subject’s risk
preference.  A significant number of subjects choosing option A for scenario #1 and
option B for scenario #2 could not be explained by any of these three theories.
For the two tax due treatment groups illustrated in table 3.11, a significant number
of subjects choosing option B for both scenario #1 and scenario #2 would suggest that
prospect theory (PT) applies.  A significant number of subjects choosing option A for
scenario #1 and option B for scenario #2 would suggest that the breakeven effect (BE)
applies.  A significant number of subjects choosing option A for both scenario #1 and
scenario #2 would suggest that expected utility theory (EUT) applies.  A significant
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number of subjects choosing option B for scenario #1 and option A for scenario #2
could not be explained by one of these three theories
3.6.5  Analysis of Variance Test
In order to test hypotheses 3A and 3B, the preference rating measures given by
each participant will be analyzed using a 2 x 2 repeated measures analysis of variance
(ANOVA) test.  Repeated measures is the type of ANOVA test performed when one or
more of the independent variables is a within-subjects variable.  This type of ANOVA
analysis enables the error term to be broken down into two components: the portion
representing between subjects and the portion representing within subjects.  The
underlying structural model for the repeated measures ANOVA will be:
AGG  = β0 + β1TAXPOS + ei + β2ELIM + β3(TAXPOS x ELIM) + ej
where:
AGG  =  The level of aggressiveness (or strength of preference) stated on a
ten-point scale.
TAXPOS  =  the tax position variable (current year’s position versus prior years’
position).
ei  =  the error term that represents the differences between subjects.
ELIM  =  the chance to eliminate the gain or loss, which is the
within-subjects variable.
(TAXPOS x ELIM) = the interaction between the tax position and chance to
eliminate the gain or loss variables.
ej  =  the error term that represents the differences within subjects.
One of the main variables, ELIM, is a within-subjects variable because each
subject will respond to two scenarios, one with a chance to eliminate a gain or loss, the
other with no chance to eliminate the gain or loss.  The order of the scenarios will be
reversed in order to avoid order effects.  This variable will be analyzed using the chi-
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square test explained in the previous section and is included in the ANOVA model to
test for potential interaction with the TAXPOS variable.  If there is an interaction, the
effects on the interpretation of the two main variables will be evaluated.
3.6.6  Potential Additional Factors
Currently, the independent variables, TAXPOS and ELIM, are tested to determine
their tendency to make a taxpayer act more aggressively.  As the study progresses,
additional tax compliance factors such as education level, individual risk propensity,
perceptions of IRS audit probabilities, etc., may be determined to be significant and
may require additional testing and analysis.
3.7 Chapter Recap
In this chapter, I describe background information, the research design including
the selection of subjects, and the research instruments.  Finally, I discuss the statistical
tests to be used to analyze the data.  The next chapter will discuss the results of the
experiment.
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter the results from performing the experimental analysis, described in
the previous chapter, are discussed.  Further, the results of testing each of the
hypotheses are discussed.  This chapter is organized as follows: the subjects used in
the study are described, the experiments are analyzed for each of the hypotheses
tested, the social desirability response bias issue is addressed, and the test for
potential ordering effects is described.  Finally, the chapter is recapped.
4.2 Description of the Subjects
A total of 415 cases were disseminated to graduate students attending four
regional universities located in the Mid-Atlantic States.  Subjects completed the case
and the corresponding questionnaire during a normal class period.  Most students took
fifteen minutes or less to complete the entire document.  Copies of the cases, the
corresponding demographic and risk perception questionnaire, and the cover letter
attached to the front of each case are located in appendices E, F and H respectively.
(Appendix G includes the follow-up pretest questionnaire.)
Responses from 17 subjects were eliminated from the study because the
respondents’ answers to questions #4 and #5 were not congruent with their responses
to question #1.  Therefore, 398 responses were included in the analysis.  In addition,
16 subjects did not answer the applicable question #4 or #5.  These responses were
included in the analysis since the nonresponse to this question was not incongruent
with their other responses.
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Table 4.1 summarizes some of the demographic data for the subjects included in
this study.  As can be seen in the table, the participants are nearly equal between
genders and about 75 percent of the subjects are professionals, while the other 25
percent are full-time students.  Fifty-five percent of subjects, or their spouses, prepare
their own returns.  Half of the subjects intend to file their federal income tax return for
the current year (2002) using Form 1040.  Almost 19 percent of the subjects are not
sure what form they will use this year, generally because someone else completes the
subject’s return each year and the subject does not pay close attention to the form
number or type.  Ninety percent of subjects are subject to employer withholding.
Table 4.2 shows the mean, median and range amounts for other demographic
data accumulated in this study.  Subjects range in age from 21 to 61, with a mean age
of 30.  Annual salaries range from $0 to $200,000, with a mean of $55,000.  Subjects
have from 0 to 44 years of experience filing a federal income tax return, with a mean of
11 years.  For each demographic variable in table 4.2, the median response is lower
than the mean response, suggesting that the study includes a relatively few older,
more experienced tax filers who inflate the averages up above the medians.
4.3 Tests of The House Money Effect and The Breakeven Effect (H1 and H2)
4.3.1  Introduction
The primary purpose of this study is to introduce and test two theories, the house
money effect and the breakeven effect, that might provide better explanations of
taxpayer behavior than prospect theory.  If the two alternative theories prove to be
explanatory, the house money effect would apply when a taxpayer is conditioned to
expect a refund, while the breakeven effect would apply when a taxpayer is
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conditioned to expect a tax due amount.  These expectations could result from an
initially computed current year tax position, or from prior years’ experience.
According to prospect theory, an individual who is conditioned to expect a refund
will be risk averse, and act conservatively either by not taking an additional deduction
or by not underreporting additional income.  The house money effect contradicts
prospect theory up to a point by theorizing that an individual who has experienced a
prior refund will act aggressively up to the point the risk involves the potential to
eliminate the expected refund.  At that point, the house money effect becomes
congruent with prospect theory and suggests that an individual will become
conservative and not take a risk.
Suggesting that the house money effect will better explain taxpayer behavior when
prior refunds are present, hypothesis #1, stated in alternative form, is:
H1: When taking a deduction does not involve the risk of eliminating a refund (either
prior years’ refunds or a preliminarily determined current year refund), subjects will
be aggressive, and when the deduction does involve the risk of eliminating a
refund, subjects will be conservative.
According to prospect theory, an individual who is conditioned to expect a tax due
amount will be risk averse, and act aggressively either by taking an additional
deduction or by underreporting additional income.  The breakeven effect contradicts
prospect theory up to a point by theorizing that an individual who has experienced a
prior tax due amount will act conservatively up to the point the risk involves the
potential to eliminate the expected tax due amount.  At that point, the breakeven effect
becomes congruent with prospect theory and suggests that an individual will become
aggressive and take a risk.
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Suggesting that the breakeven effect will better explain taxpayer behavior when
prior tax due amounts are present, hypothesis #2, stated in alternative form, is:
H2: When taking a deduction does not provide the opportunity to eliminate an
additional tax owed amount (either prior years’ additional tax owed amounts or a
preliminarily determined current year additional tax owed amount), subjects will be
conservative, and when the deduction does provide the opportunity to eliminate an
additional tax owed amount, subjects will be aggressive.
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of two domains: the refund domain or the
tax due domain.  Further, subjects were randomly assigned to one of two initial tax
positions: a current year initially computed tax position, or a tax position determined by
prior years’ experience.  As a result, four treatment groups were tested in this study:
• the refund domain – current year group,
• the refund domain – prior year group,
• the tax due domain – current year group, and
• the tax due domain – prior year group.
A diagram of the assignment of subjects is shown as:
Domain: Refund Domain Tax Due Domain
               |                             |              
Tax | | | |
Position Year: Current Year Prior Year Current Year Prior Year
| | | |
Treatment | | | |
Group: Refund – CY Refund – PY Tax Due – CY Tax Due – PY
Hypothesis #1 is tested in the two refund domain treatment groups, and hypothesis #2
is tested in the two tax due domain treatment groups.
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In order to test both hypotheses, the dichotomous response dependent variable
was accumulated for each subject, entered into a 2 x 2 contingency matrix, and
analyzed using four separate chi-square goodness of fit tests.  Responses from
subjects are grouped into one of the four cells in the contingency matrix.  An example
of a 2 x 2 contingency matrix used in this study is:
Scenario #1 (no chance to eliminate refund or tax due)
Conservative
Option
Aggressive
Option
Scenario #2 (chance to
eliminate refund or tax due)
Conservative Option
Aggressive Option
For each of the four treatment groups, in addition to performing the chi-square
goodness of fit test, the demographic and risk perception data is analyzed using a
Pearson’s chi-square test of independence to determine whether each item affected
the dependent variable.  These results are analyzed following the analysis of the
contingency matrix.
Finally, each case given to subjects included two scenarios.  Question #1 in each
scenario asked a subject whether or not he/she would take an ambiguous deduction
given an IRS disallowance rate of 40 percent and a potential loss of $600.  Questions
#4 and #5 essentially asked the subject the same thing as question #1, but allow the
subject to choose either the IRS disallowance rate or the dollar amount of the potential
loss that the subject would be willing to accept in order to take the ambiguous
deduction.  About half the subjects were given the opportunity to choose the IRS
disallowance rate, given a potential loss of $600, while the other subjects were given
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the opportunity to choose the dollar amount of loss, given an IRS disallowance rate of
40 percent.
4.3.2  Refund Domain – Current Year
In order to test for the presence of the house money effect, responses from
subjects were grouped into one of the four cells in the 2 x 2 contingency matrix shown
in section 4.3.1.  Table 4.3 shows the matrix for the refund domain – current year
group.  Faced with a preliminarily determined current year refund, a significant number
of subjects chose to respond conservatively (chi-square p-value < .001).  These results
are posited by prospect theory.  These results are consistent with most, if not all, prior
tax studies which found that taxpayers are generally conservative when it comes to
filing their federal income tax returns [Schadewald, 1989; Schepanski and Kelsey,
1990; White, Harrison and Harrel, 1993; Dusenbury, 1994; Schepanski and Shearer,
1995; Copeland and Cuccia, 2002].  In fact, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) suggest
that people, in general, are inherently conservative.  If these subjects are simply
conservative by nature, then expected utility theory (as well as prospect theory) would
explain the behavior.  In order to determine whether prospect theory or expected utility
theory better explains the behavior, responses in the refund domain must be compared
with responses in the tax due domain.  Conservative behavior in the refund domain,
combined with aggressive behavior in the tax due domain, would suggest the presence
of prospect theory.  Although the house money effect does not apply when the IRS
disallowance rate is 40 percent and the IRS penalty and interest amount is $600, this
issue will be analyzed further and discussed later in this section.
A Pearson Chi-Square test of independence was performed for each variable
obtained in the follow-up demographic and risk perception questionnaire to determine
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which ones significantly influenced a subject’s decision.  A listing of the demographic
variables, their average (mean) if the variable is not categorical (a categorical average
would have no meaning), and their corresponding chi-square p-values, are included in
table 4.4.  According to the data, age (Q1, p-value = .013) is associated with the
dependent variable.  In this treatment group, older subjects responded more
aggressively than younger subjects.  This finding corroborates the results from
Clotfelter (1983) which found that the youngest and oldest segments of the population
have the highest degree of compliance.  This finding also corroborate the results from
White, Harrison and Harrell (1993) that found that graduate students are more
aggressive than undergraduate students.  In the White et al. study, the graduate
students were older than the undergraduate students.    Also, subjects who were more
familiar with the federal tax laws that affect them (Q13, p-value = .021), acted more
aggressively than subjects less familiar with the federal tax laws.  Further, the subjects
in this treatment group consider themselves to be more honest than most taxpayers
when preparing a federal tax return (Q14b, p-value = .006), and are risk averse in
general (Q14c, p-value = .037).  However, the most significant factor influencing
subjects’ behavior in this group may be their fear of being audited by the IRS (Q24, p-
value = .019).  Forty-six out of 90 subjects (51 percent) said they feared being audited.
This fear, along with their risk aversion in general, may cause these subjects to avoid
taking risks when they prepare a federal income tax return (Q14a, p-value < .001).
Another factor influencing responses in this treatment group was the particular
information that the subject focused on when completing the case (Q26, p-value <
.001).  Question #26 asked a subject whether he/she focused on the initial refund, or
the potential $400 gain and the potential $600 loss, when responding to question #1 in
each case scenario.  The low p-value suggests that subjects responding conservatively
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focused on the initial refund amount, while subjects responding aggressively focused
on the potential gain or loss amounts.  Specifically, 34 out of 77 subjects (44 percent)
said they focused on the initial refund, 33 out of 77 subjects (43 percent) said they
focused on the potential gain or loss, and 10 out of 77 subjects (13 percent) said they
focused on something else (such as, the fear of being audited).  Integral to the
application of the house money effect is that the subject focus on the potential gain or
loss amounts and how those amounts relate to the initial refund amount.  Forty-four out
of 77 subjects (57 percent) did not do this, which helps to explain why the house
money effect did not apply for this treatment group.
In addition to analyzing responses to the demographic and risk perception
questionnaire, the responses to questions #4 and #5 (where the IRS disallowance rate
and IRS penalty and interest amount assumptions were relaxed) were analyzed for
each scenario.  About half the subjects were asked in questions #4 and #5 if they
would be willing to risk losing a higher or lower dollar amount than $600, given an IRS
disallowance rate of 40 percent.6  The responses are shown in tabular and graphical
form in chart 4.1.  As can be seen in the chart, when provided the opportunity to state
what dollar amounts they would be willing to risk losing given a 40 percent IRS
disallowance rate, subjects exhibited more aggressive behavior than they did when
answering question #1.  In table 4.3, 83 percent of subjects chose the conservative
option for both scenarios #1 and #2.  However, as can be seen in the chart, 64 percent
of subjects would not be willing to risk losing any dollar amount in scenario #1 (initial
refund = $1,000), while 56 percent of subjects would not be willing to risk losing any
                                                          
6 The risk of losing $600 represents the risk of incurring an IRS penalty and interest amount of $600.
Asking the subject whether he/she would be willing to risk losing a higher or lower dollar amount is akin
to asking the subject whether he/she would be willing to risk incurring a higher or lower IRS penalty
amount.
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dollar amount in scenario #2 (initial refund = $600).  Alternatively stated, given an IRS
disallowance rate of 40 percent, 36 percent of subjects would be willing to risk losing
some dollar amount when given an initially computed $1,000 refund, while 44 percent
of subjects would be willing to risk losing some dollar amount when given an initially
computed $600 refund.
Interestingly, more aggressive behavior is exhibited when the initially computed
refund amount is lower.7  Even though scenario #2, the initial refund = $600 scenario,
does not necessarily involve the risk of losing the entire refund, the initially computed
refund amount is lower than in scenario #1.  An explanation for this behavior pattern
first became apparent following the pretest.  Because the pretest was not anonymous,
feedback about responses could be obtained from the subjects.  During the pretest,
some subjects focused on the initially computed refund and did not consider the
potential gain or loss involved with the decision.  These subjects viewed any decision
as involving the risk of eliminating the refund.  Further, as the initial refund and
perceived potential loss amounts got larger, these subjects became more conservative
since they perceived the stakes to be higher.  As a result of this pretest finding,
question #26 was added to the follow-up questionnaire to determine whether the
subject focused on the initial refund amount or the potential gain and loss amounts.
Responses to question #26 indicate that almost one-half of the subjects in this
treatment group viewed the situation in the same manner as those in the pretest, which
could explain an increased amount of aggressiveness in the “initial refund = $600”
scenario over that shown in the “initial refund = $1,000” scenario, shown in chart 4.1.
                                                          
7 It should be noted that neither scenario #1 nor scenario #2 necessarily involves the risk of eliminating
the refund when the subject is asked what dollar amount he/she would be willing to risk losing.  For
example, a subject given an initial refund of $600, who is willing to risk losing $150 of that refund, does
not incur the risk of losing the entire refund.
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However, the difference between the proportion acting aggressively in the two
scenarios is not significant (p-value = .441).
As explained in 4.3.1, subjects who were not given the opportunity to choose the
dollar amount of the loss they would be willing to accept in order to act aggressively,
were given the opportunity to choose the IRS disallowance rate they would be willing to
accept in order to act aggressively, given a potential loss of $600 (questions #4 and
#5).  As can be seen in chart 4.2, subjects exhibited more aggressive behavior than
previously exhibited when answering question #1.  As shown in table 4.3, 83 percent of
subjects chose the conservative option for both scenarios #1 and #2.  Yet, 60 percent
of subjects would not be willing to take an ambiguous deduction at any IRS
disallowance rate in scenario #1 (initial refund = $1,000), and 68 percent of subjects
would not be willing to act aggressively at any IRS disallowance rate in scenario #2
(initial refund = $600).  Alternatively stated, 40 percent of the subjects would be willing
to act aggressively at some IRS disallowance rate when given an initially computed
$1,000 refund, and 32 percent of the subjects would be willing to act aggressively at
some IRS disallowance rate when given an initially computed $600 refund.  More
aggressive behavior is exhibited when the decision does not involve the risk of
eliminating the initially computed refund amount.  This is the behavior pattern posited
by the house money effect.  However, the difference between the proportion acting
aggressively in the “initial refund = $1,000” scenario versus the proportion acting
aggressively in the “initial refund = $600” scenario is not significant (p-value = .424).
Therefore, we cannot conclude that the house money effect explains the subjects’
behavior.
Chart 4.2 shows a total of 45 responses for scenario #1, but a total of 44
responses for scenario #2.  This result occurred because one subject answered
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question #4 or #5 for scenario #1, but did not answer question #4 or #5 for scenario #2.
In addition, four subjects responded to question #1, but not to either question #4 or #5.
Hence table 4.3 includes four more subjects than do charts 4.1 and 4.2 combined.
In summary, results from the refund domain – current year group do not show
significantly more aggressive behavior when a decision does not involve the
opportunity to eliminate the refund than when it does involve the opportunity to
eliminate the refund.  Therefore, H1 is not rejected, which suggests that the house
money effect does not explain the behavior of the current year group.  However,
looking strictly at the results in this section, including the results documented in charts
4.1 and 4.2, it cannot be concluded that prospect theory explains their behavior either.
Further conclusions will be made in chapter 5.
4.3.3  Refund Domain – Prior Year
In order to test for the presence of the house money effect, responses from 101
subjects assigned to the second treatment group were grouped into one of the four
cells in the 2 x 2 contingency matrix shown in section 4.3.1.  Table 4.5 shows the
matrix for the refund domain – prior year group.  Faced with a refund amount
experienced in prior years, a significant number of subjects responded conservatively
(chi-square p-value < .001).  These results are posited by prospect theory.  However,
as noted in the previous section, prior tax studies have found that taxpayers are
generally conservative when it comes to filing their federal income tax returns, and that
people in general are inherently conservative.  If these subjects are simply
conservative by nature, then expected utility theory could also explain the behavior.  In
order to determine whether prospect theory or expected utility theory explains the
behavior, responses in the refund domain must be compared with responses in the tax
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due domain.  Conservative behavior in the refund domain, combined with aggressive
behavior in the tax due domain, would suggest the presence of prospect theory.
Otherwise, expected utility theory would explain behavior.  Although the house money
effect does not apply when the IRS disallowance rate is 40 percent and the IRS penalty
and interest amount is $600, this issue will be analyzed further and discussed later in
this section.
A Pearson Chi-Square test of independence was performed for each demographic
and risk perception variable obtained in the follow-up questionnaire to determine which
ones significantly influenced a subject’s decision.  A listing of the demographic
variables, their mean (average) if the variable is not categorical (a categorical average
would have no meaning), and their corresponding chi-square p-values, are included in
table 4.6.  According to the data, subjects who were more familiar with the federal tax
law in general acted more aggressively (Q12, p-value = .001).  Further, the subjects in
this group are risk averse in general (Q14c, p-value = .005).  However, the most
significant factor influencing the behavior of the subjects in this group may be their fear
of being audited by the IRS (Q24, p-value = .022).  Forty-two out of 88 subjects (48
percent) said they feared being audited.  This fear, along with their risk aversion in
general, may cause these subjects to avoid taking risks when they prepare a federal
income tax return (Q14a, p-value < .001).
As explained in the previous section, about half the subjects were asked if they
would be willing to risk losing a dollar amount higher or lower than $600, given an IRS
disallowance rate of 40 percent (questions #4 and #5).  The responses are shown in
tabular and graphical form in chart 4.3.  As can be seen in the chart, when given the
opportunity to state what dollar amounts subjects would be willing to risk losing,
subjects exhibited more aggressive behavior than previously exhibited when answering
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question #1.  In table 4.5, 54 percent of subjects chose the conservative option for both
scenarios #1 and #2.  However, as can be seen in the chart, 34 percent of subjects
would not be willing to risk losing any dollar amount in scenario #1 (initial refund =
$1,000), while 47 percent of subjects would not be willing to risk losing any dollar
amount in scenario #2 (initial refund = $600).  Alternatively stated, given an IRS
disallowance rate of 40 percent, 66 percent of subjects would be willing to risk losing
some dollar amount when given an average refund in prior years of $1,000, and 53
percent of subjects would be willing to risk losing some dollar amount when given an
average refund in prior years of $600.  Therefore, more aggressive behavior is
exhibited when the prior year refund amount is larger.  In fact, when the prior year
refund equals $1,000, responses were significantly aggressive (chi-square test, p-value
= .020).  This behavior pattern is posited by the house money effect.  However, as
explain in the previous section when describing chart 4.1, neither scenario involves the
risk of eliminating the refund.  Therefore, it cannot be concluded that the house money
effect explains this behavior.
While approximately half the subjects were asked to provide a dollar amount that
they would be willing to risk losing, the other subjects (approximately half) were asked
if they would act aggressively if the IRS disallowance rate were either lower or higher
than 40 percent, given a potential loss of $600 (questions #4 and #5).  As can be seen
in chart 4.4, when the 40 percent IRS disallowance rate is relaxed, subjects exhibited
more aggressive behavior than previously exhibited when answering question #1.  In
table 4.5, 54 percent of subjects chose the conservative option for both scenarios #1
and #2.  However, as seen in chart 4.4, 36 percent of subjects would not be willing to
take an ambiguous deduction at any IRS disallowance rate in scenario #1 (initial refund
= $1,000), while 44 percent of subjects would not be willing to act aggressively at any
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IRS disallowance rate in scenario #2 (initial refund = $600).  Alternatively stated, 64
percent of subjects would be willing to act aggressively at some IRS disallowance rate
when given an average refund in prior years of $1,000, and 56 percent of subjects
would be willing to act aggressively at some IRS disallowance rate when given an
average refund in prior years of $600.  More aggressive behavior is exhibited when the
decision does not involve the chance to lose an amount equal to the refund amount
from prior years.  As was the case with chart 4.2, this is the behavior pattern posited by
the house money effect.  However, the difference between the proportion acting
aggressively between the two scenarios is not significant (p-value = .395).  Therefore,
it cannot be concluded that the house money effect explains this behavior.
Further, three subjects responded to question #1, but not to either question #4 or
#5.  Hence table 4.5 includes three more subjects than do charts 4.3 and 4.4
combined.
In summary, results from the refund domain – prior year group do not show
significantly more aggressive behavior when a decision does not involve the risk of
losing a dollar amount equal to the prior year refund than when it does involve such a
risk.  Therefore, H1 is not rejected, suggesting that we do not have the evidence to
conclude that the house money effect explains behavior for this treatment group.
However, looking strictly at the results in this section, including the results documented
in charts 4.3 and 4.4, it cannot be concluded that prospect theory explains behavior
either.
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4.3.4  Tax Due Domain – Current Year
In order to test for the presence of the breakeven effect, responses from subjects
were grouped into one of the four cells in the 2 x 2 contingency matrix shown in section
4.3.1.  Table 4.7 shows the matrix for the tax due domain – current year group.  Faced
with a preliminarily determined current year tax due amount, a significant number of
subjects chose to respond conservatively (chi-square p-value < .001).  These results
are posited by expected utility theory.  As noted in the previous two sections, prior tax
studies have found that taxpayers are generally conservative when it comes to filing
their federal income tax returns, and that people in general are inherently conservative.
Therefore, given these results by themselves, expected utility theory would explain the
conservative behavior.  Although the breakeven effect does not apply when the IRS
disallowance rate is 40 percent and the IRS penalty and interest amount is $600, this
issue will be analyzed further and discussed later in this section.
A Pearson Chi-Square test of independence was performed for each demographic
and risk perception variable obtained in the follow-up questionnaire to determine which
ones significantly influenced a subject’s decision.  A listing of the variables, their mean
(average) if the variable is not categorical (a categorical average would have no
meaning), and their corresponding chi-square p-values, are included in table 4.8.
According to the data, years worked full-time (Q5, p-value = .034) is associated with
the dependent variable.  More specifically, subjects whose number of years worked
full-time was above the median (5 years) were more aggressive than subjects whose
years worked full-time was below the median.  However, as it was in the refund
domain, the most significant factor influencing subjects’ behavior in this group may be
their fear of being audited by the IRS (Q24, p-value = .108).  Even though the p-value
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is not significant at the α = .05 level, 36 out of 86 subjects (42 percent) said they feared
being audited.  This fear, along with their risk aversion in general (Q14c, p-value =
.038), may cause these subjects to avoid taking risks when they prepare a federal
income tax return (Q14a, p-value < .001).
Not only were subjects asked whether or not they would be willing to risk
increasing their additional tax due amount by $600 given an IRS disallowance rate of
40 percent (question #1), but about half the subjects were also asked if they would be
willing to risk increasing their tax due by a higher or lower dollar amount (questions #4
and #5).  The responses are shown in tabular and graphical form in chart 4.5.  As can
be seen in the chart, subjects exhibited more aggressive behavior than previously
exhibited when answering question #1, when given the opportunity to state at what
dollar amounts they would be willing to risk increasing their tax due given a 40 percent
IRS disallowance rate.  In table 4.7, 61 percent of subjects chose the conservative
option for both scenarios #1 and #2.  However, as can be seen in chart 4.5, 40 percent
of subjects would not be willing to risk increasing their tax due by any dollar amount in
scenario #1 (initial tax due = $1,000), while 47 percent of subjects would not be willing
to risk losing any dollar amount in scenario #2 (initial tax due = $400).  Alternatively
stated, given an IRS disallowance rate of 40 percent, 60 percent of subjects would be
willing to risk increasing their tax due by some dollar amount when given an initially
computed $1,000 tax due amount, and 53 percent of subjects would be willing to risk
increasing their tax due by some dollar amount when given an initially computed $400
tax due amount.
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Interestingly, more aggressive behavior is exhibited when the initially computed tax
due amount is larger.8  This behavior pattern corroborates the finding from Schepanski
and Kelsey (1990) that subjects become more aggressive as the tax due amount
increases.  However, the difference between the proportion acting aggressively in the
“initial tax due = $1,000” scenario and the proportion acting aggressively in the “initial
tax due = $400” scenario is not significant (p-value = .478).  Thus, it cannot be
concluded that subjects become more aggressive as the tax due amount increases.
While about half the subjects were asked if they would be willing to risk increasing
the tax due by a higher or lower dollar amount than $600 given an IRS disallowance
rate of 40 percent (questions #4 and #5), the other subjects were asked if they would
act aggressively if the IRS disallowance rate were either lower or higher than 40
percent (questions #4 and #5).  As can be seen in chart 4.6, subjects exhibited more
aggressive behavior than previously exhibited when answering question #1, when
given the opportunity to state at what IRS disallowance rates they would act
aggressively.  In table 4.7, 61 percent of subjects chose the conservative option for
both scenarios #1 and #2.  But, per chart 4.6, 50 percent of subjects would be willing to
act aggressively at some IRS disallowance rate when given an initially computed tax
due amount of $1,000, and 50 percent of subjects would be willing to act aggressively
at some IRS disallowance rate when given an initially computed tax due amount of
$400.  Therefore, both scenarios exhibit the same level of aggressive behavior,
suggesting that expected utility theory would explain this behavior pattern, not the
breakeven effect or prospect theory.
                                                          
8 It should be noted that neither scenario #1 nor scenario #2 necessarily involves the chance of
eliminating the tax due amount when the subject is asked what dollar amount he/she would be willing to
risk losing.  For example, a subject given an initial tax due amount of $400, who is willing to risk losing
an additional $150, only has the opportunity to reduce the tax due amount by $100.
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Chart 4.5 shows a total of 48 responses for scenario #1, but a total of 47
responses for scenario #2.  This result occurred because one subject answered
question #4 or #5 for scenario #1, but did not answer question #4 or #5 for scenario #2.
In addition, chart 4.6 shows a total of 52 responses for scenario #1, but a total of 48
responses for scenario #2.  This result occurred because four subjects answered
question #4 or #5 for scenario #1, but did not answer question #4 or #5 for scenario #2.
Further, three subjects responded to question #1, but not to either question #4 or #5.
Hence table 4.7 includes three more subjects than do charts 4.5 and 4.6 combined.
In summary, results from the tax due domain – current year group do not show
significantly more aggressive behavior when a decision involves the opportunity to
eliminate the tax due amount than when it does not involve the opportunity to eliminate
the tax due amount.  Therefore, H2 cannot be rejected, which suggests that the
breakeven effect does not explain the behavior for this treatment group.  On the other
hand, results in this section showed that the majority of subjects acted conservatively
when faced with a tax due amount.  Therefore, prospect theory does not explain the
behavior either.
4.3.5  Tax Due Domain – Prior Year
In order to test for the presence of the breakeven effect, responses from subjects
were grouped into one of the four cells in the 2 x 2 contingency matrix shown in section
4.3.1.  Table 4.9 shows the matrix for the tax due domain – prior year group.  Faced
with an additional tax due amount experienced in prior years, a significant number of
subjects chose to respond conservatively (chi-square p-value < .001).  These results
are posited by expected utility theory.  As noted in the previous three sections, prior tax
studies have found that taxpayers are generally conservative when it comes to filing
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their federal income tax returns, and people in general are inherently conservative.
Therefore, given these results by themselves, expected utility theory would explain the
conservative behavior.  Although the breakeven effect does not apply when the IRS
disallowance rate is 40 percent and the IRS penalty and interest amount is $600, this
issue will be analyzed further and discussed later in this section.
A Pearson Chi-Square test of independence was performed for each demographic
and risk perception variable obtained in the follow-up questionnaire to determine which
ones significantly influenced a subject’s decision.  A listing of the variables, their mean
(average) if the variable is not categorical (a categorical average would have no
meaning), and their corresponding chi-square p-values, are included in table 4.10.
According to the data, occupation (Q3, p-value = .025) is associated with the
dependent variable.  Specifically, a larger percentage of full-time students exhibited
aggressive behavior than working professionals.  Yet, the most significant factor
influencing subjects’ behavior in this group may be their fear of being audited by the
IRS (Q24, p-value = .486).  Thirty-nine out of 77 subjects (51 percent) said that they
feared being audited.  The p-value for this variable should be interpreted with caution
because the 39 total amount includes 3 subjects whose response to question #24,
which asks subjects what is the most significant factor that causes them to comply with
the federal income tax laws, seems to contradict their responses to the case.  These
three subjects chose the aggressive option for both scenarios #1 and #2, implying that
they did not fear being audited.  Then, when responding to question #24, stated that
fearing an audit is their reason to comply with the tax law.  If those 3 subjects are
reclassified as not fearing an audit, the p-value for question #24 becomes .012.
Therefore, the apparent fear of audit, along with subjects’ risk aversion in general
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(Q14c, p-value = .052), may cause the subjects in this group to avoid taking risks when
they prepare a federal income tax return (Q14a, p-value < .001).
In addition to being asked whether or not they would be willing to risk increasing
their tax due amount by $600 given an IRS disallowance rate of 40 percent (question
#1), about half the subjects were also asked if they would be willing to risk increasing
their tax due by a higher or lower dollar amount (questions #4 and #5).  The responses
are shown in tabular and graphical form in chart 4.7.  As can be seen in the chart,
subjects exhibited more aggressive behavior than previously exhibited when answering
question #1.  In table 4.9, 66 percent of subjects chose the conservative option for both
scenarios #1 and #2.  However, per chart 4.7, 51 percent of subjects would not be
willing to risk increasing tax due by any dollar amount in scenario #1 (prior year tax due
= $1,000), while 55 percent of subjects would not be willing to risk increasing tax due
by any dollar amount in scenario #2 (prior year tax due = $400).  Alternatively stated,
49 percent of subjects would be willing to risk increasing tax due by some dollar
amount when given an average tax due amount from prior years of $1,000, and 45
percent of subjects would be willing to risk increasing tax due by some dollar amount
when given an average tax due from prior years of $400, given an IRS disallowance
rate of 40 percent.
As was the case with the tax due – current year group, more aggressive behavior
is exhibited when the initially computed additional tax due amount is higher.  Again, this
behavior pattern corroborates the finding from Schepanski and Kelsey (1990) that
subjects become more aggressive as the tax due amount increases.  However, the
difference between the proportion acting aggressively in scenario #1 and the proportion
acting aggressively in scenario #2 is not significant (p-value = .682).  Therefore, it
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cannot be concluded that subjects become more aggressive as the tax due amount
increases.
While about half the subjects were asked if they would be willing to risk increasing
tax due by a higher or lower dollar amount than $600 given an IRS disallowance rate of
40 percent (questions #4 and #5), the other subjects were asked if they would act
aggressively if the IRS disallowance rate were either lower or higher than 40 percent
(questions #4 and #5).  As can be seen in chart 4.8, subjects exhibited more
aggressive behavior than previously exhibited when answering question #1.  In table
4.9, 66 percent of subjects chose the conservative option for both scenarios #1 and #2.
However, per chart 4.8, 46 percent of subjects would not be willing to take an
ambiguous deduction at any IRS disallowance rate in scenario #1 (prior year tax due =
$1,000), while 54 percent of subjects would not be willing to act aggressively at any
IRS disallowance rate in scenario #2 (prior year tax due = $400).  Alternatively stated,
54 percent of subjects would be willing to act aggressively at some IRS disallowance
rate when given an average prior years’ tax due amount of $1,000, and 46 percent of
subjects would be willing to act aggressively at some IRS disallowance rate when
given an average prior years’ tax due amount of $400.  Again, this behavior pattern
corroborates the finding from Schepanski and Kelsey (1990) that subjects become
more aggressive as the tax due amount increases.  However, the difference between
the proportion acting aggressively in scenario #1 (chart 4.8) and the proportion acting
aggressively in scenario #2 is not significant (p-value = .490).  Therefore, it cannot be
concluded that subjects become more aggressive as the tax due amount increases.
Chart 4.8 shows a total of 37 responses for scenario #1, but a total of 39
responses for scenario #2.  This result occurred because two subjects answered
question #4 or #5 for scenario #2, but did not answer question #4 or #5 for scenario #1.
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In addition, four subjects in this group responded to question #1, but not to either
question #4 or #5.  Hence table 4.9 includes four more subjects than do charts 4.7 and
4.8 combined.
In summary, results from the tax due domain – prior year group do not show
significantly more aggressive behavior when a decision involves the opportunity to
eliminate the tax due amount than when it does not involve the opportunity to eliminate
the tax due amount.  Therefore, H2 is not rejected, which suggests that the breakeven
effect does not explain the behavior for this treatment group.  However, results in this
section showed that the majority of subjects acted conservatively when faced with a tax
due amount.  Therefore, prospect theory does not explain the behavior either.
4.4 Test of Current Year versus Prior Year Tax Positions (H3)
4.4.1  Introduction
A secondary objective of this study is to determine whether an initially computed
current year tax position, or a tax position based on prior years experience, more
significantly influences an individual taxpayer’s level of aggressiveness when making a
compliance decision.  The house money effect and the breakeven effect suggest that
taxpayers recognize refund and tax due positions as prior gains and losses
respectively.  Neither the house money effect nor the breakeven effect put a time limit
on when the prior gain or loss must occur in order to influence a current decision.
Although the period over which either theory has influence has not yet been tested, it
could be argued that the closer the prior event is to the current decision, the more
significant the theory’s influence.  That is, the house money and breakeven effects
could diminish with the passage of time.  This idea is supported by the Copeland and
Cuccia (2002) study which found that the influence of a current year reference point, in
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their case a taxpayer’s current year withholding position, is greater than the influence
of the prior years’ experience because taxpayers adapt to their current filing scenario.
As a result, it is expected that the initially computed current year tax position has
greater influence over a compliance decision than prior years’ experience, assuming
that prior years’ experience is viewed as a prior gain or loss.  Therefore, positing that
one or both of these two tax positions influences a compliance decision, and that the
influence of the initially computed current year tax position is greater, the third
hypothesis, stated in alternative form for each domain, is:
H3A: In the refund domain, the preliminarily computed current year tax position, in the
absence of prior years’ experience, influences a taxpayer to be more aggressive
than prior years’ experience, in the absence of a preliminarily computed current
year tax position.
H3B: In the tax due domain, the preliminarily computed current year tax position, in the
absence of prior years’ experience, influences a taxpayer to be less aggressive
than prior years’ experience, in the absence of a preliminarily computed current
year tax position.
When testing hypothesis #3, the subject’s level of aggressiveness represented the
dependent variable, which was measured using the 10-point scale as described in
section 3.6.2.  Question 14a in the follow-up questionnaire asks the subject to rate
his/her propensity to take risks, using a 7-point scale, as compared to other taxpayers
when preparing a tax return.  A Pearson’s Chi-Square test of independence was
performed to determine the association between question #14a in the questionnaire
and this 10-point scale for both scenarios #1 and #2.  The p-value of < .001 for the test
of both scenarios suggests that the subjects’ responses to question 14a and the
responses on the 10-point scale are associated.
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The 10-point scale was constructed as point 1 being strongly conservative and
point 10 being strongly aggressive.  The test contained two independent variables, the
subject’s assigned tax position (TAXPOS), and the chance to eliminate the refund or
tax due amount (ELIM).  TAXPOS0 represented the tax position based on prior years’
experience, while TAXPOS1 represented the initially determined current year’s tax
position.  ELIM1 represented no chance to eliminate the refund or tax due amount,
while ELIM2 represented the chance to eliminate the refund or tax due amount.  In
addition, the interaction between the two main variables (TAXPOS * ELIM) was tested
for significance.
In order to test hypothesis #3, a repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA)
test was performed in both the refund and the tax due domains.  A repeated measures
ANOVA was performed instead of a one-way ANOVA because one of the two
independent variables, ELIM, was a within-subjects variable.  A repeated measures
ANOVA has two error terms, one that represents the variation between subjects, the
other that represents the variation within subjects.  The underlying structural model for
the repeated measures ANOVA used in this study was:
AGG  = β0 + β1TAXPOS + ei + β2ELIM + β3(TAXPOS x ELIM) + ej
where:
AGG  =  The level of aggressiveness (or strength of preference) stated on a
ten-point scale.
TAXPOS  =  the tax position variable (current year’s position versus prior years’
position).
ei  =  the error term that represents the differences between subjects.
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ELIM  =  the chance to eliminate the gain or loss, which is the
within-subjects variable.
(TAXPOS x ELIM) = the interaction between the tax position and chance to
eliminate the gain or loss variables.
ej  =  the error term that represents the differences within subjects.
The ANOVA was performed to determine if there was a difference between the
TAXPOS0 and TAXPOS1 groups.  If there was a difference, then the means of the two
groups were examined to determine which group dominated the other.  As for the ELIM
variable, the ANOVA by itself could not determine the presence of the house money
effect or the breakeven effect.  These two theories were tested using the chi-square
test described in the previous section.  But, it was necessary to include the ELIM
variable in the ANOVA model to determine if there was any interaction effects that
would impact the interpretation of the main effects.  The analysis for the refund domain
is discussed next with that for the tax due domain to follow.
4.4.2  Refund Domain
The ANOVA analysis for both the between-subjects variable (TAXPOS) and the
within subjects variable (ELIM), plus their interaction (TAXPOS * ELIM), are displayed
in table 4.11.  As can be seen from the ANOVA table, the TAXPOS variable is
significant (p-value > .001), which suggests that there is a difference between the
means from the TAXPOS0 (prior years’ experience) group and the TAXPOS1 (initially
determined current year position) group.  Table 4.12 displays the means from the two
groups.  The subjects assigned to the prior year tax position (TAXPOS0) group (mean
= 4.63) responded more aggressively to the cases than the subjects assigned to the
current year tax position (TAXPOS1) group (mean = 2.56).  In other words, subjects
given only a tax position based on prior years’ experience responded more
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aggressively than subjects given only an initial current year tax position.  Not only is
H3A not rejected, but the opposite behavior than that posited in H3A is demonstrated.
Implications of this result will be discussed in chapter 5.
Further, analysis of table 4.11 shows that the ELIM variable is also significant (p-
value = .036), which suggests that there is a difference between the means from the
ELIM1 (no risk of eliminating the refund) group and the ELIM2 (risk of eliminating the
refund) group.  As can be seen in table 4.12, subjects in the ELIM1 group (mean =
3.75) responded more aggressively to the cases than the subjects in the ELIM2 group
(mean = 3.44).  In other words, subjects responded more aggressively when the
compliance decision did not involve the risk of eliminating the refund than when the
decision did involve the risk of eliminating the refund.  This result could suggest the
presence of the house money effect.  However, the ANOVA test by itself cannot make
that determination.  The chi-square test performed in the previous section was
necessary to make that determination.  The ELIM variable was included in the model
only to test for interaction effects.  As can be seen in table 4.11, the interaction
between the TAXPOS variable and the ELIM variable was not significant (p-value =
.390).
4.4.3  Tax Due Domain
The ANOVA analysis for both the between-subjects variable (TAXPOS) and the
within subjects variable (ELIM), plus their interaction (TAXPOS * ELIM), are displayed
in table 4.13.  As can be seen from the ANOVA table, the TAXPOS variable is not
significant (p-value = .392), which suggests that there is no difference between the
means from the TAXPOS0 (prior years’ experience) group and the TAXPOS1 (initially
determined current year position) group.  In other words, subjects assigned to the prior
89
years’ tax position (TAXPOS0) group did not respond more aggressively to the cases
than the subjects assigned to the current year tax position (TAXPOS1) group, as
posited in H3B.  Therefore, H3B is not rejected.  Implications of this result will be
discussed in chapter 5.
Further, analysis of table 4.13 shows that the ELIM variable also is not significant
(p-value = .231), which suggests that there is no difference between the means from
the ELIM1 (no risk of eliminating the refund) group and the ELIM2 (risk of eliminating
the refund) group.  Interestingly, the interaction between the TAXPOS variable and the
ELIM variable was significant (p-value = .016).  But, because neither of the two main
variables was significant, the explanation of this interaction is not meaningful.
4.5 Social Desirability Response Bias
A social desirability response bias is the tendency for the subject to respond in a
manner that he/she feels is socially acceptable, which is not necessarily congruent with
how he/she would respond in an actual situation (see section 3.5.2).  Subjects who
consistently choose the case study’s conservative option for themselves (question #1),
but who state that the majority of taxpayers would select the aggressive option
(question #3), could be demonstrating a social desirability response bias.  However,
another explanation for this response pattern is that the subject simply considers
himself/herself to be more risk averse (or conservative) when preparing a federal
income tax return.  In this study, 160 subjects (39 percent) responded conservatively
for question #1, but aggressively for question #3 in either scenario #1, #2, or both.  An
illustration of question #3 is as follows:
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3. Which option do you think the majority of taxpayers would choose in question
#1?  (Circle your choice.)
A or B
Conversely, 49 subjects (12 percent) responded aggressively for question #1, but
conservatively for question #3 in either scenario #1, #2, or both, thus suggesting that
these subjects consider themselves to be more risk seeking (or aggressive) when
preparing a federal income tax return.  Question 14a in the follow-up questionnaire
asks the subject to rate his/her propensity to take risks, using a 7-point scale, as
compared to other taxpayers when preparing a tax return.  A Pearson’s Chi-Square
test of independence was performed to determine the association between question
#14a in the questionnaire and question #3 in the case.  The p-value of < .001 suggests
that the two questions are associated.  In other words, subjects responding differently
to question #3 than to question #1 simply consider themselves to be more or less
aggressive than the average taxpayer, and there is not a social desirability response
bias problem in this study.
4.6 Test for Ordering Effects
Each scenario in each case involved a decision of whether to choose option A or
option B.  One option was the aggressive option, and the other option was the
conservative option.  The order of the options was reversed for half the subjects in
order to avoid ordering effects.  A t-test was performed in order to test for the presence
of an ordering effect.  In the refund domain, 112 subjects were given a case where
option B was the aggressive option, while 93 subjects were given a case where option
A was the aggressive option.  The t-test showed no difference in means between the
two groups (p-value = .351) and, therefore, no ordering effect in the refund domain.
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In the tax due domain, 110 subjects were given a case where option B was the
aggressive option, while 83 subjects were given a case where option A was the
aggressive option.  The t-test showed no difference in means between the two groups
at the α = .05 significance level (p-value = .057), although barely.  Looking beyond the
insignificant p-value, subjects exhibited slightly more aggressive behavior when the
aggressive option was stated first.
Each subject was given a case involving two scenarios: scenario #1 did not
provide the chance to eliminate the refund or tax due amount, while scenario #2 did
provide the chance to eliminate the refund or tax due amount.  In order to test for
potential ordering effects of the scenario order, the study was extended to
undergraduate students taking an advanced-level accounting course at a regional
university in the Mid-Atlantic region.  In the refund domain, 13 students were given a
case where scenario #1 involved the risk of eliminating the refund, while another 13
students were given a case where scenario #2 involved the risk of eliminating the
refund.  A t-test was performed to determine if there was a difference between the
mean responses of the two groups.  Results showed no difference in means (p-value =
.117) and, therefore, no ordering effect in the refund domain.
In the tax due domain, 24 students were given a case where scenario #1 involved
the chance to eliminate the tax due amount, while 17 students were given a case
where scenario #2 involved the chance to eliminate the tax due amount.  A t-test was
performed to determine if there was a difference between the mean responses of the
two groups.  Results showed no difference in means (p-value = .349) and, therefore,
no ordering effect in the tax due domain.
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4.7 Chapter Recap
In this chapter, the experimental analysis has been described and discussed.  In
the next chapter, conclusions from the study will be drawn and limitations of the
research will be discussed.  Implications for tax policy and compliance will be
discussed, along with ideas for future research.
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 CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE
RESEARCH
5.1 Introduction
The primary purpose of this study was to determine which theory in both a refund
situation and a tax due situation, better explains taxpayer behavior.  In a refund
situation, prospect theory, the object of many prior tax studies, was tested against the
house money effect, which until this point has been untested in the field of tax.  In a tax
due situation, prospect theory was tested against the breakeven effect, another theory
never before tested in the tax context.
The secondary purpose of this study was to determine whether an initially
computed current year tax position or a tax position based on prior years’ experience
more significantly influenced a taxpayer’s compliance decision.  The subjects used in
this study were graduates students attending four regional universities in the Middle-
Atlantic states.  The subjects were selected because they generally have more than a
few years of taxpaying experience and, therefore, could be representative of a large
segment of the taxpaying population.
In this chapter, the results of the tests in this study will be summarized.  Further,
the contributions to existing theory and tax policy, the limitations of the research, and
the suggestions for future research will be discussed.
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5.2 Which Theory Better Explains Taxpayer Behavior (H1 and H2)
5.2.1  IRS Disallowance Rate = 40 Percent, Potential Dollar Loss = $600
Subjects were asked whether or not they would take an ambiguous deduction in
two different scenarios, given a 40 percent chance that the IRS would disallow the
deduction, thus resulting in either a refund decrease or a tax due increase of $600.  In
each scenario, subjects were told to assume either an initial refund position or an initial
tax due position, either an initially computed current year position or a tax position
based on prior years’ experience.  In one scenario, the subject was faced with a
decision that could completely eliminate the refund or tax due amount, while the other
scenario involved only the chance of only reducing the refund or tax due amount.
When faced with an initial refund position, the house money effect posits that a
subject will take the ambiguous deduction, but only if the decision does not involve the
risk of eliminating the refund.  Prospect theory posits that a subject will not take the
ambiguous deduction in either scenario.  When faced with an initial tax due position,
the breakeven effect posits that a subject will take the ambiguous deduction, but only if
the decision involves the chance to eliminate the tax due amount.  On the other hand,
prospect theory posits that a subject will take the ambiguous deduction in either
scenario.  Expected utility theory posits that a person’s risk preference will determine
whether or not a subject will take an ambiguous deduction.
For the test of both the house money effect and the breakeven effect, a significant
number of subjects, in both the current year tax position group and the prior year tax
position group, chose to respond to both scenarios by not taking the ambiguous
deduction.  This conservative behavior pattern can be explained by the fact that, based
on a seven-point scale in the follow-up questionnaire, subjects are significantly risk
averse when preparing their federal income tax return.  Further, this risk aversion can
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be explained by the responses to another question in the follow-up questionnaire
where about one-half of the subjects in the refund domain said that they feared being
audited by the IRS.  These results suggest that when given a 40 percent IRS
disallowance rate and the potential loss of $600, neither the house money effect nor
the breakeven effect explains taxpayer behavior.  Further, because subjects acted
conservatively when faced with an initial tax due position, it cannot be concluded that
prospect theory explains taxpayer behavior either.
5.2.2  Relaxation of Assumptions – Refund Domain
Subjects were asked, if, given a decision that involved the risk of reducing the
refund by $600, they would take the ambiguous deduction using a lower or higher IRS
disallowance rate than 40 percent.  Not surprisingly, more subjects chose to act
aggressively when they were allowed to choose their IRS disallowance rate.
Specifically, more subjects chose the ambiguous deduction when the decision did not
involve the risk of eliminating the refund than when it did.  Although this behavior
pattern suggests the presence of the house money effect, the difference in proportions
was not significant and it cannot be concluded, based on this test alone, that the house
money effect explains compliance behavior.
Further, subjects were asked, if, given a 40 percent IRS disallowance rate, they
would take the ambiguous deduction if the dollar amount of the potential lost refund
were an amount lower or higher than $600.  Again, not surprisingly, more subjects
chose to act aggressively when they were allowed to choose the dollar amount their
compliance decision would risk losing.  Specifically, given an average $1,000 refund
from prior years, subjects chose to act aggressively.  Although this behavior pattern
suggests the presence of the house money effect, subjects were not provided with a
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scenario that involved a risk of eliminating the initial refund.  Therefore, it cannot be
concluded, based on this test alone, that the house money effect explains compliance
behavior.
Although this study found behavior patterns that suggested that the house money
effect could explain taxpayer compliance behavior, the results were not statistically
significant.  The message here seems to be that the experimental design used in this
study failed to demonstrate the presence of the house money effect.  Given a different
experimental design, it might be determined that the house money effect explains
taxpayer behavior.  A possible design is discussed further in section 5.6, suggestions
for future research.
5.2.3  Relaxation of Assumptions – Tax Due Domain
Subjects presented with an initial tax due position were asked if they would take
the ambiguous deduction if the potential additional tax due amount was lower or higher
than $600, given an IRS disallowance rate of 40 percent.  More subjects chose to act
aggressively when they were allowed to choose the dollar amount their compliance
decision would risk losing.  Specifically, given a tax due tax position in both the current
year and prior years, more subjects chose to act aggressively when the decision did
not involve the opportunity to eliminate the tax due amount than when it did.  This
behavior pattern does not support the presence of the breakeven effect, which posits
the opposite pattern of behavior.  But, this behavior pattern is suggested by the finding
from Schepanski and Kelsey (1990) that subjects become more aggressive as the
additional tax due amount increases.  However, the difference in proportions between
the two scenarios was not significant and, therefore, it cannot be concluded, based on
97
this test alone, that the findings from the Schepanski and Kelsey study are
corroborated.
Further, subjects were asked if they would take the ambiguous deduction given a
lower or higher IRS disallowance rate than 40 percent, given the potential of increasing
the tax due amount by $600.  More subjects chose to act aggressively when they were
allowed to choose their IRS disallowance rate.  Specifically, more subjects, given a
prior year initial tax position, chose the ambiguous deduction when the decision did not
involve the chance to eliminate the tax due amount than when the decision did involve
the chance to eliminate the tax due amount.  Although this behavior pattern also seems
to support the Schepanski and Kelsey finding, the difference in proportions was not
significant.  Again, based on this test alone, the findings from the Schepanski and
Kelsey study are not corroborated.
As for the group that was given an initial tax due position in the current year, one-
half the subjects chose to act aggressively when the decision involved the opportunity
to eliminate the tax due amount, and one-half the subjects acted aggressively when it
did not.  This result does not support prospect theory, the breakeven effect, or the
findings from the Schepanski and Kelsey study.
The results of this study do not provide evidence that the breakeven effect
explains taxpayer compliance behavior.  Suggestions for different experimental
designs that might find the breakeven effect to be explanatory are discussed in section
5.6, suggestions for future research.
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5.3 Which Tax Position More Significantly Influences Taxpayer Behavior (H3)
5.3.1  Refund Domain
Hypothesis #3A theorizes that the initially computed current year tax position, in
the absence of prior years’ experience, influences a taxpayer to be more aggressive
than prior years’ experience, in the absence of an initially computed current year tax
position, assuming that both the initial current year and prior year tax positions are
viewed as prior gains.  Results did not support this hypothesis.  Although both the
current year and prior year groups acted conservatively, subjects given only an initial
prior year tax position acted more aggressively than subjects given only an initial
current year tax position.  Alternatively stated, subjects that were given only an initial
current year tax position acted more conservatively than subjects that were given only
a prior year tax position.
A possible explanation for not rejecting H3A is that subjects may not have viewed
initial current year and prior year refund positions as prior gains.  The house money
effect is predicated on the existence of a prior gain.  Therefore, for the house money
effect to be applicable, subjects must view one or both tax positions as a prior gain.
The lack of support for H3A suggests that either subjects do not view initial refund
positions as prior gains, or that a prior gain makes a subject more conservative, not
more aggressive.  In fact, a prior gain that makes an individual more conservative
supports the idea of prospect theory.  Therefore, contrary to what is theorized in H3A,
the existence of an initially computed current year tax position in the absence of prior
years’ experience, influenced a subject to be less aggressive, not more aggressive,
than the existence of prior years’ experience in the absence of an initially computed
current year tax position.  If a current year tax position more significantly influences a
compliance decision than a prior year tax position, as found in Copeland and Cuccia
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(2002), then the tenets of prospect theory are supported, even though the ANOVA test
used to test hypothesis #3 does not allow a direct test of prospect theory to be
performed.  In other words, it can be concluded that an initially determined current year
refund makes a taxpayer more conservative than refunds received in prior years.
5.3.2  Tax Due Domain
Hypothesis #3B theorizes that the initially computed current year tax position, in
the absence of prior years’ experience, influences a taxpayer to be less aggressive
than prior years’ experience in the absence of an initially computed current year tax
position, assuming that both the initial current year and prior year tax positions are
viewed as prior losses.  Results did not support this hypothesis.  Unlike the results in
the refund domain, the difference in means in the tax due domain was not significant.
Therefore, neither initial tax position, current year or prior year, dominates the other.
A possible explanation for the lack of support for H3B is that subjects may not have
viewed initial current year and prior year tax due positions as prior losses.  The
breakeven effect is predicated on the existence of a prior loss.  Therefore, for the
breakeven effect to apply, subjects must view one or both tax positions as a prior loss.
The lack of support for H3B suggests that either subjects do not view initial tax due
positions as prior losses, or that a prior loss makes a subject more aggressive, not
more conservative.  In fact, a prior loss that makes an individual more aggressive
supports the idea of prospect theory.  Because neither initial tax position dominated the
other in the tax due domain, this study fails to support the finding of Copeland and
Cuccia (2002) that a current year initial tax due position more significantly influences a
compliance decision than a prior year initial tax due position.  Neither the existence of
the breakeven effect, nor prospect theory, is suggested by these results.   It can be
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concluded that an initially determined current year tax due amount does not make an
individual either more or less aggressive than tax due amounts paid in prior years.
5.4 Contributions
This study contributes to extant literature by testing two theories that had not yet
been tested in a tax context.  The idea is that one or both of these theories might better
explain taxpayer compliance behavior than prospect theory, which prior studies have
determined to explain taxpayer compliance behavior.  Although this study did not
demonstrate that either the house money effect or the breakeven effect better explain
compliance behavior than prospect theory, the results provide only limited support for
prospect theory, as noted in section 5.3.1.
In addition, this study extends our understanding of taxpayer behavior in general.
This is important from a tax policy perspective because it demonstrates what situations
might cause a taxpayer to be more aggressive.  This is also important from a tax
enforcement perspective because it identifies situations where the IRS might focus its
enforcement efforts.
5.5 Limitations
This study involved an experiment in a controlled setting.  Therefore, the results of
this study have to be interpreted understanding the inherent threats to external validity.
In addition, tax compliance is a sensitive subject for many taxpayers.  As a result,
subjects might respond to hypothetical cases in a manner that is socially desirable
rather than candid.  However, this study was designed to measure and control for the
potential of social desirability response bias.
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This study used graduate students as subjects.  The subjects had a mean of 11
years of taxpaying experience.  Although graduate students usually have at least a few
years of taxpaying experience, not every taxpayer is a college graduate.  In addition,
not all college graduates go to graduate school.  Therefore, the results of this study
cannot necessarily be generalized to all taxpayers.
5.6 Suggestions for Future Research
In order to test for the presence of the house money effect and the breakeven
effect, the experiment must be designed so that each subject gets at least 2 scenarios
in a case, one where the subject’s decision involves the risk of eliminating the refund or
tax due amount, the other where the subject’s decision involves the risk of only
reducing the refund or tax due amount.  There are two ways to accomplish this: 1)
keep the initial refund or tax due amounts constant between the two scenarios, or 2)
keep the potential gain and loss amounts constant between the two scenarios.  For this
study, the decision was made to keep the potential gain and loss amounts constant
because it facilitated comparisons between groups and it enabled the testing of
hypothesis #3.  A future study might provide a better test the house money effect
and/or the breakeven effect by designing the experiment so that the initial refund or tax
due amounts are held constant between the two scenarios.
The case given to subjects in this study included the same dollar amounts for all
subjects.  However, the dollar amounts could have different utilities, or levels of
importance, to different subjects.  If the cases were designed so that the potential loss
was stated as a percentage of a subject’s tax liability or a percentage of a subject’s
income, then the potential loss should, theoretically, have the same utility for each
subject.
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This study used graduate students as subjects because they have taxpaying
experience.  This study could be extended to include subjects with less taxpaying
experience, such as undergraduate students.  Further, this study could be extended to
include subjects who are not college graduates, but who have more taxpaying
experience than typical undergraduate students do, and to those with an
undergraduate degree who are not graduate students.
Finally, this study found that subjects are inherently conservative when it comes to
preparing a federal income tax return.  To most effectively test either the house money
effect or the breakeven effect against prospect theory in a tax context, taxpayers’ ultra-
conservative nature should be controlled for.
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Appendix A: Comprehensive Listing of Tax Compliance Factors as they appear
in the IRS’s “Dictionary of Compliance Factors”
Age of Taxpayer
Sex of Taxpayer
Marital Status
Citizenship of Taxpayer
Wealth of Taxpayer
Education of Taxpayer
Home Ownership
Car Ownership
Criminal History
Welfare Status
White vs. Blue Collar
Farm vs. Non-Farm
Risky vs. Safe Job
Self Employed vs. Other
Occupational Status
Conformity (Includes Peer Group Influence)
Job History
Percent in Manufacturing
Population Density
Age of Housing
Percent Owner-Occupied Housing
In-Migration
Population Turnover
Federal Assistance
Median Income
Percent Civic Members
Inheritance
Goods vs. Service Industry
Crime Statistics
Utility of Income
Cash Transactions
Barter Transactions
Taxpayer’s Records
Third Party Records
Pattern of Receipts
Interstate Transactions
International Transactions
Ability to Sustain Dispute Costs
Inflation Rates
Unemployment Rates
Economic Growth
Bankruptcies, Etc.
Interest Rates
Mood of Economy
SAT Scores, Etc.
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Tax Expertise
Risk Preference
Incentive to Learn How to Comply
Personal Adjustment
Gamemanship
Altruism
Lying Behavior
Attitudes Toward Government
Attitudes Toward Tax System
Views of IRS Integrity
Attitudes Toward Protest Movements
Other Psychological
General Complexity of Tax Situation
Make up of Return
Hassle Factor
Run a Business
Withholding
IRP Coverage
Composition of Income
Rental Income
Moonlighting
Interest Income
Tax Brackets
Composition of Offsets
Examination History
Service Center Contacts
Examination Ripple (1 and 2)
Collection History
Collection Ripple
Fraud Investigation History
Fraud Ripple
Tax Penalties
Perceptions of Exam Program
Perceptions of Collection Program
Perceptions of C.I.D.
Perceptions of IRP
Perceptions of Appellate
Perceptions of IRS Computers
Sevice PR
General Perception of IRS
Coordination with Sister Jurisdictions
Use of Preparer
Preparer’s Compliance
Regulation of Prepareres
Accountant vs. Attorney Preparer
Use of Taxpayer Services
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Appendix B: Figures
Utility
 Risk Seeking
   Risk Neutral
Risk Averse
Commodity (in $)
Figure 1: Expected Utility Curves for Risk Taking, Risk Neutral, and Risk Averse
Individuals
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Value
Losses (in $) Gains (in $)
Figure 2: Prospect Theory Value Function
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Figure 3: Prospect Theory Decision Weight Function
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Appendix C: Tables
Table 1.1: Revenue Losses (Noncompliance Tax Gap)
 ($ in billions)
Tax Year 1985 Tax Year 1988 Tax Year 1992
     Range       Range      Range
Low    -   High Low    -   High Low    -   High
Gross Tax Gap ($)  68.9   -   70.4  79.3   -   80.9  93.2   -   95.3
True Tax Liability ($)     372.2  -  373.7      460.7  -  462.3      550.2  -  552.3
Tax Gap Percentage (%)  18.5   -   18.8  17.2   -   17.5  16.9   -   17.3
Source: [IRS, 1996]
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Table 3.1: Predictions about Taxpayer Behavior for Each of the 3 Theories
Prospect House Breakeven
Scenario                      Theory * Money Effect Effect
1. Refund – No risk
of eliminating
the refund Conservative Aggressive N/A
2. Refund – Risk of
eliminating the refund Conservative Conservative N/A
3. Tax Due – No chance
to eliminate the
tax due Aggressive N/A Conservative
4. Tax Due – Chance
to eliminate the
tax due Aggressive N/A Aggressive
N/A  -  The theory does not address taxpayer behavior in this domain.
*  -  Assumes that taxpayer’s withholding position is the taxpayer’s reference point.
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Table 3.2: Current Year Tax Position Case -- Refund Domain
Assume that you have prepared a preliminary copy of your tax return and have initially
determined that you will receive a $1,000 refund.  The only issue outstanding is
whether or not to take the ambiguous deduction in the current year.  You may choose
either Option A, to not take the deduction, or Option B, to take the deduction.  If you
choose Option A, you will receive the $1,000 refund and will not hear from the IRS.  If
you choose Option B, you will receive a $1,400 refund but there is a 40% chance that
the IRS will subsequently disallow the deduction and thereby decrease your refund to
$400 after charging $600 in penalties and interest.
PLEASE RESPOND TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS.
1. Which option (A or B) would you choose?  (Circle your choice.)
A: Provides a 100% chance of receiving a $1,000 refund.
B: Provides a 60% chance of receiving a $1,400 refund, and a 40% chance of
receiving a $400 refund.
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Table 3.3: Prior Years’ Tax Position Case -- Refund Domain
Assume that you have not yet completed a preliminary copy of your tax return.
Therefore, you are not sure whether you will receive a refund or owe additional taxes.
However, in prior years you have typically received a refund of about $1,000 each
year.  The issue is whether or not to take the ambiguous deduction in the current year.
You may choose either Option A, to take the deduction, or Option B, to not take the
deduction.  If you choose Option A, you will either increase your refund or reduce your
additional tax owed by $400.  However, there is a 40% chance that the IRS will
subsequently disallow the deduction and you will be required to pay $600 in penalties
and interest.  In this event, your refund would decrease by $1,000 or your additional tax
owed amount would increase by $1,000, the $400 lost from the disallowed deduction
plus the $600 in penalties and interest.  If you choose Option B, you will not incur any
IRS penalties or interest, and thus will receive a smaller refund, or owe a larger amount
of additional tax, than if you did take the deduction.
PLEASE RESPOND TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS.
1. Which option (A or B) would you choose?  (Circle your choice.)
A: Provides a 60% chance of increasing the refund or reducing the additional tax
owed by $400, and a 40% chance of losing the deduction and incurring $600
in penalties and interest.
B: Provides a 100% chance of not changing the current year refund or additional
tax owed amount.
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Table 3.4: Summary of the Decision Scenarios
Current Year Tax Position          Prior Years’ Tax Position           
Current Prior Current
Year Years’ Year
Scenario # Result     Probability # Average Impact     Probability
     *        *    **
Refund Domain
1. A: $1,000 1.0 1a. $1,000 A: $   0 1.0
B: $1,400 0.6 B: $   400 0.6
$   400 0.4 ($  600) 0.4
2. A: $   600 1.0 2a. $   600 A: $   0 1.0 
B: $1,000 0.6 B: $   400 0.6
$  0 0.4 ($  600) 0.4
Tax Due Domain
3. A: ($1,000) 1.0 3a. ($1,000) A: $   0 1.0
B: ($   600) 0.6 B: $   400 0.6
($1,600) 0.4 ($  600) 0.4
4. A: ($   400) 1.0 4a. ($  400) A: $   0 1.0
B:  $    0 0.6 B: $   400 0.6
($1,000) 0.4 ($  600) 0.4
Key
  *  In these two columns, positive dollar amounts represent refunds and
       negative dollar amounts represent additional tax owed.
  **  In the prior years’ tax position group, the current year result is not
   determined.  Therefore, this column shows the current year impact only.
      Positive dollar amounts can either represent additional refund or reduced
    additional tax owed, and negative dollar amounts represent the IRS penalty
   and interest amount.
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Table 3.5: Amounts Used in Comparable Studies
Refund or Potential additional Refund
Citation (Tax Due) or reduced Tax Due
Schadewald, 1989 $600 $1,400
($1,400) $1,400
Schepanski and Kelsey, 1990 $200 $500
($500) $500
White et al., 1993 $2,000 $700
($2,000) $700
Schepanski and Shearer, 1995 $1,000 $250
($250) $250
Chang, 1995 Not Given $2,000
Christiansen and Hite, 1997 Not Given See explanation in the
                    paragraph
Current Study $1,000 and $600 $400
($1,000) and ($400) $400
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Table 3.6: IRS Interest Rates applied to Underpayments
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
First Quarter 9% 9% 7% 8% 9%
Second Quarter 9% 8% 8% 9% 8%
Third Quarter 9% 8% 8% 9% 7%
Fourth Quarter 9% 8% 8% 9% 7%
Average Interest Rate for the 5-year period: 8.3%
Source: Revenue Ruling 2001-47, Internal Revenue Bulletin No. 2001-39
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Table 3.7: IRS Disallowance and Penalty & Interest Rates
Current Probability Probability
Year of Result of IRS Penalty &
Result    Occurring Disallowance Interest Rate
A: $1,000 1.0   0 % N/A
B: $1,400 0.6 40 % ($1,000 - $400)   =  150 %
$   400 0.4 ($1,400 - $1,000)
B’: $1,500 0.5 50 % ($1,000 - $500)   =  100 %
$   500 0.5 ($1,500 - $1,000)
B’’: $1,600 0.4 60 % ($1,000 - $600)   =    67 %
$   600 0.6 ($1,600 - $1,000)
B’’’: $1,700 0.3 70 % ($1,000 - $700)   =    43 %
$   700 0.7 ($1,700 - $1,000)
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Table 3.8: Potential Results When Making Individual Comparisons of the Within-
Subjects Variable – Refund Domain
Scenario # Observed Behavior Explanation           
1 Aggressive House Money Effect applies.
2 Conservative
1 Conservative Prospect Theory applies, assuming that
2 Conservative withholding position is the reference point.
1 Aggressive Expected Utility Theory applies for
2 Aggressive risk-seekers.
1 Conservative No theory applies.
2 Aggressive
                                                           
121
Table 3.9: Potential Results When Making Individual Comparisons of the Within-
Subjects Variable – Tax Due Domain
Scenario # Observed Behavior Explanation           
1 Conservative Breakeven Effect applies.
2 Aggressive
1 Aggressive Prospect Theory applies, assuming that
2 Aggressive withholding position is the reference point.
1 Conservative Expected Utility Theory applies for
2 Conservative risk-averse individuals.
1 Aggressive No theory applies.
2 Conservative
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Table 3.10: Number of Subjects Selecting the Conservative Option versus the
Aggressive Option for each Scenario – Refund Domain
                                         Scenario #1 (no chance to eliminate refund)
Conservative
Option  (A)
Aggressive
Option  (B)
Scenario #2 (chance to
eliminate refund)
Conservative Option (A) PT HME
Aggressive Option (B) NT EUT
Note:  This table will be prepared for each of the two refund domain treatment groups.
Key:  PT     =  Prospect Theory
         HME  =  House Money Effect
         EUT   =  Expected Utility Theory (assumes risk-seeker)
         NT     =  No theory explains results in this cell.
123
Table 3.11: Number of Subjects Selecting the Conservative Option versus the
Aggressive Option for each Scenario – Tax Due Domain
                                         Scenario #1 (no chance to eliminate tax due)
Conservative
Option  (A)
Aggressive
Option  (B)
Scenario #2 (chance to
eliminate tax due)
Conservative Option (A) EUT NT
Aggressive Option (B) BE PT
Note:  This table will be prepared for each of the two additional tax owed domain
treatment groups.
Key:  PT    =  Prospect Theory
         BE    =  Breakeven Effect
         EUT  =  Expected Utility Theory (assumes risk-averse individual)
         NT    =  No theory explains results in this cell.
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Table 4.1: Demographic Data – Counts
Total % of
Number * Total
Gender:
Female 197 49.7
Male 199 50.3
Occupation:
Professional 295 74.5
Full-time student 101 25.5
The form the subject will use this year:
Form 1040EZ   60 15.5
Form 1040A   62 16.0
Form 1040 194 50.0
Not sure   72 18.5
Who prepares the return:
Subject or subject’s spouse 212 54.6
Paid tax professional 112 28.9
Someone prepares the return as a favor   64 16.5
Subject’s method of paying federal income tax during the year:
Paycheck withholding 330 90.4
Estimated quarterly payments   13   3.6
Both   22   6.0
* If the count totals for any variable do not add to 398, it is because some of the
subjects did not respond to some of the demographic questions.  In fact, two
subjects did not respond to any of the demographic questions.
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Table 4.2: Demographic Data – Mean, Median and Range
Mean Median Range
Age 30.4 28.0 21 - 61
Years worked in current profession 6.2 4.0 0 - 35
Years worked full-time 9.0 6.0 0 - 35
Current annual salary ($ stated in 000’s) 54.9 50.0 0 - 200
Years that the subject has filed a
federal income tax return 11.4 10.0 0 - 44
Subject’s perceived IRS audit rate (%) 16.1 10.0 0 - 95
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Table 4.3: Number of Subjects: Refund Domain – Current Year
                                         Scenario #1 (no chance to eliminate refund)
Conservative
Option  (A)
Aggressive
Option  (B)
Scenario #2 (chance to
eliminate refund)
Conservative Option (A) 86
(83%)
7
(7%)
Aggressive Option (B)  4
(3%)
7
(7%)
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Table 4.4: Demographic and Risk Perception Data – Association with the Dependent Variable:
Refund Domain – Current Year Tax Position
Mean Pearson
(if variable is Chi-Square
not categorical) p-value
Q1 - Age 30 years .013
Q2 - Gender .506
Q3 - Occupation (professional vs. full-time student) .494
Q4 - Years worked in current profession 6 years .398
Q5 - Years worked full-time 9 years .294
Q6 - Current annual salary $53,000 .927
Q7 - Highest level of education completed    *
Q8 - Filing a federal income tax return 11 years .419
Q9 - Filing a Form 1040   **
Q10 - The form the subject will use this year .764
Q11 - Who prepares the return .639
Q12 - Familiarity with the tax law in general [scale 1-7] 3.5 .121
Q13 - Familiarity with tax laws that specifically affect
   the subject [scale 1-7] 4.0 .021
Q14a - Risk-taking propensity when preparing a
     federal tax return [scale 1-7] 2.7 .000
Q14b - Honesty level compared with other taxpayers
     when preparing a return [scale 1-7] 5.1 .006
Q14c - Risk-taking avoidance in general [scale 1-7] 4.7 .037
Q15 - Perceived IRS audit rate 18% .859
Q16 - Anxiety level about being audited [scale 1-7] 3.0 .366
Q17 - Perceived probability that the IRS would disallow
   an ambiguous deduction N/A .261
Q18 - Method of paying income tax during the year .755
Q19 - Affect of 2001 tax law on 2001 tax liability .996
Q20 - Affect of 2001 tax law on 2002 tax liability .898
Q21 - Intertemporal issue .881
Q22 - Affect of prior year’s refund on current year return .267
Q23 - Affect of prior year’s tax due on current year return .506
Q24 - Significant tax compliance factor .019
Q25 - Perception of the fairness of the federal tax system .922
Q26 - Subject’s focus: Initial refund versus potential gain/loss .000
Key
Q#  = The question number on the demographic and risk perception questionnaire.
N/A = Information is not available.
*  The responses to question #7 are not informative as virtually all subjects had their
baccalaureate degree since they were graduate students.
** This question (#9) is not included because it appears that many subjects thought that
“Form 1040” meant either Form 1040, 1040A, or 1040EZ.  For example, many subjects
answered question #9 by stating that they had been preparing Form 1040 for a number of
years, but then answered question #10 by stating that they were filing Form 1040EZ or
1040A in the current year.  While this is possible, it is not likely.
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Table 4.5: Number of Subjects: Refund Domain – Prior Year
                                         Scenario #1 (no chance to eliminate refund)
Conservative
Option  (A)
Aggressive
Option  (B)
Scenario #2 (chance to
eliminate refund)
Conservative Option (A) 55
(54%)
10
(10%)
Aggressive Option (B)  4
(4%)
32
(32%)
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Table 4.6: Demographic and Risk Perception Data – Association with the Dependent Variable:
Refund Domain – Prior Year Tax Position
Mean Pearson
(if variable is Chi-Square
not categorical) p-value
Q1 - Age 32 years .594
Q2 - Gender .104
Q3 - Occupation (professional vs. full-time student) .020
Q4 - Years worked in current profession 8 years .381
Q5 - Years worked full-time 11 years .809
Q6 - Current annual salary $59,700 .286
Q7 - Highest level of education completed    *
Q8 - Filing a federal income tax return 13 years .458
Q9 - Filing a Form 1040   **
Q10 - The form the subject will use this year .240
Q11 - Who prepares the return .733
Q12 - Familiarity with the tax law in general [scale 1-7] 3.6 .001
Q13 - Familiarity with tax laws that specifically affect
   the subject [scale 1-7] 4.0 .062
Q14a - Risk-taking propensity when preparing a
     Federal tax return [scale 1-7] 3.2 .000
Q14b - Honesty level compared with other taxpayers
     when preparing a return [scale 1-7] 5.2 .640
Q14c - Risk-taking avoidance in general [scale 1-7] 4.5 .005
Q15 - Perceived IRS audit rate 14% .068
Q16 - Anxiety level about being audited [scale 1-7] 3.0 .263
Q17 - Perceived probability that the IRS would disallow
   an ambiguous deduction N/A .149
Q18 - Method of paying income tax during the year .652
Q19 - Affect of 2001 tax law on 2001 tax liability .605
Q20 - Affect of 2001 tax law on 2002 tax liability .584
Q21 - Intertemporal issue .351
Q22 - Affect of prior year’s refund on current year return .078
Q23 - Affect of prior year’s tax due on current year return .263
Q24 - Significant tax compliance factor .022
Q25 - Perception of the fairness of the federal income tax system .575
Q26 - Subject’s focus: Initial refund versus potential gain/loss .382
Key
Q#  = The question number on the demographic and risk perception questionnaire.
N/A = Information is not available.
*  The responses to question #7 are not informative as virtually all subjects had their
baccalaureate degree since they were graduate students.
** This question (#9) is not included because it appears that many subjects thought that
“Form 1040” meant either Form 1040, 1040A, or 1040EZ.  For example, many subjects
answered question #9 by stating that they had been preparing Form 1040 for a number of
years, but then answered question #10 by stating that they were filing Form 1040EZ or
1040A in the current year.  While this is possible, it is not likely.
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Table 4.7: Number of Subjects: Tax Due Domain – Current Year
                                         Scenario #1 (no chance to eliminate tax due)
Conservative
Option  (A)
Aggressive
Option  (B)
Scenario #2 (chance to
eliminate tax due)
Conservative Option (A) 63
(61%)
7
(7%)
Aggressive Option (B)  14
(14%)
19
(18%)
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Table 4.8: Demographic and Risk Perception Data – Association with the Dependent Variable:
Tax Due Domain – Current Year Tax Position
Mean Pearson
(if variable is Chi-Square
not categorical) p-value
Q1 - Age 29 years .390
Q2 - Gender .126
Q3 - Occupation (professional vs. full-time student) .589
Q4 - Years worked in current profession 5 years .238
Q5 - Years worked full-time 8 years .034
Q6 - Current annual salary $53,800 .428
Q7 - Highest level of education completed    *
Q8 - Filing a federal income tax return 10 years .057
Q9 - Filing a Form 1040   **
Q10 - The form the subject will use this year .314
Q11 - Who prepares the return .121
Q12 - Familiarity with the tax law in general [scale 1-7] 3.7 .759
Q13 - Familiarity with tax laws that specifically affect
   the subject [scale 1-7] 4.2 .210
Q14a - Risk-taking propensity when preparing a
     federal tax return [scale 1-7] 3.0 .000
Q14b - Honesty level compared with other taxpayers
     when preparing a return [scale 1-7] 5.1 .120
Q14c - Risk-taking avoidance in general [scale 1-7] 4.3 .038
Q15 - Perceived IRS audit rate 17% .557
Q16 - Anxiety level about being audited [scale 1-7] 3.3 .987
Q17 - Perceived probability that the IRS would disallow
   an ambiguous deduction N/A .481
Q18 - Method of paying income tax during the year .544
Q19 - Affect of 2001 tax law on 2001 tax liability .567
Q20 - Affect of 2001 tax law on 2002 tax liability .807
Q21 - Intertemporal issue .703
Q22 - Affect of prior year’s refund on current year return .838
Q23 - Affect of prior year’s tax due on current year return .232
Q24 - Significant tax compliance factor .108
Q25 - Perception of the fairness of the federal tax system .154
Q26 - Subject’s focus: Initial tax due amount versus potential gain/loss .045
Key
Q#  = The question number on the demographic questionnaire.
N/A = Information is not available.
*  The responses to question #7 are not informative as virtually all subjects had their
baccalaureate degree since they were graduate students.
** This question (#9) is not included because it appears that many subjects thought that
“Form 1040” meant either Form 1040, 1040A, or 1040EZ.  For example, many subjects
answered question #9 by stating that they had been preparing Form 1040 for a number of
years, but then answered question #10 by stating that they were filing Form 1040EZ or
1040A in the current year.  While this is possible, it is not likely.
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Table 4.9: Number of Subjects: Tax Due Domain – Prior Year
                                         Scenario #1 (no chance to eliminate tax due)
Conservative
Option  (A)
Aggressive
Option  (B)
Scenario #2 (chance to
eliminate tax due)
Conservative Option (A) 59
(66%)
13
(14%)
Aggressive Option (B)  4
(4%)
14
(16%)
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Table 4.10: Demographic and Risk Perception Data – Association with the Dependent Variable:
Tax Due Domain – Prior Year Tax Position
Mean Pearson
(if variable is Chi-Square
not categorical) p-value
Q1 - Age 30 years .678
Q2 - Gender .316
Q3 - Occupation (professional vs. full-time student) .025
Q4 - Years worked in current profession 6 years .991
Q5 - Years worked full-time 8 years .145
Q6 - Current annual salary $52,300 .775
Q7 - Highest level of education completed    *
Q8 - Filing a federal income tax return 12 years .130
Q9 - Filing a Form 1040   **
Q10 - The form the subject will use this year .135
Q11 - Who prepares the return .849
Q12 - Familiarity with the tax law in general [scale 1-7] 3.1 .980
Q13 - Familiarity with tax laws that specifically affect
   the subject [scale 1-7] 3.5 .922
Q14a - Risk-taking propensity when preparing a
     federal tax return [scale 1-7] 2.9 .000
Q14b - Honesty level compared with other taxpayers
     when preparing a return [scale 1-7] 5.1 .178
Q14c - Risk-taking avoidance in general [scale 1-7] 4.5 .052
Q15 - Perceived IRS audit rate 17% .403
Q16 - Anxiety level about being audited [scale 1-7] 3.1 .189
Q17 - Perceived probability that the IRS would disallow
   an ambiguous deduction N/A .968
Q18 - Method of paying income tax during the year .952
Q19 - Affect of 2001 tax law on 2001 tax liability .949
Q20 - Affect of 2001 tax law on 2002 tax liability .272
Q21 - Intertemporal issue .674
Q22 - Affect of prior year’s refund on current year return .171
Q23 - Affect of prior year’s tax due on current year return .630
Q24 - Significant tax compliance factor .486
Q25 - Perception of the fairness of the federal tax system .357
Q26 - Subject’s focus: Initial tax due amount versus potential gain/loss .190
Key
Q#  = The question number on the demographic questionnaire.
N/A = Information is not available.
*  The responses to question #7 are not informative as virtually all subjects had their
baccalaureate degree since they were graduate students.
** This question (#9) is not included because it appears that many subjects thought that
“Form 1040” meant either Form 1040, 1040A, or 1040EZ.  For example, many subjects
answered question #9 by stating that they had been preparing Form 1040 for a number of
years, but then answered question #10 by stating that they were filing Form 1040EZ or
1040A in the current year.  While this is possible, it is not likely.
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Table 4.11: Analysis of Variance – Refund Domain: ANOVA Tables
Test of Between-Subjects Effects
Sum of
Squares Df Mean Square F Sig.
TAXPOS 439.602 1 439.602 32.874 .000
Error (Between Subjects) 2714.579 203 13.372
Test of Within-Subjects and Interaction Effects
Sum of
Squares Df Mean Square F Sig.
ELIM 9.795 1 9.795 4.437 .036
TAXPOS * ELIM 1.639 1 1.639 .742 .390
Error (Within Subjects) 448.180 203 2.208
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Table 4.12: Analysis of Variance – Refund Domain: Variable Means
Variable:  TAXPOS
TAXPOS Mean Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
0 – Prior Year 4.63 .26 4.13 5.14
1 – Current Year 2.56 .25 2.06 3.06
Variable:  ELIM
ELIM Mean Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
1 – No Chance to
      Eliminate Refund 3.75 .20 3.36 4.14
2 – Chance to
      Eliminate Refund 3.44 .19 3.07 3.82
Variable:  TAXPOS * ELIM
TAXPOS ELIM Mean Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
0 1 4.85 .28 4.30 5.41
2 4.42 .27 3.88 4.96
1 1 2.65 .28 2.11 3.20
2 2.47 .27 1.94 3.00
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Table 4.13: Analysis of Variance – Tax Due Domain: ANOVA Tables
Test of Between-Subjects Effects
Sum of
Squares Df Mean Square F Sig.
TAXPOS 10.438 1 10.438 .738 .392
Error (Between Subjects) 2688.872 190 14.152
Test of Within-Subjects and Interaction Effects
Sum of
Squares Df Mean Square F Sig.
ELIM 5.442 1 5.442 1.441 .231
TAXPOS * ELIM 22.369 1 22.369 5.924 .016
Error (Within Subjects) 717.464 190 3.776
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Chart 4.1: Dollar Amount Subject is Willing to Risk Losing:
Refund Domain – Current Year Tax Position
Dollar amount subject Number of
is willing to risk losing     subjects     Percentage
Initial Current Year Refund = $1,000
 $    0 * 35 63.6%
$150   5   9.1%
$300   5   9.1%
$450   1   1.8%
$600   3   5.5%
$750   4   7.3%
$900   2   3.6%
Total 55       100.0%
Initial Current Year Refund = $600
 $    0 * 31 56.4%
$150   9 16.4%
$300   4   7.3%
$450   4   7.3%
$600   2   3.6%
$750   2   3.6%
$900   3   5.4%
Total 55       100.0%
*  Subjects would not take the ambiguous deduction.
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
$0
$1
50
$3
00
$4
50
$6
00
$7
50
$9
00
Initial Refund =
1,000
Initial Refund =
$600
139
Chart 4.2: IRS Disallowance Rate where Subject Would Act Aggressively:
Refund Domain – Current Year Tax Position
IRS disallowance rate where Number of
subject would act aggressively subjects     Percentage
Initial Current Year Refund = $1,000
   0% * 27 60.0%
10%   6 13.3%
20%   3   6.7%
30%   5 11.2%
40%   2   4.4%
50%   1   2.2%
80%   1   2.2%
Total 45       100.0%
Initial Current Year Refund = $600
   0% * 30 68.2%
10%   2   4.5%
20%   3   6.8%
30%   5 11.4%
40%   2   4.5%
50%   1   2.3%
80%   1   2.3%
Total 44       100.0%
*  Subjects would not take the ambiguous deduction.
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Chart 4.3: Dollar Amount Subject is Willing to Risk Losing:
Refund Domain – Prior Year Tax Position
Dollar amount subject Number of
is willing to risk losing     subjects     Percentage
Refund from Prior Years = $1,000
 $    0 * 18 34.0%
$150   5   9.4%
$300   2   3.8%
$450   0   0.0%
$600 15 28.2%
$750 10 18.9%
$900   3   5.7%
Total 53       100.0%
Refund from Prior Years = $600
 $    0 * 25 47.2%
$150   4   7.5%
$300   3   5.7%
$450   1   1.9%
$600 13  24.5%
$750   6 11.3%
$900   1   1.9%
Total 53       100.0%
*  Subjects would not take the ambiguous deduction.
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Chart 4.4: IRS Disallowance Rate where Subject Would Act Aggressively:
Refund Domain – Prior Year Tax Position
IRS disallowance rate where Number of
subject would act aggressively subjects     Percentage
Refund from Prior Years = $1,000
   0% * 16 35.6%
10% 10 22.2%
20%   4   8.9%
30%   3   6.7%
40%   2   4.4%
50%   4   8.9%
60%   4   8.9%
70%   2   4.4%
Total 45       100.0%
Refund from Prior Years = $600
   0% * 20 44.4%
10%   6 13.3%
20%   3   6.7%
30%   2   4.4%
40%   4   8.9%
50%   3   6.7%
60%   5 11.2%
70%   2   4.4%
Total 45       100.0%
*  Subjects would not take the ambiguous deduction.
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
0% 10
%
20
%
30
%
40
%
50
%
60
%
70
%
Prior Year Refund
= $1,000
Prior Year Refund
= $600
142
Chart 4.5: Dollar Amount Subject is Willing to Risk Losing:
Tax Due Domain – Current Year Tax Position
Dollar amount subject Number of
is willing to risk losing     subjects     Percentage
Initial Current Year Tax Due = $1,000
 $    0 * 19 39.6%
$150   7 14.6%
$300   9 18.7%
$450   2   4.2%
$600   6 12.5%
$750   4   8.3%
$900   1   2.1%
Total 48       100.0%
Initial Current Year Tax Due = $400
 $    0 * 22 46.8%
$150   6 12.8%
$300   2   4.3%
$450   0   0.0%
$600   9 19.1%
$750   3   6.4%
$900   5 10.6%
Total 47       100.0%
*  Subjects would not take the ambiguous deduction.
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Chart 4.6: IRS Disallowance Rate where Subject Would Act Aggressively:
Tax Due Domain – Current Year Tax Position
IRS disallowance rate where Number of
subject would act aggressively subjects     Percentage
Initial Current Year Tax Due = $1,000
   0% * 26 50.0%
10%   5   9.6%
20%   5   9.6%
30%   2   3.8%
40%   8 15.5%
50%   1   1.9%
60%   2   3.8%
70%   3   5.8%
Total 52       100.0%
Initial Current Year Tax Due = $400
   0% * 24 50.0%
10%   4   8.3%
20%   2   4.2%
30%   4   8.3%
40%   7 14.5%
50%   1   2.1%
60%   3   6.3%
70%   2   4.2%
80%   1   2.1%
Total 48       100.0%
*  Subjects would not take the ambiguous deduction.
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Chart 4.7: Dollar Amount Subject is Willing to Risk Losing:
Tax Due Domain – Prior Year Tax Position
Dollar amount subject Number of
is willing to risk losing     subjects     Percentage
Prior Years Average Tax Due = $1,000
 $    0 * 24 51.1%
$150   2   4.3%
$300   7 14.8%
$450   0   0.0%
$600   5 10.6%
$750   6 12.8%
$900   3   6.4%
Total 47       100.0%
Prior Years Average Tax Due = $400
 $    0 * 26 55.3%
$150   3   6.4%
$300   6 12.8%
$450   1   2.1%
$600   3   6.4%
$750   5 10.6%
$900   3   6.4%
Total 47       100.0%
*  Subjects would not take the ambiguous deduction.
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Chart 4.8: IRS Disallowance Rate where Subject Would Act Aggressively:
Tax Due Domain – Prior Year Tax Position
IRS disallowance rate where Number of
subject would act aggressively subjects     Percentage
Prior Years Average Tax Due = $1,000
   0% * 17 45.9%
10%   1   2.7%
20%   6 16.3%
30%   2   5.4%
40%   3   8.1%
50%   2   5.4%
60%   1   2.7%
70%   5 13.5%
Total 37       100.0%
Prior Years Average Tax Due = $400
   0% * 21 53.8%
10%   3   7.8%
20%   5 12.8%
30%   5 12.8%
40%   2   5.1%
50%   1   2.6%
70%   2   5.1%
Total 39       100.0%
*  Subjects would not take the ambiguous deduction.
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Appendix E: Cases
The following 16 versions of the case were disseminated to subjects:
        Case Description    
Format of
Aggressive Questions Copy of Case
Option in #4 and #5 Included in
Case Label Treatment Group Question #1 ($ or %)   this Appendix?
HME.CY.A1 Refund Domain – Current Year B $ Included
HME.CY.A2 Refund Domain – Current Year A $
HME.CY.B1 Refund Domain – Current Year B %
HME.CY.B2 Refund Domain – Current Year A %
HME.PY.A1 Refund Domain – Prior Year B $
HME.PY.A2 Refund Domain – Prior Year A $
HME.PY.B1 Refund Domain – Prior Year B %
HME.PY.B2 Refund Domain – Prior Year A % Included
BE.CY.A1 Tax Due Domain – Current Year B $
BE.CY.A2 Tax Due Domain – Current Year A $
BE.CY.B1 Tax Due Domain – Current Year B % Included
BE.CY.B2 Tax Due Domain – Current Year A %
BE.PY.A1 Tax Due Domain – Prior Year B $
BE.PY.A2 Tax Due Domain – Prior Year A $ Included
BE.PY.B1 Tax Due Domain – Prior Year B %
BE.PY.B2 Tax Due Domain – Prior Year A %
Four of the cases, as noted above, are included in this appendix for illustrative
purposes.
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HME.CY.A1
Case
Assume that you are preparing your federal income tax return for the current year and that you
are faced with the decision whether or not to claim an ambiguous deduction on your tax return.
The deduction is ambiguous because after reading authoritative sources such as Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) guidelines, you cannot determine whether or not the particular deduction
is allowed.  If you claim the deduction and the IRS subsequently disallows it, your tax liability
would increase, plus you would be charged a penalty plus interest.  However, it is not illegal to
take an ambiguous deduction and there would be no additional ramifications beyond paying the
penalty plus interest.
In this study, you are given 2 independent scenarios, each involving the decision whether or not
to include the ambiguous deduction on your tax return.  Please consider each choice in each
scenario independently and sequentially.  There are no correct or incorrect responses.
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Scenario #1
Assume that you have prepared a preliminary copy of your tax return and have initially
determined that you will receive a $1,000 refund.  The only issue outstanding is whether or
not to take the ambiguous deduction in the current year.  You may choose either Option A, to
not take the deduction, or Option B, to take the deduction.  If you choose Option A, you will
receive the $1,000 refund and will not hear from the IRS.  If you choose Option B, you will
receive a $1,400 refund but there is a 40% chance that the IRS will subsequently disallow the
deduction and thereby decrease your refund to $400 after charging $600 in penalties and
interest.
PLEASE RESPOND TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS.
1. Which option (A or B) would you choose?  (Circle your choice.)
A: Provides a 100% chance of receiving a $1,000 refund.
B: Provides a 60% chance of receiving a $1,400 refund, and a 40% chance of receiving a
$400 refund.
2. How strongly do you feel about your choice in question #1?  (Circle the appropriate
number.)
1                              2                              3                              4                              5
  weakly moderately    strongly
3. Which option do you think the majority of taxpayers would choose in question #1?  (Circle
your choice.)
A or B
IF YOU CHOSE OPTION A FOR QUESTION #1, THEN ANSWER QUESTION #4 AND
SKIP QUESTION #5.
IF YOU CHOSE OPTION B FOR QUESTION #1, THEN SKIP QUESTION #4 AND
ANSWER QUESTION #5.
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4. Choosing Option A for question #1 suggests that you are not willing to accept a 40% risk
of losing $600 of the refund in return for a 60% chance of increasing it by $400.  Would
your response to this question be different if you were to risk a lower dollar amount (e.g.,
Options X, Y or Z below) in return for the potential of increasing your refund by a certain
dollar amount?  (Circle your choice.)
Yes   or No
If you answered no, go to the next page.  If you answered yes, choose the option (by
circling only one letter: X, Y, or Z) that best reflects the maximum dollar amount that you
would be willing to risk.
    X           Y           Z
Refund amount if deduction
is not disallowed (60% chance) . . . . . . . . $1,300 $1,200 $1,100
Refund amount if deduction
is disallowed (40% chance)  . . . . . . . . . . $   550 $   700 $   850
PROCEED TO THE NEXT PAGE (without responding to question #5)
5. Choosing Option B for question #1 suggests that you are willing to accept a 40% risk of
losing $600 of the refund in return for a 60% chance of increasing it by $400.  Would your
response to this question be different if you were to risk a higher dollar amount (e.g.,
Options M or N below) in return for the potential of increasing your refund by a certain
dollar amount?  (Circle your choice.)
Yes or No
If you answered no, go to the next page.  If you answered yes, choose the option (by
circling only one letter: M or N) that best reflects the maximum dollar amount that you
would be willing to risk.
    M     N
Refund amount if deduction
is not disallowed (60% chance) . . . . . . . . $1,500 $1,600
Refund amount if deduction
is disallowed (40% chance)  . . . . . . . . . . $   250 $   100
PROCEED TO THE NEXT PAGE
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Scenario #2
Assume that you have prepared a preliminary copy of your tax return and have initially
determined that you will receive a $600 refund.  The only issue outstanding is whether or not
to take the ambiguous deduction in the current year.  You may choose either Option A, to not
take the deduction, or Option B, to take the deduction.  If you choose Option A, you will
receive the $600 refund and will not hear from the IRS.  If you choose Option B, you will
receive a $1,000 refund but there is a 40% chance that the IRS will subsequently disallow the
deduction and thereby decrease your refund to $0 after charging $600 in penalties and interest.
PLEASE RESPOND TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS.
1. Which option (A or B) would you choose?  (Circle your choice.)
A: Provides a 100% chance of receiving a $600 refund.
B: Provides a 60% chance of receiving a $1,000 refund, and a 40% chance of receiving a
$0 refund.
2. How strongly do you feel about your choice in question #1?  (Circle the appropriate
number.)
1                              2                              3                              4                              5
  weakly moderately    strongly
3. Which option do you think the majority of taxpayers would choose in question #1?  (Circle
your choice.)
A or B
IF YOU CHOSE OPTION A FOR QUESTION #1, THEN ANSWER QUESTION #4 AND
SKIP QUESTION #5.
IF YOU CHOSE OPTION B FOR QUESTION #1, THEN SKIP QUESTION #4 AND
ANSWER QUESTION #5.
151
4. Choosing Option A for question #1 suggests that you are not willing to accept a
40% risk of losing $600 of the refund in return for a 60% chance of increasing it by $400.
Would your response to this question be different if you were to risk a lower dollar amount
(e.g., Options X, Y or Z below) in return for the potential of increasing your refund by a
certain dollar amount?  (Circle your choice.)
Yes   or No
If you answered no, go to the next page.  If you answered yes, choose the option (by
circling only one letter: X, Y, or Z) that best reflects the maximum dollar amount that you
would be willing to risk.
    X           Y           Z
Refund amount if deduction
is not disallowed [60% chance] . . . . . . . . $ 900 $ 800 $ 700
Refund amount if deduction
is disallowed [40% chance]  . . . . . . . . . . $ 150 $ 300 $ 450
PROCEED TO THE NEXT PAGE (without responding to question #5)
5. Choosing Option B for question #1 suggests that you are willing to accept a 40% risk of
losing $600 of the refund in return for a 60% chance of increasing it by $400.  Would your
response to this question be different if you were to risk a higher dollar amount (e.g.,
Options M or N below) in return for the potential of increasing your refund by a certain
dollar amount?  (Circle your choice.)
Yes or No
If you answered no, go to the next page.  If you answered yes, choose the option (by
circling only one letter: M or N) that best reflects the maximum dollar amount that you
would be willing to risk.
    M     N
Refund amount if deduction
is not disallowed [60% chance] . . . . . . . . $1,100 $1,200
(Additional Tax Owed) amount if
deduction is disallowed [40% chance] . . . ($  150) ($  300)
PROCEED TO THE NEXT PAGE
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HME.PY.B2
Case
Assume that you are preparing your federal income tax return for the current year and that you
are faced with the decision whether or not to claim an ambiguous deduction on your tax return.
The deduction is ambiguous because after reading authoritative sources such as Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) guidelines, you cannot determine whether or not the particular deduction
is allowed.  If you claim the deduction and the IRS subsequently disallows it, your tax liability
would increase, plus you would be charged a penalty plus interest.  However, it is not illegal to
take an ambiguous deduction and there would be no additional ramifications beyond paying the
penalty plus interest.
In this study, you are given 2 independent scenarios, each involving the decision whether or not
to include the ambiguous deduction on your tax return.  Please consider each choice in each
scenario independently and sequentially.  There are no correct or incorrect responses.
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Scenario #1
Assume that you have not yet completed a preliminary copy of your tax return.  Therefore, you
are not sure whether you will receive a refund or owe additional taxes.  However, in prior years
you have typically received a refund of about $1,000 each year.  The issue is whether or not to
take the ambiguous deduction in the current year.  You may choose either Option A, to take the
deduction, or Option B, to not take the deduction.  If you choose Option A, you will either
increase your refund or reduce your additional tax owed by $400.  However, there is a 40%
chance that the IRS will subsequently disallow the deduction and you will be required to pay
$600 in penalties and interest.  In this event, your refund would decrease by $1,000 or your
additional tax owed amount would increase by $1,000, the $400 lost from the disallowed
deduction plus the $600 in penalties and interest.  If you choose Option B, you will not incur
any IRS penalties or interest, and thus will receive a smaller refund, or owe a larger amount of
additional tax, than if you did take the deduction.
PLEASE RESPOND TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS.
1. Which option (A or B) would you choose?  (Circle your choice.)
A: Provides a 60% chance of increasing the refund or reducing the additional tax owed
by $400, and a 40% chance of losing the deduction and incurring $600 in penalties
and interest.
B: Provides a 100% chance of not changing the current year refund or additional tax
owed amount.
2. How strongly do you feel about your choice in question #1?  (Circle the appropriate
number.)
1                              2                              3                              4                              5
  weakly moderately    strongly
3. Which option do you think the majority of taxpayers would choose in question #1?  (Circle
your choice.)
A or B
IF YOU CHOSE OPTION B FOR QUESTION #1, THEN ANSWER QUESTION #4 AND
SKIP QUESTION #5.
IF YOU CHOSE OPTION A FOR QUESTION #1, THEN SKIP QUESTION #4 AND
ANSWER QUESTION #5.
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4. Choosing Option B for question #1 suggests that you are not willing to accept an IRS
disallowance rate of 40%.  Would your response to this question be different if the IRS
disallowance rate were lower (e.g., Options X, Y, or Z below)?  (Circle your choice.)
Yes or No
If you answered no, go to the next page.  If you answered yes, choose the option (by
circling only one letter: X, Y, or Z) that best reflects the maximum IRS disallowance rate
that you would be willing to accept.  Note that the chance of receiving each amount is
stated in brackets below the dollar amount.
            X                Y      Z
Amount of Refund increase, or Tax Owed
decrease, if deduction is not disallowed . . . . .   $300  $200  $100
[Chance IRS will not disallow] . . . . . . . . . . .     [70%]         [80%]      [90%]
Amount of Refund (decrease), or Tax Owed
(increase), if deduction is disallowed . . . . . . .   ($700) ($800) ($900)
[IRS Disallowance Rate] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .     [30%]       [20%]      [10%]
PROCEED TO THE NEXT PAGE (without responding to question #5)
5. Choosing Option A for question #1 suggests that you are willing to accept an IRS
disallowance rate of 40%.  Would your response to this question be different if the IRS
disallowance rate were higher (e.g., Options M, N, or O below)?  (Circle your choice.)
Yes or No
If you answered no, go to the next page.  If you answered yes, choose the option (by
circling only one letter: M, N, or O) that best reflects the maximum IRS disallowance rate
that you would be willing to accept.  Note that the chance of receiving each refund amount
is stated in brackets below the dollar amount.
  M  N  O
Amount of Refund increase, or Tax Owed
decrease, if deduction is not disallowed . . . . . . .       $500         $600       $700
[Chance IRS will not disallow] . . . . . . . . . . . . .        [50%]        [40%]    [30%]
Amount of Refund (decrease), or Tax Owed
(increase), if deduction is disallowed . . . . . . . . .    ($500)    ($400)    ($300)
[IRS Disallowance Rate] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .        [50%]        [60%]    [70%]
PROCEED TO THE NEXT PAGE
155
Scenario #2
Assume that you have not yet completed a preliminary copy of your tax return.  Therefore, you
are not sure whether you will receive a refund or owe additional taxes.  However, in prior years
you have typically received a refund of about $600 each year.  The issue is whether or not to
take the ambiguous deduction in the current year.  You may choose either Option A, to take the
deduction, or Option B, to not take the deduction.  If you choose Option A, you will either
increase your refund or reduce your additional tax owed by $400.  However, there is a 40%
chance that the IRS will subsequently disallow the deduction and you will be required to pay
$600 in penalties and interest.  In this event, your refund would decrease by $1,000 or your
additional tax owed amount would increase by $1,000, the $400 lost from the disallowed
deduction plus the $600 in penalties and interest.  If you choose Option B, you will not incur
any IRS penalties or interest, and thus will receive a smaller refund, or owe a larger amount of
additional tax, than if you did take the deduction.
PLEASE RESPOND TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS.
1. Which option (A or B) would you choose?  (Circle your choice.)
A: Provides a 60% chance of increasing the refund or reducing the additional tax owed
by $400, and a 40% chance of losing the deduction and incurring $600 in penalties
and interest.
B: Provides a 100% chance of not changing the current year refund or additional tax
owed amount.
2. How strongly do you feel about your choice in question #1?  (Circle the appropriate
number.)
1                              2                              3                              4                              5
  weakly moderately    strongly
3. Which option do you think the majority of taxpayers would choose in question #1?  (Circle
your choice.)
A or B
IF YOU CHOSE OPTION B FOR QUESTION #1, THEN ANSWER QUESTION #4 AND
SKIP QUESTION #5.
IF YOU CHOSE OPTION A FOR QUESTION #1, THEN SKIP QUESTION #4 AND
ANSWER QUESTION #5.
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4. Choosing Option B for question #1 suggests that you are not willing to accept an IRS
disallowance rate of 40%.  Would your response to this question be different if the IRS
disallowance rate were lower (e.g., Options X, Y, or Z below)?  (Circle your choice.)
Yes or No
If you answered no, go to the next page.  If you answered yes, choose the option (by
circling only one letter: X, Y, or Z) that best reflects the maximum IRS disallowance rate
that you would be willing to accept.  Note that the chance of receiving each amount is
stated in brackets below the dollar amount.
            X                Y      Z
Amount of Refund increase, or Tax Owed
decrease, if deduction is not disallowed . . . . .   $300  $200  $100
[Chance IRS will not disallow] . . . . . . . . . . .     [70%]        [80%]        [90%]
Amount of Refund (decrease), or Tax Owed
(increase), if deduction is disallowed . . . . . . .   ($700) ($800) ($900)
[IRS Disallowance Rate] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .         [30%]        [20%]        [10%]
PROCEED TO THE NEXT PAGE (without responding to question #5)
5. Choosing Option A for question #1 suggests that you are willing to accept an IRS
disallowance rate of 40%.  Would your response to this question be different if the IRS
disallowance rate were higher (e.g., Options M, N, or O below)?  (Circle your choice.)
Yes or No
If you answered no, go to the next page.  If you answered yes, choose the option (by
circling only one letter: M, N, or O) that best reflects the maximum IRS disallowance rate
that you would be willing to accept.  Note that the chance of receiving each refund amount
is stated in brackets below the dollar amount.
  M  N  O
Amount of Refund increase, or Tax Owed
decrease, if deduction is not disallowed . . . . . . .       $500        $600         $700
[Chance IRS will not disallow] . . . . . . . . . . . . .        [50%]        [40%]    [30%]
Amount of Refund (decrease), or Tax Owed
(increase), if deduction is disallowed . . . . . . . . .      ($500)    ($400)    ($300)
[IRS Disallowance Rate] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .        [50%]        [60%]    [70%]
PROCEED TO THE NEXT PAGE
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HME.PY.B2
Case
Assume that you are preparing your federal income tax return for the current year and that you
are faced with the decision whether or not to claim an ambiguous deduction on your tax return.
The deduction is ambiguous because after reading authoritative sources such as Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) guidelines, you cannot determine whether or not the particular deduction
is allowed.  If you claim the deduction and the IRS subsequently disallows it, your tax liability
would increase, plus you would be charged a penalty plus interest.  However, it is not illegal to
take an ambiguous deduction and there would be no additional ramifications beyond paying the
penalty plus interest.
In this study, you are given 2 independent scenarios, each involving the decision whether or not
to include the ambiguous deduction on your tax return.  Please consider each choice in each
scenario independently and sequentially.  There are no correct or incorrect responses.
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Scenario #1
Assume that you have not yet completed a preliminary copy of your tax return.  Therefore, you
are not sure whether you will receive a refund or owe additional taxes.  However, in prior years
you have typically received a refund of about $1,000 each year.  The issue is whether or not to
take the ambiguous deduction in the current year.  You may choose either Option A, to take the
deduction, or Option B, to not take the deduction.  If you choose Option A, you will either
increase your refund or reduce your additional tax owed by $400.  However, there is a 40%
chance that the IRS will subsequently disallow the deduction and you will be required to pay
$600 in penalties and interest.  In this event, your refund would decrease by $1,000 or your
additional tax owed amount would increase by $1,000, the $400 lost from the disallowed
deduction plus the $600 in penalties and interest.  If you choose Option B, you will not incur
any IRS penalties or interest, and thus will receive a smaller refund, or owe a larger amount of
additional tax, than if you did take the deduction.
PLEASE RESPOND TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS.
1. Which option (A or B) would you choose?  (Circle your choice.)
A: Provides a 60% chance of increasing the refund or reducing the additional tax owed
by $400, and a 40% chance of losing the deduction and incurring $600 in penalties
and interest.
B: Provides a 100% chance of not changing the current year refund or additional tax
owed amount.
2. How strongly do you feel about your choice in question #1?  (Circle the appropriate
number.)
1                              2                              3                              4                              5
  weakly moderately    strongly
3. Which option do you think the majority of taxpayers would choose in question #1?  (Circle
your choice.)
A or B
IF YOU CHOSE OPTION B FOR QUESTION #1, THEN ANSWER QUESTION #4 AND
SKIP QUESTION #5.
IF YOU CHOSE OPTION A FOR QUESTION #1, THEN SKIP QUESTION #4 AND
ANSWER QUESTION #5.
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4. Choosing Option B for question #1 suggests that you are not willing to accept an IRS
disallowance rate of 40%.  Would your response to this question be different if the IRS
disallowance rate were lower (e.g., Options X, Y, or Z below)?  (Circle your choice.)
Yes or No
If you answered no, go to the next page.  If you answered yes, choose the option (by
circling only one letter: X, Y, or Z) that best reflects the maximum IRS disallowance rate
that you would be willing to accept.  Note that the chance of receiving each amount is
stated in brackets below the dollar amount.
            X                Y      Z
Amount of Refund increase, or Tax Owed
decrease, if deduction is not disallowed . . . . .   $300  $200  $100
[Chance IRS will not disallow] . . . . . . . . . . .        [70%]        [80%]        [90%]
Amount of Refund (decrease), or Tax Owed
(increase), if deduction is disallowed . . . . . . .   ($700) ($800) ($900)
[IRS Disallowance Rate] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .        [30%]        [20%]        [10%]
PROCEED TO THE NEXT PAGE (without responding to question #5)
5. Choosing Option A for question #1 suggests that you are willing to accept an IRS
disallowance rate of 40%.  Would your response to this question be different if the IRS
disallowance rate were higher (e.g., Options M, N, or O below)?  (Circle your choice.)
Yes or No
If you answered no, go to the next page.  If you answered yes, choose the option (by
circling only one letter: M, N, or O) that best reflects the maximum IRS disallowance rate
that you would be willing to accept.  Note that the chance of receiving each refund amount
is stated in brackets below the dollar amount.
  M  N  O
Amount of Refund increase, or Tax Owed
decrease, if deduction is not disallowed . . . . . .       $500         $600      $700    
[Chance IRS will not disallow] . . . . . . . . . . . .         [50%]        [40%]    [30%]
Amount of Refund (decrease), or Tax Owed
(increase), if deduction is disallowed . . . . . . . .         ($500)    ($400)    ($300)
[IRS Disallowance Rate] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .               [50%]       [60%]    [70%]
PROCEED TO THE NEXT PAGE
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Scenario #2
Assume that you have not yet completed a preliminary copy of your tax return.  Therefore, you
are not sure whether you will receive a refund or owe additional taxes.  However, in prior years
you have typically received a refund of about $600 each year.  The issue is whether or not to
take the ambiguous deduction in the current year.  You may choose either Option A, to take the
deduction, or Option B, to not take the deduction.  If you choose Option A, you will either
increase your refund or reduce your additional tax owed by $400.  However, there is a 40%
chance that the IRS will subsequently disallow the deduction and you will be required to pay
$600 in penalties and interest.  In this event, your refund would decrease by $1,000 or your
additional tax owed amount would increase by $1,000, the $400 lost from the disallowed
deduction plus the $600 in penalties and interest.  If you choose Option B, you will not incur
any IRS penalties or interest, and thus will receive a smaller refund, or owe a larger amount of
additional tax, than if you did take the deduction.
PLEASE RESPOND TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS.
1. Which option (A or B) would you choose?  (Circle your choice.)
A: Provides a 60% chance of increasing the refund or reducing the additional tax owed
by $400, and a 40% chance of losing the deduction and incurring $600 in penalties
and interest.
B: Provides a 100% chance of not changing the current year refund or additional tax
owed amount.
2. How strongly do you feel about your choice in question #1?  (Circle the appropriate
number.)
1                              2                              3                              4                              5
  weakly moderately    strongly
3. Which option do you think the majority of taxpayers would choose in question #1?  (Circle
your choice.)
A or B
IF YOU CHOSE OPTION B FOR QUESTION #1, THEN ANSWER QUESTION #4 AND
SKIP QUESTION #5.
IF YOU CHOSE OPTION A FOR QUESTION #1, THEN SKIP QUESTION #4 AND
ANSWER QUESTION #5.
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4. Choosing Option B for question #1 suggests that you are not willing to accept an IRS
disallowance rate of 40%.  Would your response to this question be different if the IRS
disallowance rate were lower (e.g., Options X, Y, or Z below)?  (Circle your choice.)
Yes or No
If you answered no, go to the next page.  If you answered yes, choose the option (by
circling only one letter: X, Y, or Z) that best reflects the maximum IRS disallowance rate
that you would be willing to accept.  Note that the chance of receiving each amount is
stated in brackets below the dollar amount.
            X                Y      Z
Amount of Refund increase, or Tax Owed
decrease, if deduction is not disallowed . . . . .    $300  $200  $100
[Chance IRS will not disallow] . . . . . . . . . . .    [70%]        [80%]        [90%]
Amount of Refund (decrease), or Tax Owed
(increase), if deduction is disallowed . . . . . . .   ($700) ($800) ($900)
[IRS Disallowance Rate] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .        [30%]        [20%]        [10%]
PROCEED TO THE NEXT PAGE (without responding to question #5)
5. Choosing Option A for question #1 suggests that you are willing to accept an IRS
disallowance rate of 40%.  Would your response to this question be different if the IRS
disallowance rate were higher (e.g., Options M, N, or O below)?  (Circle your choice.)
Yes or No
If you answered no, go to the next page.  If you answered yes, choose the option (by
circling only one letter: M, N, or O) that best reflects the maximum IRS disallowance rate
that you would be willing to accept.  Note that the chance of receiving each refund amount
is stated in brackets below the dollar amount.
  M  N  O
Amount of Refund increase, or Tax Owed
decrease, if deduction is not disallowed . . . . . .       $500        $600         $700
[Chance IRS will not disallow] . . . . . . . . . . . .        [50%]        [40%]    [30%]
Amount of Refund (decrease), or Tax Owed
(increase), if deduction is disallowed . . . . . . . . .       ($500)    ($400)    ($300)
[IRS Disallowance Rate] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .        [50%]        [60%]    [70%]
PROCEED TO THE NEXT PAGE
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BE.PY.A2
Case
Assume that you are preparing your federal income tax return for the current year and that you
are faced with the decision whether or not to claim an ambiguous deduction on your tax return.
The deduction is ambiguous because after reading authoritative sources such as Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) guidelines, you cannot determine whether or not the particular deduction
is allowed.  If you claim the deduction and the IRS subsequently disallows it, your tax liability
would increase, plus you would be charged a penalty plus interest.  However, it is not illegal to
take an ambiguous deduction and there would be no additional ramifications beyond paying the
penalty plus interest.
In this study, you are given 2 independent scenarios, each involving the decision whether or not
to include the ambiguous deduction on your tax return.  Please consider each choice in each
scenario independently and sequentially.  There are no correct or incorrect responses.
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Scenario #1
Assume that you have not yet completed a preliminary copy of your tax return.  Therefore, you
are not sure whether you will receive a refund or owe additional taxes.  However, in prior years
you have typically owed additional taxes of about $1,000 each year.  The issue is whether or
not to take the ambiguous deduction in the current year.  You may choose either Option A, to
take the deduction, or Option B, to not take the deduction.  If you choose Option A, you will
either increase your refund or reduce your additional tax owed by $400.  However, there is a
40% chance that the IRS will subsequently disallow the deduction and you will be required to
pay $600 in penalties and interest.  In this event, your refund would decrease by $1,000 or your
additional tax owed amount would increase by $1,000, the $400 lost from the disallowed
deduction plus the $600 in penalties and interest.  If you choose Option B, you will not incur
any IRS penalties or interest, and thus will receive a smaller refund, or owe a larger amount of
additional tax, than if you did take the deduction.
PLEASE RESPOND TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS.
1. Which option (A or B) would you choose?  (Circle your choice.)
A: Provides a 60% chance of increasing the refund or reducing the additional tax owed
by $400, and a 40% chance of losing the deduction and incurring $600 in penalties
and interest.
B: Provides a 100% chance of not changing the current year refund or additional tax
owed amount.
2. How strongly do you feel about your choice in question #1?  (Circle the appropriate
number.)
1                              2                              3                              4                              5
  weakly moderately    strongly
3. Which option do you think the majority of taxpayers would choose in question #1?  (Circle
your choice.)
A or B
IF YOU CHOSE OPTION B FOR QUESTION #1, THEN ANSWER QUESTION #4 AND
SKIP QUESTION #5.
IF YOU CHOSE OPTION A FOR QUESTION #1, THEN SKIP QUESTION #4 AND
ANSWER QUESTION #5.
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4. Choosing Option B for question #1 suggests that you are not willing to accept a
40% risk of losing $600 of a refund (or owing $600 more additional tax) in return for a
60% chance of increasing a refund (or decreasing additional tax owed) by $400.  Would
your response to this question be different if you were to risk a lower dollar amount (e.g.,
Options X, Y or Z below) in return for the potential of increasing a refund (or decreasing
additional tax owed) by a certain dollar amount?  (Circle your choice.)
Yes   or No
If you answered no, go to the next page.  If you answered yes, choose the option (by
circling only one letter: X, Y, or Z) that best reflects the maximum dollar amount that you
would be willing to risk.
    X           Y           Z
Amount of Refund increase, or Tax
Owed decrease, if deduction
is not disallowed [60% chance] . . . . . . . . . . .  $300  $200  $100
Amount of Refund (decrease), or Tax
Owed (increase), if deduction
is disallowed [40% chance] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ($450) ($300) ($150)
PROCEED TO THE NEXT PAGE (without responding to question #5)
5. Choosing Option A for question #1 suggests that you are willing to accept a 40% risk of
losing $600 of a refund (or owing $600 more additional tax) in return for a 60% chance of
increasing a refund (or decreasing additional tax owed) by $400.  Would your response to
this question be different if you were to risk a higher dollar amount (e.g., Options M or N
below) in return for the potential of increasing a refund (or decreasing additional tax owed)
by a certain dollar amount?  (Circle your choice.)
Yes or No
If you answered no, go to the next page.  If you answered yes, choose the option (by
circling only one letter: M or N) that best reflects the maximum dollar amount that you
would be willing to risk.
    M     N
Amount of Refund increase, or Tax
Owed decrease, if deduction
is not disallowed [60% chance] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $500 $600
Amount of Refund (decrease), or Tax
Owed (increase), if deduction
is disallowed [40% chance]  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ($750) ($900)
PROCEED TO THE NEXT PAGE
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Scenario #2
Assume that you have not yet completed a preliminary copy of your tax return.  Therefore, you
are not sure whether you will receive a refund or owe additional taxes.  However, in prior years
you have typically owed additional taxes of about $400 each year.  The issue is whether or not
to take the ambiguous deduction in the current year.  You may choose either Option A, to take
the deduction, or Option B, to not take the deduction.  If you choose Option A, you will either
increase your refund or reduce your additional tax owed by $400.  However, there is a 40%
chance that the IRS will subsequently disallow the deduction and you will be required to pay
$600 in penalties and interest.  In this event, your refund would decrease by $1,000 or your
additional tax owed amount would increase by $1,000, the $400 lost from the disallowed
deduction plus the $600 in penalties and interest.  If you choose Option B, you will not incur
any IRS penalties or interest, and thus will receive a smaller refund, or owe a larger amount of
additional tax, than if you did take the deduction.
PLEASE RESPOND TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS.
1. Which option (A or B) would you choose?  (Circle your choice.)
A: Provides a 60% chance of increasing the refund or reducing the additional tax owed
by $400, and a 40% chance of losing the deduction and incurring $600 in penalties
and interest.
B: Provides a 100% chance of not changing the current year refund or additional tax
owed amount.
2. How strongly do you feel about your choice in question #1?  (Circle the appropriate
number.)
1                              2                              3                              4                              5
  weakly moderately    strongly
3. Which option do you think the majority of taxpayers would choose in question #1?  (Circle
your choice.)
A or B
IF YOU CHOSE OPTION B FOR QUESTION #1, THEN ANSWER QUESTION #4 AND
SKIP QUESTION #5.
IF YOU CHOSE OPTION A FOR QUESTION #1, THEN SKIP QUESTION #4 AND
ANSWER QUESTION #5.
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4. Choosing Option B for question #1 suggests that you are not willing to accept a 40% risk
of losing $600 of a refund (or owing $600 more additional tax) in return for a 60% chance
of increasing a refund (or decreasing additional tax owed) by $400.  Would your response
to this question be different if you were to risk a lower dollar amount (e.g., Options X, Y or
Z below) in return for the potential of increasing a refund (or decreasing additional tax
owed) by a certain dollar amount?  (Circle your choice.)
Yes   or No
If you answered no, go to the next page.  If you answered yes, choose the option (by
circling only one letter: X, Y, or Z) that best reflects the maximum dollar amount that you
would be willing to risk.
    X           Y           Z
Amount of Refund increase, or Tax
Owed decrease, if deduction
is not disallowed [60% chance] . .  . . . . . . . . . . . $300  $200  $100
Amount of Refund (decrease), or Tax
Owed (increase), if deduction
is disallowed [40% chance] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ($450) ($300) ($150)
PROCEED TO THE NEXT PAGE (without responding to question #5)
5. Choosing Option A for question #1 suggests that you are willing to accept a 40% risk of
losing $600 of a refund (or owing $600 more additional tax) in return for a 60% chance of
increasing a refund (or decreasing additional tax owed) by $400.  Would your response to
this question be different if you were to risk a higher dollar amount (e.g., Options M or N
below) in return for the potential of increasing a refund (or decreasing additional tax owed)
by a certain dollar amount?  (Circle your choice.)
Yes or No
If you answered no, go to the next page.  If you answered yes, choose the option (by
circling only one letter: M or N) that best reflects the maximum dollar amount that you
would be willing to risk.
    M       N
Amount of Refund increase, or Tax
Owed decrease, if deduction
is not disallowed [60% chance] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $500  $600
Amount of Refund (decrease), or Tax
Owed (increase), if deduction
is disallowed [40% chance]  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ($750) ($900)
PROCEED TO THE NEXT PAGE
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Appendix F: Follow-up Demographic and Risk Perception Questionnaire
The following questions are designed to provide background information.  Please
respond to every question.  Remember, there is no right or wrong answer and all of
your responses will remain anonymous.
1. What is your age?                                            
2. What is your gender? (M or F)                                            
3. If you are not a full-time student, what is your
occupation?  If you are a full-time student,
please write full-time student.                                            
4. If you are not a full-time student, how long have
you worked in your current profession?                                            
5. If you are not a full-time student, how long
have you worked full-time?                                            
6. If you are not a full-time student, what is your
approximate current annual salary?                                            
7. What is the highest level of education that you have completed?
(Please check one of the following.)
High School Degree                       
Associate’s Degree                       
Baccalaureate Degree                       
Master’s Degree                       
None of the above (explain)                       
8. Approximately how many years have you filed a
federal income tax return?                                            
9. Approximately how many years have you filed a
federal income tax return using Form 1040?                                            
10. Which form do you expect to use when filing this year’s federal income tax return?
[Please circle one.]
a. Form 1040EZ
b. Form 1040A
c. Form 1040
d. I am not sure (explain).
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11. Ordinarily (circle one)
a.  You or your spouse prepares your federal income tax return.
b. You pay a professional tax practitioner to prepare your federal income tax
return.
c. You have someone prepare your federal income tax return for you as a favor.
12. Using the following scale, please rate your familiarity with federal tax law in
general.  (Circle the appropriate number.)
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Very    Neutral Very
Unfamiliar Familiar
13. Using the following scale, please rate your familiarity with federal tax laws that
affect you.  (Circle the appropriate number.)
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Very    Neutral Very
Unfamiliar Familiar
14. Using the following scale, please respond to the following statements about
yourself.  (Circle the appropriate number.)
a. Compared with other taxpayers in a situation similar to mine, I am more likely
to take risks when preparing my federal income tax return.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly    Neutral Strongly
Disagree Agree
b. I am more honest than most taxpayers when preparing my federal income tax
return.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly    Neutral Strongly
Disagree Agree
c. In general, I tend to avoid taking risks.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly    Neutral Strongly
Disagree Agree
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15. In general, what do you perceive is the percentage of income
tax returns filed with the IRS that are audited by the IRS?                       %
16. Using the following scale, please rate how much the potential of being audited by
the IRS makes you anxious when you prepare and/or file your federal income tax
returns?  (Circle the appropriate number.)
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Not    Significantly
Anxious Anxious
17. In general, what do you perceive is the probability (%) that the
IRS will disallow an ambiguous deduction?  (Recall that a deduction
is ambiguous when it is not clear whether or not it is allowed.)                       %
18. Typically, does your employer withhold federal income taxes
from your paycheck, or do you make estimated quarterly
federal income tax payments during the year, or both?                              
19. Did the new tax law passed by Congress in 2001
provide you with a larger or smaller tax liability
reduction than you expected?                               
20. Considering the new tax law passed by Congress in 2001,
and if you have computed your tax liability for 2002, is your
2002 tax liability larger or smaller than you expected?                              
21. It might take the IRS 3 years to disallow a deduction.
Did you know this?                       
If yes, did this fact influence your responses to the 2 scenarios?                       
If yes, how did it influence your responses?
[Note: please do not change your original responses.]
22. If you received a refund on your federal income tax return last year,
please answer these questions.  If not, go to the next question.
Do you need to receive a larger refund this year than
last year in order to feel like you received a gain
(i.e., a reward or a benefit)?                              
If you receive a refund amount this year less than the
refund amount received last year, would you feel
like you received a loss (i.e., a deficit or a shortfall)?                              
Would you view any refund amount this year as a gain
(i.e., a reward or a benefit)?                              
If your answer to each of these 3 questions is no,
please explain.
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23. If you owed additional tax on your federal income tax return last year,
please answer these questions.  If not, go to the next question.
If you owe additional tax again this year but at a lesser
amount than last year, would you feel like you received
a gain (i.e., a reward or a benefit)?                              
Would you view any amount of additional tax owed
this year as a loss (i.e., a deficit or a shortfall)?                              
If your answer to each of these 2 questions is no,
please explain.
24. When filing your federal income tax return, what is the most significant factor that
causes you to comply with the federal income tax laws?
25. Do you perceive the federal income tax system to be fair?
Why or why not?
26. When responding to question #1 for both scenario #1 and #2, did you focus more
on the initial refund amount or additional tax owed amount (either current year or
prior year), or on the potential $400 gain (increased refund or decreased additional
tax owed) and the potential $600 loss (decreased refund or increased additional
tax owed)?
[Note: please do not change your original responses.]
27. In the space provided, please list any major current year changes to your tax
situation that have occurred or you expect will occur.  (For example, did your
marital status change?  Did you take a second job causing your gross income to
be substantially higher than last year?  Etc.)
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Appendix G: Follow-up Pretest Questionnaire
Thank you for agreeing to review my Case Study and my Demographic Questionnaire.
Your feedback is greatly appreciated.
After you have answered the questions, first in the Case Study and then in the
Demographic Questionnaire, please take a few minutes to answer the questions on
this questionnaire.  If you need more space than is provided, please use the back of
the paper or an additional sheet of paper if necessary.  After answering the questions,
please give me any other comments that you feel are appropriate and helpful.  My
overall objective is to develop a Research Instrument that is valid and pertinent to
subjects.
1. Were the Case Study and Questionnaire easy to read and easy to understand?
2. Was the Case Study realistic?  If not, how could it be more realistic?
3. How long did it take for you to complete:
•  the Case Study?
•  the Demographic Questionnaire?
4. Do you think the Research Instrument is too long?
5. Did you consider prior years’ experience when completing the questions in the
case study?
6. Perhaps most importantly, do you think the dollar amounts in the Case Study will
be significant enough to be taken seriously by the participants completing this
case?
7. Please use the following space and the back of the page, if necessary, to make
any additional suggestions or comments.  Again, thank you for your help.
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Appendix H: Cover Letter Attached to the Front of Each Case
March, 2003
Dear Participant,
Researchers at Drexel University have selected you to participate in a study that
attempts to further our understanding of taxpayer behavior.  You have been selected
because you have tax filing experience and you represent a large segment of the
population.  In order for the researchers to properly understand taxpayer behavior, it is
important that you read the attached case carefully and provide candid responses.
The attached case will provide a set of facts and then ask a series of questions.
Reading the case and responding to the questions in both the case and the follow-up
questionnaire should take approximately 15 minutes.  Be assured that all of the
information you provide is strictly confidential, and no individuals will be identified.
Your answers will be combined with those of many others and used only for statistical
analysis.
As a token of the researchers’ appreciation, ten individuals participating in this study
will be randomly selected to receive a $50 cash prize.  To be eligible to receive the
prize, you must provide your e-mail address below, and you must completely respond
to those questions that apply to you.  Understand that your e-mail address will be
detached from the rest of this page and placed in a container.  Ten addresses will be
randomly drawn from the container.  After the results are gathered, an executive
summary reporting the findings of the study and a listing of the prizewinners will be
sent to all participants that provide their e-mail address.  Each winner will be requested
to personally pick up the cash prize.  If a winner cannot pick up the prize, other
arrangements will be made for its delivery.
There are no correct or incorrect answers to any question.  Further, once the e-mail
address below is removed from the rest of this page, the information provided by you
will become anonymous.  Please begin reading the case and answering the questions
now.  The instructor will collect your completed packet of information in about 15
minutes.
Thank you for your participation.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Your E-Mail Address: ___________________________________________________
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